230
C773t

Rev. Joseph Cook's Monday Lectures

THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS
LIBRARY
230
C773t

Quantz

TWELVE

MONDAY LECTURES

IN

TREMONT TEMPLE, BOSTON, U.S.,

THE LIBRARY OF THE
MAR 4 1932
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

ON

EMERSON'S VIEW OF IMMORTALITY.
THEODORE PARKER'S ABSOLUTE RELIGION.
THEODORE PARKER ON THE GUILT OF SIN (Two Lectures).
THEODORE PARKER ON THE PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE HERALD.
THEODORE PARKER ON THE PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE NATURE.
THEODORE PARKER ON ADORATION.
TRIUNITY AND TRITHEISM.
POPULAR AND SCHOLARLY THEOLOGY.
COMMUNION WITH GOD, AS PERSONAL.
THE TRINITY A PRACTICAL TRUTH.
THE TRINITY THE MARTYR'S FAITH.

BY REV. JOSEPH COOK.

SECOND EDITION.

BY PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR.

LONDON:
R. D. DICKINSON, FARRINGDON STREET, E.C.

1877.

230
C773t

4.3.32 Exch. West. Dub. U.L. London Jones 7532

EMERSON'S VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

As light fills and yet transcends the rainbow, so God fills and yet transcends all natural law. According to scientific Theism, we are equally sure of the Divine Immanency in all Nature, and of the Divine Transcendency beyond it. Pantheism, however, with immeasurably narrower horizons, asserts that natural law and God are one; and thus, at its best, it teaches but one-half the truth—namely, the Divine Immanency, and not the Divine Transcendency. Christian Theism, in the name of the Scientific Method, teaches both. While you are ready to admit that every pulsation of the colours even in the rainbow is light, you yet remember well that all the pulsations taken together do not constitute the whole of light. Solar radiance billows away to all points of the compass. Your bow is bent above only one quarter of the horizon. So scientific Theism supposes that the whole universe, or finite existence in its widest range, is filled by the Infinite Omnipresent Will, as the bow is filled with light, and this in such a sense that we may say that natural law is God, who was, who is, and who is to come. In the incontrovertible scientific certainty of the Divine Immanency, we may feel ourselves transfigured, as truly as any poetic Pantheist ever felt himself to be when lifted to his highest possible mount of vision. But, beyond all that, Christian Theism affirms that God, knowable, but unfathomable—incomprehensible, but not inapprehensible—billows away beyond all that we call infinities and eternities, as light beyond the rainbow. While He is in all finite mind and matter as light is in the colours seven, He is as different from finite mind and matter as is the noon from a narrow band of colour on the azure. Asserting the Divine Transcendency side by side with the Divine Immanency, religious science escapes on the one hand the self-contradictions and narrowness of Pantheism, and attains by the cold precision of exact research a plane of thought as much higher than that of materialism as the seventh heaven is loftier than the platform of the insect or the worm.

It would be very Emersonian to differ from Emerson. His mission, according to his own statement, is to unsettle all things. It is common to hear the acutest readers assert that his writings have no mental unity. The poet Lowell thinks that sometimes Emerson's paragraphs are arranged by being shuffled in manuscript; and the

806974

best British criticism* says "they are tossed out at random like the contents of a conjuror's hat." But is there no point of view from which the Emersonian sky

> "With cycles, and with epicycles
> Scribbled o'er,"

may be seen to have within it a comprehensible law? Before Hegel, Emerson's master, became obsolete or obsolescent in Germany, no doubt Emerson was a pantheist; but I cannot explain by any form of pantheism the later motions of some stars in his pure soft azure. You may prove that he is more poet than philosopher, more seer than poet, more mystic than seer; and yet the surety in the last analysis is that he is more Emerson than either. *Individualism held firmly, pantheism held waveringly*, are to me the explanation of the bewildering and yet gorgeous motions of the constellations in his sky. Mr. Frothingham acutely says that Mr. Emerson's place is among poetic, not among philosophic minds.† It is not Emersonian to wince under philosophical self-contradiction; but it is Emersonian to writhe under the remotest attempt to cast on individualism so much as the fetter of a shadow.

Loyalty to the Over-Soul is Emerson's supreme mood. Whether it lead to philosophic consistency or not is to his scheme of thought an empty question. Whatever shooting star streams at this instant across the inner sky of personal inspiration is to be observed, and its course mapped down, even if it move in a direction opposite to that of the last flaming track of light noted there. What if the map at last show a thousand tracks crossing each other? Are they not all Divine paths? Are they not to be all included and explained in a sufficiently wise philosophy? The point of departure of all the shooting stars in Emerson's sky is the constellation Leo. All his metaphysics he is ready to abandon at any moment if the loftier movements of the Soul as it exists in himself come into conflict with his philosophy. He utters whatever the Over-Soul seems to him to say, whether in harmony with previous deliverances or not. He is a pantheist, but not a consistent pantheist; he is an idealist, but not a consistent idealist; he is a religious mystic, but not a consistent mystic. *He is an individualist, mapping his own highest inner self—or, as he would say in pantheistic phrase, mapping God.* The Over-Soul comes to consciousness only in man. In the transfigured work of tracing on the page of literature all gleams of light in the Over-Soul in Emerson, he is consistent with himself, and in this only. A maker of maps of the

* Encyc. Brit., 1875, art. on American Literature.

† Transcendentalism in New England, 1876, p. 236.

paths of shooting stars is Emerson, and he is more devout than any astronomer intoxicated with the azure. Sit in the constellation Leo if you would understand the Emersonian sky.

A brilliant and learned volume by a reverend preacher of this city* contains the most luminous analytical proof that a pantheistic trend sets through Emerson's writings, as the gulf current through the Atlantic. But Emerson often proclaims his readiness to abandon pantheism itself if the Over-Soul seems to command him to do so. In the whole range of his often self-destructive apothegms I find no single sentence so descriptive of his position as a fixed individualist and a wavering pantheist as this:—

"In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity; yet, when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and colour. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat, in the hand of the harlot, and flee."†

Whoever would come to the point of view from which all Emerson's self-contradictions are reconciled must take his position upon the summit of individualism, and transfigure that height by the thought that there billows around it, what we call God in conscience, and what Emerson calls the Over-Soul. In the loftiest zones of human experience there are influences from a somewhat and someone that is in us, but not of us, and Emerson is so far pantheistic as to hold that this highest in man is not only a manifestation of God, but God and the only God. Therefore he is always in the mount. His supreme tenet is the primacy of mind in the universe, and I had almost said the identity of the human mind with the Divine mind. As the waves are many and yet one with the sea, so to pantheism finite minds and the events of the universe are many and yet one with God. As the green billows that dash at this moment on Boston Harbour Bar, and cap themselves with foam, are one with the Atlantic, so you, and I, and Shakespeare, and Charlemagne, and Cæsar, and the Seven Stars, and Orion, are but so many waves in the Divine All. The ages, like the soft hissing spray, may take this shape or that, but they all come from one sea. "There is," says Emerson, "one mind common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same."‡ "*The simplest person who in his integrity worships God, becomes God.*" Eight generations of clerical dissent are behind Emerson's unwavering reverence for the still small voice; one generation of now almost outgrown German thinkers is behind his wavering reverence for pantheism. Would he only assert,

---

* Rev. Dr. Manning, "Half Truths and the Truth," 1872.

† Emerson, "Essays," vol. i. p. 50.

‡ Essay on History.

side by side with the Divine Immanence, the Divine Transcendency, we might call him a Christian mystic, where now we can only call him a teacher of transfigured pantheistic individualism.

Pantheism denies the personal immortality of the soul. To pantheism death is the sinking of a wave back into the sea. We shall find, however, that Emerson, true to his central tenet of hallowed individualism, has again and again asserted the personal immortality of the soul, and never denied it in reality, though he has often done so in appearance.

When, in 1832, Mr. Emerson bade adieu to his parish in this city, he used, as on every occasion he is accustomed to use, memorable words. "I commend you," the last sentences of his letter to that parish read, "to the Divine Providence; may He multiply to your families and to your persons early genuine blessing; and whatever discipline may be appointed to you in this world, may the blessed hope of the resurrection, which He has planted in the constitution of the human soul, and confirmed and manifested by Jesus Christ, be made good to you beyond the grave. In this faith and hope I bid you farewell."*

These are wholly unambiguous words. You say that Emerson never has asserted, since 1832, the personal immortality of the soul; but what do you make of certain almost sacredly private statements of his to Frederika Bremer? That authoress, whose works Germany gathers up in thirty-four volumes, came out of the snows of Northern Europe, and one day found Mr. Emerson walking down the avenue of pines in front of his house, through the falling snow, to greet her. Day after day they conversed on the highest themes; months passed while Frederika Bremer was the guest of Boston; and toward the end of the lofty interchanges of thought between these two elect souls there occurred what Frederika Bremer calls a most serious season. One afternoon in Boston, with all the depth of her passionate and poetic temperament, she endeavoured to convince Emerson that God is not only in all natural law, but that he transcends it all; that He demands of us perfection, and that, therefore, as Kant used to say, we must expect personal immortality or opportunity to fulfil the demand; that religion is the marriage of the soul with God; and that the idea that God is objective to us, and that our souls may come into harmony with His, a Person meeting a person, is vastly superior, as an inspiration, to any pantheistic theory that all there is of God is what is revealed to us in the insignificant scope of our faculties. She endeavoured, in the name of lofty thought, to show the narrowness of

* Emerson, R. W. Letter dated Boston, December 22, 1832, quoted in Frothingham's Transcendentalism in New England, 1876, p. 235.

pantheism at its best. The interview was serious in the last degree, and Frederika Bremer says that Emerson closed it with these words: "I do not wish that people should pretend to know or believe more than they really do know and believe. The resurrection, the continuance of our being, is granted; we carry the pledge of this in our own breast. I maintain merely that we cannot say in what form or in what manner our existence will be continued.*

Transcendentalism in New England was marked by a bold assertion of the personal continuance of the soul after death. The Dial always assumed the fact of immortality. "The transcendentalist was an enthusiast on this article," Mr. Frothingham says; and Mr. Emerson's writings, he adds, were "redolent of the faith." Theodore Parker thought personal immortality is known to us by intuition, or as a self-evident truth, as surely as we know that a whole is greater than a part. It must be admitted that New England Transcendentalism caused in many parts of our nation a revival of interest and of faith in personal immortality.† Mr. Emerson was the leader of New England Transcendentalism.

But you say that since 1850 Emerson has changed his opinion; and yet, if you open the last Essay he has given to the world, that on "Immortality," you will read:—"Everything is prospective, and man is to live hereafter. That the world is for his education is the only sane solution of the enigma. . . . The implanting of a desire indicates that the gratification of that desire is in the constitution of the creature that feels it. . . . The Creator keeps His word with us. . . . All I have seen teaches me to trust the Creator for all I have not seen. Will you, with vast cost and pain, educate your children to produce a master-piece, and then shoot them down?" What do these phrases amount to taken in connection with the two earlier passages which I have cited, and which assuredly assert personal immortality? "All sound minds rest on a certain preliminary conviction—namely, that if it be best that *conscious personal life* shall continue, it will continue; if not best, then it will not; and we, if we saw the whole, should of course see that it was better so. . . . I admit that you shall find a good deal of scepticism in the street, and hotels, and places of coarse amusement. But that is only to say that the practical faculties are faster developed than the spiritual. Where there is depravity, there is a slaughter-house style of thinking. One argument of future life is the recoil of the mind in such company—our pain at every sceptical statement."

The "conscious personal" continuance of the soul, Emerson no more

* Emerson, Conversation with Frederika Bremer, "Homes of the New World," vol. i. p. 223.

† See Frothingham, Transcendentalism, pp. 195-198.

than Goethe denies. In this very essay, however, we must expect to find apparent self-contradiction, and accordingly we can read here these sentences, written from the point of view of a wavering Pantheism: "Jesus never preaches the personal immortality. . . . I confess that everything connected with our personality fails. The moral and intellectual reality to which we aspire is immortal, and we only through that."

Allow me on this occasion to contrast arguments with *ipse dixits*, and to use only the considerations which are implied in Emerson's teachings on immortality. You will be your own judges whether the conclusion that there is a personal existence after death must follow from his premises. I shall, of course, unbraid the reasoning and show its strands, but its braided form is Emerson's axiom: "The Creator keeps His word with us." The argument is old; and, for that reason, probably, Emerson values it. It has borne the tooth of time and the buffetings of acutest controversy age after age. In our century it stands firmer than ever, because we know now through the microscope, better than before, that there is that behind living tissues which blind mechanical laws cannot explain.

1. An organic or constitutional instinct is an impulse or propensity existing prior to experience and independent of instruction.

This definition is a very fundamental one; and is substantially Paley's.*

2. The expectation of existence after death is an organic or constitutional instinct.

3. The existence of this instinct in man is as demonstratable as the existence of the constitutional instincts of admiration for the beautiful, or of curiosity as to the relations of cause and effect.

What automatic action is you know; and an instinct is based upon the automatic action of the nervous mechanism. Who doubts that certain postures in anger, certain attitudes in fear, certain others in reverence, certain others in surprise, are instinctive? These postures are taken up by us without reflection on our part; they are organic in origin. It is instinct for us to rest when we are fatigued, and to take the recumbent position; and we do not reason about this. The babe does it. Instinctive actions appear early in the progress of life, and are substantially the same in all men and in all times. An educated impulse does not appear early, and is not the same among all men in all times. Of course it would avail nothing if I were to prove that the belief in immortality has come to us from education. If that belief result from an organic instinct, however—if it be constitutional—then it means much, and more than much.

---

* Nat. Theol., ch. 18.

4. The dulness of these instincts in a few low races or in poorly-developed individuals does not disprove the proposition that admiration for the beautiful and curiosity as to the relations of cause and effect are constitutional in man.

5. So the occasional feebleness of the expectation of existence after death does not show that it is not an organic or constitutional instinct.

6. This instinct appears in the natural operations of conscience, which anticipates personal punishment or reward in an existence beyond death.

You desire incisive proof that we have a constitutional anticipation of something beyond the veil; but can you look into Shakespeare's mirror of the inner man and not see case after case of the action of that constitutional expectation? Shakespeare's delineations are philosophically as unpartisan and as exact as those of a mirror. Is it not the immemorial proverb of all great poetry, as well as of all profound philosophy, that there is something that makes cowards of us all as we draw near to death, and that this something is not physical pain, but a somewhat behind the veil? Death would have little terror if its pains were physical and intellectual only. There is an instinctive action of the moral sense by which we anticipate that there are events to come after death, and that these will concern us most closely.

Archbishop Butler, in his famous sermons on Conscience, has no more incisive passage than that in which he declares that "Conscience, unless forcibly stopped, magisterially exerts itself, and always goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and confirm its own." This prophetic action of conscience I call the chief proof that man has an instinctive expectation of existence after death. We are so made that we touch somewhat behind the veil. As an insect throws out its antennæ, and by their sensitive fibres touches what is near it, so the human soul throws out the vast arms of conscience to touch eternity, and Somewhat, not ourselves, in the spaces beyond this life. All there is in literature, all there is in heathen sacrifice, continued age after age, to propitiate the powers beyond death—all there is in the persistency of human endeavour, grotesque and cruel at times, to secure the peace of the soul behind the veil—are proclamations of this prophetic action of conscience; yet conscience itself is only one thread in the web o the pervasive organic instinct which anticipates existence after death.

7. This instinct appears in a sense of obligation to meet the requirements of an infinitely perfect moral law. We know that the moral law is perfect, and therefore that the Moral Lawgiver is perfect. But the moral law demands our perfection. "Therefore," said Immanuel Kant, "the moral law contains in it a postulate of immortality." Its

requirement is a part of our constitution, and cannot be met in this stage of existence. It is not met here, and therefore the moral law requires us to believe in an existence after death. That is Kant's very celebrated proof; but I am pointing to it only as one thread in this organic web which we call instinctive anticipation of existence after death. Put your Shakespeare on the fear of what is behind the veil, side by side with your Kant on this anticipation of the time when we can approximate to perfection, and you will find these broad-shouldered men in the name of both poetry and philosophy, affirming, as the postulate of organic instinct in man, that existence after death is a reality.

8. It appears in the universality of the belief in existence after death. All widely-extended beliefs result much more from organic instinct than from tradition.

9. It appears in the human delight in permanence.

10. It appears in the unoccupied capacities of man in his present state of being.

11. It appears in the convictions natural to the highest moods of the soul.

> "There shine through all our earthly dresse,
> Bright shootes of everlastingnesse."

12. It appears in the longing for personal immortality characteristic of all high states of culture.

13. It appears conspicuously in Paganism itself, in the persistence of all the ages of the world, in the efforts to propitiate Supreme powers, and to secure the peace of the soul beyond the grave.

How is the force of any impulse to be measured unless by the work it will do? What work has not this desire of man, to be sure that all will be well with him beyond the veil, not done? What force has maintained the bloody sacrifices of the heathen world through all the dolorous ages of the career of Paganism on the planet? What force has given intensity to the inquiries of philosophy as to immortality? What has been the inspiration of the loftiest literature in every nation and in all time, whenever it has spoken of avenging Deities that will see that all is made right at last? How are we to explain the persistency of every age in the attempt to propitiate the powers beyond the veil, and to secure the peace of the soul after death, if not by this impulse arising organically and existing as a part of the human constitution?

14. Nature makes no half hinges. God does not create a desire to mock it. The universe is not unskilfully made. There are no dissonances in the Divine works. Our constitutional instincts raise no

false expectations. Conscience tells no Munchausen tales. The structure of the human constitution is not an organised lie. "The Creator keeps His word with us."

15. But if there is no existence after death, conscience does tell Munchausen tales; man is bunglingly made; his constitution raises false expectations; his structure is an organized lie.

Our age has many in it who wander as lost babes in the woods, not asking whether there is any way out of uncertainties on the highest of all themes, and in suppressed sadness beyond that of tears. Small philosophers are great characters in democratic centuries when every man thinks for himself; but lost babes are greater. There is a feeling that we can know nothing of what we most desire to know. I hold first of all to the truth that man may know, not everything, but enough for practical purposes. If I have a Father in heaven, if I am created by an intelligent and benevolent Being, then it is worth while to ask the way out of these woods. I will not be a questionless lost babe, for I believe there is a way, and that, although we may not know the map of all the forest, we can find the path home.

There are four stages of culture, and they are all represented to-day in every highly civilised quarter of the globe. There is the first stage, in which we usually think we know everything. Then comes the second stage, in which, as our knowledge grows, we are confronted with so many questions which we can ask and cannot answer, that we say, in our sophmorical, despairing mood, that we can know nothing. A little above that we say we can know something, but only what is just before our senses. Then, lastly, we come to the stage in which we say, not that we can know everything; not that we can know much, indeed; but in which we are sure we can know enough for practical purposes.

Everything, nothing, something, enough! There are the infantine, adolescent, juvenile, and mature stages of culture.

16. But so far as human observation extends, we know inductively that there is no exception to the law that every constitutional instinct has its correlate to match it.

17. Wherever we find a wing, we find air to match it; a fin, water to match it; an eye, light to match it; an ear, sound to match it; perception of the beautiful, beauty to match it; reasoning power, cause and effect to match it; and so through all the myriads of known cases.

18. From our possession of a constitutional or organic instinct by which we expect existence after death, we must therefore infer the fact of such existence, as the migrating bird might infer the existence of a South from its instinct of migration.

19. This inference proceeds strictly upon the scientific principle of the universality of law.

20. It everywhere implies, not the absorption of the soul into the mass of general being, but its personal continuance.

Your poet, William Cullen Byrant, once sat in the sweet country side, and heard the bugle of the wild migrating swan as the bird passed over him southward in the twilight. Looking up into the assenting azure, this seer uttered reposefully the deepest words of his philosophy:—

"Whither, midst falling dew,
While glow the heavens with the last steps of day,
Far through their rosy depths dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way?

"There is a Power whose care
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast,
The desert and illimitable air,
Lone wandering, but not lost.

"He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright."

THEODORE PARKER'S ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

When Daniel Webster was asked how he obtained his clear ideas, he replied: "By attention to definitions." Dr. Johnson, whose business it was to explain words, was once riding on a rural road in Scotland, and as he paused to water his horse at a wayside spring, he was requested by a woman of advanced age to tell her how he, the great Dr. Johnson, author of a renowned dictionary, could possibly have defined the word *pastern* the *knee* of a horse. "Ignorance, madam," was the reply; "pure ignorance." For one, if I am forced to make a confession as to my personal difficulties with Orthodoxy of the scholarly type, I must use, as perhaps many another student might, both Webster's and Johnson's phrases as the outlines of the story. Before I attended to definitions I had difficulties. After I attended to them in the spirit of the scientific method, my own serious account to myself of the origin of my perplexities was in most cases given in Johnson's words—"Ignorance; pure ignorance."

Theodore Parker's chief intellectural fault was inadequate attention to definitions. As a consequence, his caricatures or misconceptions of Christian truth were many and ghastly. I cannot discuss them all; but, in addition to his failure to distinguish between *intuition* and *instinct*, and between *inspiration* and *illumination*, it must be said, in continuance of the list of his chief errors, he did not carefully distinguish from each other *inspiration* and *dictation*.

When Benjamin Franklin was a young man, one of his hungriest desires was to acquire a perfect style of writing; and as he admired Addison more than any other author, he was accustomed to take an essay of *The Spectator* and make very full notes of all its thoughts, images, sentiments, and of some few of the phrases. He then would place his manuscript in his drawer, wait several weeks, or until he had forgotten the language of the original, and then would take his memoranda and write out an essay, including every idea, every pulse of emotion, every flash of imagination, that he had transferred from Addison to his notes. Then he would compare his work with the original, and humiliate himself by the contrast of his own uncouth rhetorical garment with Addison's perfect robe of flowing silk. He studied how to improve his crabbed, cold, or obscure phrases by the light of Addison's noon of luminousness and imaginative and moral

heat. Now Franklin's essay was, you would say in such a case, not *dictated* by Addison, but was *inspired* by Addison.

Plainly, there is a difference between inspiration and dictation. Orthodoxy believes the Bible to be inspired, and her definition of inspiration is the gift of infallibility in teaching moral and religious truth. But by *inspiration*, thus defined, Orthodoxy does not mean *dictation*. She means that the Bible is as full of God as Franklin's echoed essay was of Addison. As in his essay there were both an Addisonian and a Franklinian element, so, speaking roundly, there are in the Bible a divine and a human element. But the former is swallowed up in the latter even more completely than the Franklinian was in the Addisonian. All the thought in Franklin's essay is, by supposition, Addison's, and some of the phrases are his; but Franklin's words are there. All the moral and religious thought of the Bible is, according to the definition of inspiration, divine, and so are some of the phrases; but human words are there.

The chief proof, after all, that the Bible is good food is the eating of it. The healing efficacy of a medicine when it is used is the demonstration that it is good. Now, the world has been eating the Bible as it never ate any other book, and the Bible has been saturating the veins of the ages as they were never saturated by the food derived from any other volume; but there is no spiritual disease that you can point to that is the outcome of biblical inculcation. We all feel sure that it would be better than well for the world if all the precepts of this volume were absorbed and transmuted into the actions of men. *The astounding fact is that the Bible is the only book in the world that will bear full and permanent translation into life.* The careless and superficial sometimes do not distinguish from each other the biblical record and the biblical inculcation. I know that fearful things are recorded in the Bible concerning men who, in some respects, were approved of God; but it is the biblical inculcation which I pronounce free from adulterate elements, not the biblical record. Of course, in a mirror held up before the human heart, there will be reflected blotches; but the inculcation of the Scriptures, from the beginning to the end of the sixty-six pamphlets, is known by experience to be free from adulterate elements, and I defy the world to show any disease that ever has come from the absorption into the veins of the ages of the biblical inculcation. And, moreover, I defy the ages to show any other book that could be absorbed thus in its inculcations and not produce dizziness of the head, pimples on the skin, staggering at last, and the sowing of dragons' teeth.

There is something very peculiar about this one book, in the incontrovertible fact that its inculcations are preserved from such error as

would work out, in experience, moral disease in the world. Plato taught such doctrines that, if the world had followed him as it has the Bible, and had absorbed not his account of men's vices, but his positive inculcation, we to-day should be living in barracks, and we could not know who are our brothers and who are our sisters.* There was in Plato, you say, inspiration. Very well; his inculcation under what you call inspiration and I call illumination would, as every scholar knows, have turned this fat world into a pasturage-ground for the intellectual and powerful on the one side; but the poor, on the other side, it would have ground down into the position of unaspiring and hopeless hewers of wood and drawers of water. And, worse than that, it would have quenched the divinest spark in natural religion—family life.

Dictation and plenary inspiration are not the same. I avoid technical terms here; but you must allow me, since Theodore Parker so often spoke against the plenary inspiration of the Bible, to say that by plenary inspiration Orthodoxy does not mean verbal inspiration. Franklin's essay was plenarily, but not always verbally, inspired by Addison. If the Bible is written by dictation or verbal inspiration, as Theodore Parker often taught that Orthodox scholarship supposes that it is, even then it would not be at all clear that any translation of the Bible is verbally inspired. If anything was dictated, of course only the original was dictated.

In places I believe we have in the Bible absolute dictation; and yet inspiration and dictation are two things, and the difference between them is worth pointing out when Orthodoxy is held responsible for a caricature of her definition, and when men are thrown into unrest on this point, as if they were called on to believe self-contradiction. The fact that all portions of the Bible are inspired does not imply at all that King James's version, or the German, or the French, or the Hindustanee, or any other, is dictated by the Holy Ghost. Even these versions, however, are full of God, as Franklin's essay was of Addison, and fuller. *They, too, will bear translation into life.* Sometimes, as in the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount, and in transfigured Psalm and Prophecy, it well may be that we have in the original words which came not by the will of man.

There are three degrees of inspiration, and the distinctions between them are not manufactured by me, here and now, to meet the exigency of this discussion. They are as old as John Locke. It is commonplace in religious science to speak of the inspiration of superintendence, as in Acts or Chronicles; the inspiration of elevation, as in the Psalms; and the inspiration of suggestion, as in the

* Grote's Plato, The Republic; social laws.

prophecies. The historical books of the Scriptures have been so superintended that they are winnowed completely of error in moral inculcation. But the inspiration of superintendence is the lowest degree of inspiration. We come to the great Psalms, which assuredly have no equals in literature, and which are palpably rained out of a higher sky than unassisted human genius has dropped its productions from. These Psalms, we say, are examples of the inspiration of elevation. But we have a yet higher range of the action of inspiration in passages like the distinct predictions that the Jews should be scattered among all nations, and nevertheless preserved as a separate people, as they have been; or that Jerusalem should be destroyed, as it was; or that there should come a Supreme Teacher of the race, as he has come. We find in the biblical record unmistakably prophetic passages; and these are the seals of the inspiration of suggestion, for they could have been written only by suggestion. Infidelity never yet has made it clear that the Old Testament predictions concerning the Jews have not been fulfilled. Rationalism, in Germany, whenever it takes up that topic, drops it like hot iron. "What is a short proof of inspiration?" said Frederic the Great to his chaplain. "The Jews, your majesty," was the answer. If there be in the Bible a single passage that is plainly prophetic, there is in that passage a very peculiar proof of its own divine origin. We have our Lord pointing out the prophecies concerning himself, and he makes it a reason why we should turn to the Old Testament, that they are they which testify of him. Now, if there be some passages of the Bible that contain these prophetic announcements, then the Teacher thus announced is divinely attested, and we are to listen to him.

If, however, we stand simply on the amazing fact of the moral and religious winnowedness of Scripture, we have also a divine attestation. That winnowedness is providential. What God does, he means to do. He has done this for the Bible; he has kept it free from moral and religious error in its inculcations; he has done that for no other book; and what he has done, he from the first intended to do. Therefore, the very fact of the winnowedness of the Bible is proof of a divine superintendence over it.

Superintendence, elevation, suggestion, are different degrees of inspiration, which is of one kind. But inspiration and illumination, according to established definitions, differ in kind, and not merely in degree; for inspiration, as a term in religious science—I am not talking of popular literature—always carries with it the idea of winnowedness as to moral and religious truth.

There is nothing in the intuitive ranges of truth that comes into collision with biblical inculcation; but there is no other sacred book on the globe

which those same ranges of axiomatic moral truth do not pierce through and through in more places than ever knight's sword went through an opponent's shield. A few brilliants plucked out of much mire are the texts sometimes cited to us from the sacred literature of India, China, Arabia, Greece, and Rome. I defy those who seem to be dazzled by these fragments to read before any mixed company of cultivated men and women the complete inculcations of the Vedas, Shasters, and the Koran. Those books have been absorbed into the veins of nations, and we know what diseases have been the result. *They must be tried by the stern test which the Bible endures—that is, by intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism.* All the sacred literatures of the world come into collision with the intuitions of conscience, or with the dictates of long experience, except that one strange volume, coming from a remoter antiquity than any other sacred book, and read to-day in two hundred languages of the globe, and kept so pure, in spite of all the tempests of time that have swept through its sky, that above the highest heavens opened to us by genius, and beyond all our latest and loftiest ideals, the biblical azure spreads out as noon risen on mid-noon.

Theodore Parker was not careful enough to distinguish between inspiration and revelation. By revelation I mean all self-manifestation of God in his words and his works both. Inspiration is his self-manifestation in the Scriptures alone. Allow me to assert, face to face with the learning of this audience, in the presence of which I speak with sincere deference, that Christianity would stand on the basis of revelation—that is, on the self-manifestation of God in his works, including the facts of the New Testament history—even if the doctrine of inspiration were all thrown to the winds. You have been taught too often by rationalism that Christianity stands or falls on the truth of the doctrine of inspiration; whereas, the nature and the degree of inspiration are questions between Christians themselves. Christianity as a redemptive system might stand on the great facts of the New Testament if they were known as historic only, and the New Testament literature were not inspired at all. Religion based on axiomatic moral truth would stand on revelation thus defined, even if inspiration were given up as a dream.

Will you remember that the configuration of New England is the same at midnight and at noon? It is my fortune to be a flying scout, or a kind of outlook committee for my learned brethren here, and I carry a guide-book to this delicious nook of the round world. But what if I should lose that volume? Would not the Merrimack continue to be the most industrious river within your borders, the Connecticut the most majestic, the White Hills and the Green Mountains the most stately of your elevations? Would there be any

gleaming shore on your coast, where the Atlantic surge plays through the reeds, that would change its outline at all by day or by night, because of the loss of my guide-book? Would not north and south, east and west, be just the same? *Inspiration gives us a guide-book. It does not create the landscape.* Our human reason, compared with inspiration, is as starlight contrasted with the sunlight; but the landscape of our relations to God is just the same whether it be illumined or left in obscurity. We might trace out by starlight much of the map. The sun of inspiration arises, and we know the Merrimack and Connecticut as never before; but the sun did not create the Merrimack or the Connecticut. On all our shores the orb of day shows to the eye the distinction between rock and wave; but it does not create that distinction, which we not dimly knew before by the noises in the dark and by the wrecks!

There is a soul, there is a God; and, since law is universal, there must be conditions of harmony between the soul and God. *Since the soul is made on a plan, there must be natural conditions of its peace, both with itself and with God; and these conditions are not altered by being revealed.* Newton did not make the law of gravitation by discovering it—did he? The Bible does not create, it reveals the nature of things. As long as it remains true that there is a best way to live, it will be best to live the best way; and religion is very evidently safe, whether the Bible stands or falls.

Theodore Parker did not carefully distinguish from each other the supernatural and the unnatural.

There are three kinds of natural laws: physical, organic, and moral. It is very important to distinguish these three from each other, for penalty under the one class of laws does not always carry with it penalty under the others. A pirate may enjoy good health, and yet lose his desire to be holy, and thus be blessed under the organic, but cursed under the moral natural laws. A Christian, if he is thrown into the sea, will sink in spite of his being a saint; that is, he will be condemned under the physical law of gravitation, although blessed under the moral. We are stupid creatures; and so we ask, naturally, whether those on whom the Tower of Siloam fell were sinners above all others? Were those who perished in the Ashtabula horror sinners above all others? A sweet singer—one whose words of melody will, I hope, for some centuries yet prolong his usefulness on this and every other continent—may have been rapt away to heaven in a bliss which his own best poems express only as the spark expresses the noon; but there was somewhere and somehow a violation of physical law, and the penalty was paid. While that penalty was in process of execution, the bliss of obedience to

the moral law may have been descending also; and thus, out of the fire, and the ice, and the jaws of unimaginable physical agony, this man may have been caught up into eternal peace.

The distinction between the physical, organic, and moral natural laws, however, is not as important as that between the higher and the lower natural laws. Do you not admit that gravitation, a physical law, is lower than the organic force that builds animal and vegetable tissues? In the growth of the elms on the Boston Mall yonder, is not gravitation seized upon by some power superior to itself, and is not matter made to act as gravitation does not wish?

Is it not a common assertion of science that chemical forces are counteracted by the organic forces which build up living tissues? Has not my will power to counteract the law of gravitation? A higher may anywhere counteract a lower natural law. Scientific Theism does not admit that all there is of God is in natural law. He transcends Nature. Therefore he may reach down into it, as I, with the force of my will, reach into the law of gravitation. *If he counteracts Nature, his action is supernatural, but it is not unnatural.*

Mr. Furness, of Philadelphia, says that a marvellous character, such as our Lord was, must be expected to do marvellous works. We know that when men are illumed by the poetic trance they have capacities that no other mood gives them. There are lofty zones in human experience, and when we are in them we can do much which we do in none of our lower zones. What if a man should appear filled with a life that leaves him in constant communication with God? What if there should come with existence a stainless soul? What if it should remain stainless? What if there should appear in history a being in this sense above Nature? Is it not to be expected that he will have power over Nature, and perform works above Nature? Endowed as the Author of Christianity was, we should naturally expect from that supernatural endowment works not unnatural, but supernatural.

Theodore Parker said the resurrection has "no evidence in its favour." De Wette, whose book he translated, said, in his latest volume, that the fact of the resurrection, although a mystery that cannot be dissipated hangs over the way and manner of it, cannot be brought into doubt, any more than the assassination of Cæsar.

Theodore Parker, in his middle life, stood vigorously for the propositions which he reached at the Divinity School at Cambridge and in West Roxbury. He was attacked too early. He says himself that he had not completed his system of thought. But he was attacked vigorously, and, with the spirit of his grandfather, who led the first charge on the British troops, he stood up and vehemently

defended himself. But that early attack caused some of his crudities to crystallize speedily. He was afterwards too much absorbed in vast philanthropic enterprises to be an exact philosopher in metaphysics or ethics. He never made himself quite clear in these sciences, or even in the latest biblical research. His own master, De Wette, went far beyond him, and admitted, in the face of German scholarship, that the resurrection can be proved to be an historic certitude. Theodore Parker, although De Wette did not make that admission till 1846, lived ten years longer, and never made it.

Attacked early, and defending his unformed opinions vigorously, Parker's scheme of thought crystallized in its crude condition. *Theodore Parker's Absolute Religion is not a Boston, but a West Roxbury creed.* It is the speculation of a very young man besides.

Theodore Parker seemed to understand little of the distinction between belief and faith.

He never misconceived orthodoxy more monstrously than when he said: "It is this false theology, with its vicarious atonement, *salvation without morality or piety, only by belief in absurd doctrines*, which has bewitched the leading nations of the earth with such practical mischief."* Is that orthodoxy? I shall undertake to call it a caricature. It is omnipresent in Parker's works. Whether it was a dishonest representation I care not to determine. My general feeling is that Theodore Parker was honest. He rarely came into companionship with orthodox scholars of the first rank. When he did he seemed to be pleased and softened, and was in many respects another man. Attacked, he always stood up with the spirit of the early martyr of Lexington under his waistcoat.

What is saving faith? What is the difference between belief and faith? I venture much, but I shall be corrected swiftly here if I am wrong. Saving faith, rightly defined is—1. A conviction of the intellect that God, or God in Christ, is; and, 2. An affectionate choice of the heart that God, or God in Christ, should be both our Saviour and our Lord.

The first half of this definition is belief. The whole is faith. All of it without the last two words would be merely religiosity, and not religion. There is nothing in that definition which teaches that a man is saved by opinion, irrespective of character. Belief is assent. Faith is consent to God as both Saviour and Lord.

On April 19th, 1775, a rider on a horse flecked with blood and foam brought to the city of Worcester the news of the battle of Lexington, in which Theodore Parker's grandfather captured the first

---

* Weiss, "Life of Theodore Parker," vol. ii. p. 497.

British gun. The horse fell dead on the main street of the city, and, on another steed, the rider passed westward with his news. Some of those who heard the intelligence were loyal, and some were disloyal. They all heard that there had been a victory of the American troops over the British, and they all believed the report. Now, was there any political virtue or vice in the belief by the Tory in Worcester that there had been a victory over the British? Was there any political virtue or vice in the belief by the patriot yonder that there had been a victory over the British? Neither the one nor the other. Where, then, did the political virtue or political vice come in? Why, when your Tory at Worcester heard of the victory, he believed the report and was sorry, and was so sorry that he took up arms against his own people. When the patriot heard the report, he believed it and was glad, and was so glad that he took up arms and put himself side by side with the stalwart shoulders of Parker's grandfather. In that attitude of the heart lay the political virtue or political vice. Just so, in the government of the universe, we all hear that God is our Saviour and Lord; and we all believe this, and so do all the devils, and tremble. Is there any virtue or vice in that belief, taken alone? None whatever. But some of us believe this and are sorry. We turn aside; and, although we have assent, we have no consent to God, and we take up arms against the fact that he is our Saviour and Lord. Others of us believe this, and by Divine grace are glad. We have assent and consent both. We come into the mood of total, affectionate, irreversible self-surrender to God, not merely as a Saviour, but also as Lord. When we are in that mood of rejoicing loyalty to God we have saving faith, and never till then. How can salvation be obtained by assent alone—that is, by opinion merely? What is salvation? It is permanent deliverance from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin. Accepting God gladly as Saviour, we are delivered from the guilt of sin; and, accepting him gladly as Lord, we are delivered from the love of sin. Only when we accept God as both Saviour and Lord are we loyal. Only when we are affectionately glad to take him as both are we or can we be at peace. When we believe the news that he is Saviour and Lord, and are glad, and so glad as to face the foe, we are in safety.

THEODORE PARKER ON THE GUILT OF SIN.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

Keep, my friends, the hush of what Hegel calls the highest act of the human spirit, prayer, while we ask whether there is such a thing in man as enmity of the heart against God. Theodore Parker said there is not. When the unclean in thought and life, a dissipated man, comes into the presence of a pure and queenly woman, he understands his leprosy, perhaps for the first time, simply because it is brought into contrast with that virtue of which Milton said:

> "So dear to Heaven is saintly Chastity,
> That when a soul is found sincerely so,
> Ten thousand liveried angels lackey her,
> And in clear dream and solemn vision
> Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear."

It is only when a hush produced by the sense of the Divine Omnipresence fills the chambers of philosophy that they are fit places in which to discuss the fact of sin. Not always in Paris has that condition been fulfilled; not always at Berlin or London; not always in Boston. Our ears are too gross to hear the innermost truths of conscience until we feel the breath of eternity on our cheeks. But what a man sees only in his best moments as truth is truth in all moments. As now there falls a hushed sense of the Unseen Holy upon this city of scholarship, it is a fit time to raise the question whether sin is a self-evident fact in human experience. Theodore Parker affirmed that it is not.

James Freeman Clarke, when Theodore Parker was in Italy, in 1859, went into the pulpit of the latter, and was so faithful, both to science and to friendship, as to criticise Parker's scheme of thought for not adequately recognizing the significance of the fact of sin. In reply to that criticism, there came to Mr. Clarke from Italy a letter, which he gave to Theodore Parker's biographer, who has given it to the world. It is a painful duty of mine to-day to cite this latest and frankest expression of Theodore Parker's views. In his youth Parker had written: "I think no sin can make an indelible mark on what I call the soul. I think sin makes little mark on the soul; for much of it is to be referred to causes exterior even to the physical man, and much to the man's organization. Ninety-nine hundredths of sin are thus explicable. I am sure that sin, the result of man's circumstances or of his organization, can make no permanent mark on the soul."*

---

* Weiss's "Life of Parker," vol. i. p. 149.

Were these not the crude opinions of a beginner in philosophy? Did he hold these opinions through life? Substantially. From his death-bed, Theodore Parker wrote from Italy, in 1860, to James Freeman Clarke:

"Many thanks for standing in my pulpit and preaching about me and mine. All the more thanks for the criticisms. Of course, I don't *agree* with your criticisms. If I had, I should not have given you occasion to make them.

* * * * * * * *

"Now a word about *sin*. It is a theological word, and is commonly pronounced *ngsin-n-n-n*. But I think the thing which ministers mean by *ngsin-n-n-n* has no more existence than *phlogiston*, which was once adopted to explain combustion. I find *sins—i.e., conscious violations of natural right;* but no *sin—i.e.*, no conscious and intentional preference of wrong (as such) to right (as such)—no condition of 'enmity against God.' I seldom use the word sin; it is damaged phraseology, tainted by contact with infamous notions of man and God. I have some sermons of *sin* and of *sins*, which I may live long enough to prepare for printing, but also may not.

"Deacon Wryface, of the Hellfire Church, says: 'Oh! I am a great sinner. I am one mass of sin all over. The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. In me there dwelleth no good thing. There is no health in me.' 'Well,' *you* say to him, 'for once, Deacon, I think you pretty near right; but you are not yet quite so bad as you talk. What *are* the special sins you do commit?'

"'Oh! *there ain't any.* I hain't got a bad habit in the world; no, not one.'

"'Then what did you mean by saying just now that you were such a sinner?'

"'Oh! I referred to my *natur'*. It is all *ngsin-n-n-n.*'

"That is the short of it. All men are created equal in *ngsin-n-n-n.*

"Oh, James! I think the Christian (!) doctrine of sin is the Devil's own; and I hate it—hate it bitterly. Orthodox scholars say: 'In the heathen classics you find no consciousness of sin.' It is very true. God be thanked for it!

* * * * * * * * *

"I would rather have a good, plump, hearty heathen like Aristotle, or Demosthenes, or Fabius Maximus, than all the saints from Peter, James, and John (*dokountes stuloi einai* ['who seemed to be pillars'] down to the last one manufactured by the Roman Church. I mean as those creatures are represented in art. For the actual men I have a reasonable respect. They had some force in them, while the statues even of Paul represent him 'as mean as a *yaller* dog.' But let *ngsin-n-n-n* go."—(*Ibid*, p. 151).

That is an amazing letter. The tone of it is unworthy of a cultured man, and is astounding in a dying man. Never would such words have been chosen by Channing, never by Emerson, and never by Parker himself, if there had been behind his phrases a calm, scientific conviction that on this majestic theme he was philosophically right. There is in that letter an irritability, I had almost said a vulgarity, of tone, proceeding not from Theodore Parker's better nature, but largely, I think, from his fear that his positions as to sin would not bear the test of scientific criticism, and yet could not be

wholly given up without giving up the very Malakoff and Redan of his Absolute Religion.

Why, if you should adopt as an established truth the proposition that there is not to be found in man any intentional preference of wrong to right, or no enmity against God, and if you should carefully expurgate literature by that rule, how would Shakespeare look? There is no such thing as preference of wrong to right, Theodore Parker says. If there were to be produced an edition of Shakespeare according to this principle, how much would be left of the naturalness of that mirror of humanity? We now have character after character in Shakespeare represented as making evil a delight, and as knowing the right and approving it, and as abhorring the wrong and yet pursuing it. Your Shakespeare edited after the Parker principle—that there never is in man a preference of wrong to right—would be a limp, boneless, flaccid, lavender thing. You would scorn to call such a Shakespeare a fair mirror of human life. You would find such an expurgated edition plentifully misleading in the study of man's nature. In the case supposed, you could not admit that Shakespeare is the prince of philosophers, as well as the prince of poets, and that he becomes both the one and the other simply by holding up his mirror to all that is.

Were you to expurgate the laws of the civil governments of the world according to Parker's rule, where would justice be? Ask the gentlemen who every day stand in courts of justice, and administer in God's name the eternal law of right, and they will tell you that the expurgation of our courts by the principle that there is no intentional preference of wrong to right would reduce legal equity to moral chaos, and that everything in law proceeds upon the supposition that man does choose the wrong when he knows it to be wrong.

Where would philosophy be if it were expurgated by the Parkerian principle? We have in the last twenty-five years studied more deeply than ever before the subjective experiences of the human heart in the moral region. It is coming now to be one of the highest offices of philosophy to explore the deepest inmost of conscience, and to reveal to man the extent of that disturbance which must arise in his nature when he loves what God hates, and hates what God loves. It is now the highest office of philosophy to show man not only that he has conscience, but that conscience has him.

I affirm that, as men who love clear ideas, we do not want either philosophy or law or literature expurgated according to Parker's principle. But do you want theology expurgated by it? Do you want this delicate little shoot you call religious science shut away from the healthy winds of criticism? Is it to be kept behind the walls of

some colossal authority, and not allowed to battle its way to its full size in all the tempests that strike it out of the north, south, east, or west? How is religious science ever to become a stalwart oak, throwing out its boughs in every direction, vigorously and graciously, and in no fear of tempests, unless it contend with all the shocks of criticism that beat on philosophy, and law, and literature? Religious Science must take her chances according to the law of the survival of the fittest. I maintain that, if you will not expurgate literature, law, and your philosophy according to the principle that a man never has enmity against God, you must not expurgate your theology according to that principle. We must not play fast and loose with the scientific tests of truth.

Having already shown that Theodore Parker did not carefully distinguish intuition from instinct, or inspiration from illumination, or inspiration from dictation, or the supernatural from the unnatural, or belief from faith, I must further affirm that—

He made no adequate distinction between human infirmity and human iniquity.

What are the chief points established by self-evident truths as to the fact of sin?

1. Good is what ought to be.
2. Evil is what ought not to be.
3. Conscience intuitively perceives the difference between what ought to be and what ought not to be in the soul's choices among motives.

These are standard definitions, and apprehensible, I hope. Remember that I do not say that conscience knows what ought to be in any matter of expediency outside of the soul. Strictly speaking, there is no right or wrong in external action, taken wholly apart from its motives. There is in such action only expediency or inexpediency. There may be physical evil outside the field of motives; but moral evil is to be found only in the acts of choice. Conscience intuitively perceives motives to be either good or bad. Here stands on one side of the will a motive, and on the other is another motive; and, looking on what we mean to do, we decide whether we will do the best we know, or not. Right and wrong in motives are pointed out by conscience, and not in merely external action.

There is in conscience the power of tasting motives, just as in the tongue there is the power of tasting flavours. I know by the tongue whether a given fruit is bitter or sweet. No doubt we bring up the pomegranate to the lips by the hands; no doubt we look at the pomegranate; no doubt we smell the pomegranate; but only by the tongue do we taste it. So, no doubt, the intellect is concerned in

bringing up considerations before the inner tribunal; but, after all, the moral character of our motives is tasted by a special power which we call conscience. This perceives intuitively the difference between a good motive and a bad. But the good motive is one which conscience not only pronounces right, but one which conscience says *ought* to rule the will. Two things are thus pointed out by conscience in motives—rightness and oughtness. The former is perceived intuitively; the latter is perceived and felt both. The *oughtness* is a mysterious, powerful constraint cast upon us by some force outside of ourselves, and operating through all our instincts. I am willing to define conscience as *that which perceives and feels rightness and oughtness in motives.*

You cannot go behind that rightness and oughtness which conscience points out. Why is this fruit bitter to the human taste? Why is this other sweet? We are so made that the tongue tastes here bitterness, and there sweetness, and you cannot go behind that ultimate fact. You are so made that if you do what you know has behind it a wrong intention, there is a constraint brought upon you. You have violated the supreme law of things in the universe. You are in dissonance with your own nature, and there springs up in you, under the inflexible law of conscience, a sense of guilt.

4. Conscience reveals, therefore, a moral law.

5. That law is above the human will, and acts without, and even against, the consent of the will.

6. There cannot be a thought without a being who thinks; nor a law without a being who wills; nor a moral law without a moral lawgiver.

There must have been the thought of the right and of the good before there could have been a law promulgated in the universe supporting the right and the good. That thought of the right and the good, which must have gone before the law, could have existed only in a thinker. The choice of that thinker to promulgate a law eternally supporting the right and the good could have proceeded only from a righteous thinker. There cannot be a law without a being who wills, for law is only the method of the operation of a will. That is Darwin, if you please. That is not Haeckel, nor Huxley; but it is Charles Darwin and ninety-five out of a hundred of all the foremost men of physical science. It is the great Butler, too, and Julius Müller; and none the worse for that. There cannot be a moral law without a moral lawgiver.

7. When, therefore, the will chooses to act from a motive which conscience pronounces evil, that act of the will is disobedience—not to abstract law only, but to God.

8. Thus evil becomes sin.

I have defined evil as that which ought not to be, or as that which is condemned by the moral law revealed by conscience. Sin is disobedience to the moral law considered as the revelation of a personal lawgiver. Sin is a choice of wrong motives. Personal disloyalty to the Infinite Oughtness—that is sin. All agree to this latter definition; but the somewhat which I call the Infinite Oughtness is to all men who think clearly not merely a somewhat, but a some one.

Let us now proceed cautiously, step by step, and convince ourselves that on this theme much may be placed beyond controversy by a simple statement of the acknowledged laws of the operation of conscience.

9. It is incontrovertible that man often hears a still, small voice within him saying, "I ought."

Does anybody deny this? I wish to be very elementary, and to carry the assent of your minds point by point, and I forewarn you here and now that immense consequences hang on your admission of these fundamental, simple principles. Be on your guard. Do you deny that sometimes we all hear a still, small voice within us saying, "I ought"? If a man is conscious of any great defect in his organization—intellectual, moral, or physical—he does not blame himself for it; but the instant a man violates a command of conscience, uttered in this whispered "I ought," he blames himself.

I may have limitations of my faculties, such that I never can amount to much; but I do not blame myself. But the instant I do what conscience pronounces *wrong*, that moment I know that I am to blame. That is human nature, and Edmund Burke used to say: "I cannot alter the constitution of man." It is in every sane man to say "I ought."

10. It is incontrovertible that man often answers the voice which says "I ought," by saying "I will not."

You doubt that? Is it not a fact certified to you by any narrative of your own experience that you have multitudes of times replied to this still, small voice "I ought" by a soft or vehement "I will not"?

11. It is incontrovertible that instantly and invariably after saying to "I ought" "I will not," a man must say "I am not at peace with myself."

12. It is incontrovertible that he must say also: "I am not in fellowship with the nature of things."

Why, this is only tautology. If a man has a powerful faculty within him that says one thing, and another powerful faculty which says another thing, there is within him civil war. Peace ends. He recognises the condition of the republic of his faculties by his wails of

unrest. He knows that the disturbance of his nature resulted from his saying "I will not" to the still, small voice "I ought."

13. It is incontrovertible also that he must say also: "I have lost fellowship with God."

What is there in sin more mysterious than the sense which always comes with it that the stars in their courses fight against us when we do not say "I will" in response to "I ought"? There is in the inner heavens a voice saying "Thou shalt," "Thou oughtest," and we reply to that celestial summons "I will not," and instantly out of the inner heavens falls on us a thunderbolt. It is by irreversible natural law that every man who says "I will not," when the inner voice says "I ought," falls into dissonance with himself, and into a feeling that the stars in their courses fight against him. There is nowhere a heart given at all to sensitive self-study that does not understand perfectly how the sun behind the sun may be put out by saying "I will not" to the still, small voice which says "I ought." *God causes the natural sun to rise on both the just and the unjust; but not the sun behind the sun.* We are so made that the only light of our inner sky is peace with ourselves. In the nature of things, the sun behind the sun comes not, and cannot come forth for us from the east, if we say "I will not" when conscience says "I ought." The simple refusal to follow that still, small voice leaves a drought in the soul, for it dries up the sweetest rains from the sky behind the sky. It is terrific, scientific, penetratingly human truth that the sun behind the sun does not rise equally upon the just and the unjust; and that the rains from the sky behind the sky do not fall, never have fallen, and, in the nature of things, never will or can fall, in this world or the next, equally upon the righteous and the unrighteous.

14. It is incontrovertible that he who is disloyal to the voice which says "I ought," must also say: "I ought to satisfy the injured majesty of the law I have violated." Sin creates an obligation to satisfy the injured majesty of the moral law.*

15. It is incontrovertible that, in the absence of expiation, man forbodes punishment.

That sounds like a theological and biblical proposition. It is simply an ethical and purely scientific one. It is what is taught everywhere in Shakespeare and the Greek poets. It is what is illustrated by all the history of pagan sacrifices since the world began. If we are to estimate the strength of any human impulse by the work it will do, then this perception that sin creates an obligation to satisfy the injured majesty of the moral law must be presumed to have behind it a most

---

* Julius Müller, "Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. pp. 1-200.

powerful force. Again and again, age after age, it has shown itself to be stronger than love or death. There is nothing clearer than that a man is so made that, after he has been disloyal, after he has looked into the face of God and said "I will not," he feels that this act has created an obligation, which must in some way be discharged, to satisfy the majesty and the moral right of the moral law.

It is not a pleasant thing to say that that is the way a man is made; but that *is* the way he is made. A liberal theology is one that looks at all the facts. "Instead of fashioning with great labour a theory that would account for all the facts, Theodore Parker," his biographer, Mr. Weiss, says, "overcame doubt by a humane and tender optimism."*

There must be a philosophy that will account for all the facts of human nature, if we are ever to have a religious science; for, whether you will or not think boldly, north, south, east, and west, men by-and-bye will do so, and they will look into all these astounding certainties of human nature. When a man says "I ought," and then says "I will not," he must say "I am not at peace with myself;" "I am dropped out of fellowship with the nature of things;" "I am not in fellowship with God;" "The stars fight against me;" "Nature is against me;" "I ought, I ought to render satisfaction." That is the way Nature acts. Shakespeare was philosopher enough to make one of his characters say, when one complained that he was a man whom fortune had most cruelly scratched, that it was "too late to pare her nails now," and that "Fortune is a worthy lady, and will not have knaves prosper long in her kingdom." Even Shakespeare speaks of a "primrose path to the eternal bonfire," and of "the flowery path that leads to the broad gate and the great fire."

Too late! Probably Shakespeare meant something by that phrase, and knew what he meant. For one, I think he meant that it is possible for a man to fall into a final permanency of character, hating what God loves, and loving what God hates.

16. It is incontrovertible that, even after a man disloyal to conscience has reformed, he has behind him an irreversible record of sin in the past.

It will always remain true that he has been a deserter; and, therefore, conscience will always leave him at far lower heights than those of peace, if he be not sure that some power beyond his own has satisfied the moral law.

17. It is incontrovertible that when man is free from the love of sin he is not free from constitutional apprehension as to the effect of the guilt of past sin on his personal future in this world and the next.

---

* Life of Parker, vol. i. p. 150.

18. It is incontrovertible that the desire to be sure that the guilt of sin will be overlooked is one of the most powerful forces in human nature.

19. It is incontrovertible that an Atonement may thus in the solitudes of conscience be scientifically known to be the desire of all nations—that is, of all who have fallen into that disturbance of the moral nature which is called sin.

20. The atonement which Reason can prove is needed, Revelation declares has been made.

I do not affirm that by reason I can prove the fact of the Atonement. I believe, as assuredly as that I exist, that by reason I can prove our need of the Atonement. I do not assert the sufficiency of natural religion. I assert merely its efficiency. I believe that Julius Müller, building on the same axiomatic truths which Parker relied upon, and forming his system with entire freedom, and at last finding it correspondent with Christian truth, has been far more loyal to the scientific method than he who asserted that there is in man no enmity against God. That an Atonement has been made you must learn from Revelation. That an Atonement is needed you can learn from human reason.

Old man and blind, Michael Angelo, in the Vatican, used to stand before the Torso, the famous fragment of a statue, made, possibly, by one of the most skilled chisels of antiquity, and, with his fingers upon the mutilated lines, he would tell his pupils how the entire figure must have been formed when it was whole. He would trace out the fragmentary plan, and say that the head must have had this posture and the limbs that posture, and that the complete work could have been only what the fragments indicated. Religious science, with the dim torch of reason, and not illuminated by revelation, is a blind Michael Angelo, standing before Torso of the religious universe, and feeling blindly along fragmentary lines. Although the head of this statue is infinitely beyond our touch or sight in the infinities and the eternities above us, and although its feet stand on adamant, lower than thought can reach with its plummet, we do know, in the name of the universality of law, that the lines we touch in our blindness in natural religion would, if completed according to the plan which is tangible to us, be revealed religion, and nothing less.

THEODORE PARKER ON THE GUILT OF SIN.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

When Charles IX. of France was importuned to kill Coligny, he for a long time refused to do so publicly, or secretly; but at last he gave way, and consented in these memorable words: "Assassinate Admiral Coligny, but leave not a Huguenot alive in France to reproach me." So came the massacre of St. Bartholomew. When the soul resolves to assassinate some holy motive; when the spirit determines to kill, in the inner realm, Admiral Coligny, it, too, delays for a while, and, when it gives way, usually says: "Assassinate this accuser of mine; but leave not an accusing accomplice of his in all my kingdom alive to reproach me." So comes the massacre of the desire to be holy.

Emerson quotes the Welch Triad as saying: "God himself cannot procure good for the wicked." Julius Müller, Dorner, Rothe, Schleiermacher, no less than Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, assert that, in the nature of things, there *can* be no blessedness without holiness. Confucius said: "Heaven means principle." But what if a soul permanently loses principle? *Si vis fugere a Deo, fuge ad Deum*, is the Latin proverb. If you wish to flee from God, flee to him. The soul cannot escape from God; and can two walk together unless they are agreed? Surely, there are a few certainties in religion, or several points clear to exact ethical science in relation to the natural conditions of the peace of the soul.

It is plainly possible that a man may lose not all subsidiary, but all predominant, desire to be holy.

If he does lose that, it remains scientifically certain that even omnipotence and omniscience cannot force upon such a character blessedness. There can be no blessedness without holiness; and there can be no holiness without a supreme love of what God loves, and a supreme hate of what God hates. It is possible that a man may so disarrange his nature as to fall into a permanent loss of the predominant desire to be holy.

Theodore Parker, as his biographers admit, must be called a great reader, rather than a great scholar. But De Wette, his German master, although most of his works have ceased to be authorities in biblical research, ought to have prevented Theodore Parker from asserting that the Founder of Christianity did not teach that there may be a permanent loss of a predominant desire to be holy. Theodore Parker himself ought to have prevented himself from that assertion. In his earlier career he held that our Lord did teach a

possibility of the lapse of some for ever and for ever from the supreme love of what God loves, and the supreme hate of what God hates. He thought that the New Testament, properly interpreted, does contain in it a statement that it is possible for a man to lose permanently the predominant desire to be holy, and this was one of Parker's reasons for rejecting the authority of the New Testament. But toward the end of his career he tried to persuade Frances Power Cobbe that the Founder of Christianity did not teach that any will be lost. Parker's writings are self-contradictory on this supreme topic, most of the real difficulties of which he skipped.

It is the wisdom of all science, however, never to skip difficulties. In addition to the other chief errors of Parker's theology already mentioned, it is important to notice that—

He failed to distinguish properly between arbitrary penalties and natural wages of sin.

I know how widely intellectual unrest on the topic I am now introducing fills minds that never have been much troubled by Theodore Parker. I know that many conscientious and learned persons have asked themselves the question the disciples once asked our Lord: "Are there few that be saved?" He answered that inquiry very distinctly: "Yes, there are few." Does science answer in the same way?

It would not follow, even if you were to take our Lord's answer as supreme authority, as I do, that this universe is a failure. All ages to come are to be kept in view—all other worlds. Our Lord's word referred to our present evil generation; and, if you ask the central question in the best modern form, you must answer it in his way. How many, in the present state of our earth, love predominantly what God loves, and hate predominantly what God hates? How many have acquired predominant similarity of feeling with God? Only those who have, can be at peace in his presence, either here or hereafter. That is as certain as any deduction from our intuitions concerning the nature of things. As sure as that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time in the same sense, so sure is it that a man cannot be at peace with God when he loves what he hates and hates what he loves. There must be harmony or dissonance between them. Dissonance is its own punishment. Dissimilarity of feeling with God carries with it immense wages in the nature of things. In the name of science, ask: Are there few that have acquired a predominant love of what God loves, and a predominant hate of what God hates? We must answer, in the name of science, that broad is the way and wide is the gate which, in our evil generation, leads to dissimilarity of feeling with God, and many there be who go in thereat; but straight

is the way and narrow is the gate which leads to similarity of feeling with God, and few are they in our time that find it. But there are other worlds; there are other ages. "Save yourselves from this untoward generation." Who knows that in the final summing up the number of the lost may be greater than that of the saved? Or, as Lyman Beecher used to say in this city, "Greater than the number of our criminals in penal institutions is in contrast with the whole of the population." But I talk of the galaxies, I talk of the infinities, and of the eternities, and not merely of this world, in which you and I are to work out our deliverance from the love of sin and the guilt of sin, and have reason to do so with fear and trembling.

I ask no man to take my opinions. You are requested to notice whether discussion is clear; not whether it is orthodox. Let us put aside all ecclesiastical and denominational tests. This Lectureship has for its purpose simply the discussion of the clear, the true, the new, and the strategic in the relations between science and religion.

What are some of the more important natural laws which enable us to estimate scientifically the possible extent of the natural penalties of sin?

1. Under irreversible natural law sin produces judicial blindness. Kill Admiral Coligny, drive out the Huguenots, permit the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and you have made a new France. Carlyle says that it pleased France to slit her own veins and let out the best blood she had; and that she did this on the night of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and that after that she was historically another creature. Having killed Coligny, you cannot look his friends in the face. You kill them, and your kingdom is a new one. When a man sins against light, there comes upon him an unwillingness to look into the accusing illumination, and the consequence is that he turns away from it. But that effect itself becomes a cause. Keep your eyes upon your Shakespeare, upon your Greek poets, or upon whatever is a good mirror of human nature, and tell me whether these six propositions are not all scientifically demonstrable:—

1. Truth possessed, but not obeyed, becomes unwelcome.

2. It is, therefore, shut out of the voluntary activities of memory and reflection, as it gives pain.

3. The passions it should check grow, therefore, stronger.

4. The moral emotions it should feed grow weaker.

5. An ill-balanced state of the soul thus arises, and tends to become habitual.

6. That ill-balanced state renders the soul blind to the truths most needed to rectify its condition.

"On the temperate man," said Aristotle,* "are attendant, perhaps

* "Rhetoric," Bohn's edition, p. 70.

forthwith, by motion of his temperance, good opinions, and appetites as to pleasures; but on the intemperate the opposite."

A man sins against light boldly. To the divine "I ought," he answers "I will not;" to the divine "Thou shalt," or "Thou oughtest," he replies "I will not." The consequence instantly is, that he ceases to be at peace with himself; and light, instead of becoming a blessing, is to him an accusation. The slant javelin of truth, that was intended to penetrate him with rapture, fills him now with torture. If we give ourselves to an exact study of the soul's pains and pleasures, there is in man no greater bliss than conscience can afford, and no greater pain than it can inflict. In this stage of existence the highest bliss comes from the similarity of feeling with God, and the highest pain from dissimilarity of feeling with him. The greatest pains and pleasures, therefore, are set over against our greatest duties; and so God's desire that we should agree with him is shown by our living under the points of all these penalties and blisses. But light having become an accuser, man turns away from it. Then the virtues which that light ought to quicken are allowed to languish. The vices which that light ought to repress grow more vigorous. Repeated acts of sin result in a continued state of dissimilarity of feeling with God. That state is an effect; but it becomes a cause. According to New England theology, sin exists only in acts of choice; but the newest school of that theology need have no war with the oldest, for the former recognises, as fully as the latter can, that the state of dissimilarity of feeling with God is the source of the evil acts of choice.

That state of the dispositions is the copious fountain of sin, and as such is properly called depravity.

This state, continuing, becomes a habit; then that habit, continuing long, becomes chronic; and so the result is an ill-balanced growth of the character.

When I hung my hammock up last summer on the shores of Lake George, I noticed that the trees nearest the light at the edge of the forest had larger branches than those in the interior of the wood; and the same tree would throw out a long branch toward the light, and a short one toward obscurity in the interior of the forest. Just so a man grows toward the light to which he turns. According to the direction in which he turns with his supreme affection he grows; and as he grows he balances; and, under the irreversible natural law of moral gravitation—as fixed as scientific a certainty in the universe as the law of physical gravitation—as he balances so he falls; and, according to science, after a tree has fallen under that law, the prostrate trunk continues to be under the law, and, therefore, as it falls so

it lies. Under moral gravitation, no less, surely, than under physical, every free object that falls out of the skies strikes on its heavier side.

They showed me at Amherst, the other day, a meteorite that dropped out of the azure, and it struck—on which side? Of course, on its heavier. As the stream runs, so it wears its channel; as it wears its channel, so it runs.

All the mythologies of the globe recognize this fearful law of judicial blindness.

Go yonder into Greenland with Dr. Ranke, and you will find a story among the men of the lonely North to the effect that if a sorcerer will make a stirrup out of a strip of sealskin, and wind it around his limbs, three times about his heart, and thrice about his neck, and seven times about his forehead, and then knot it before his eyes, that sorcerer, when the lamps are put out at night, may rise into space and fly whithersoever his leading passion dictates. So we put ourselves into the stirrup of predominant love of what God hates, and predominant hate of what God loves, and we coil the strands about our souls. They are thrice wound about our heart, three times around our neck, seven times around our foreheads, and knotted before our eyes. If the poor savages yonder, where the stars look down four months in the year without interruption, are right in their sublime theory as to the solemnities of the universe, we, too, when the lamps are out, shall rise into the Unseen Holy, and fly whithersoever our leading passion dictates.

Greenland says that hunters once went out and found a revolving mountain, and that, attempting to cross the chasm between it and the firm land, some of these men were crushed as the mountain revolved. But they finally noticed that the gnarled, wheeling mass had a red side and a white side. They waited till the white side came opposite them, and then, ascending the mountain, found that a king lived on its summit, made themselves loyal to him, surrendered themselves to him affectionately and irreversibly, and afterwards found themselves able to go and come safely. But the mountain had a red side, and it turned and turned, and there was no safety on it except on the white side, and in loyalty to the king at the summit in the clouds. That mythology of the North, lately read for us by scholars, has in it eternal verity and a kind of solemnity like that of the long shining of the Arctic stars, and the tumbling icebergs, and the peaceable gurgle of the slow-heaving Polar Ocean, far gleaming under the boreal lights of the midnight Arctic sun. Stunted, you think, the men of that zone? Why, on the banks of the Charles, yonder, your Longfellow, taking

up a German poet, finds the same idea in far less sublime and subtle imagery, and translates it for its majesty and truth :—

"The mills of God grind slowly;
But they grind exceeding small."

To me, there is in Macbeth nothing so terrible as Lady Macbeth's invocation of the spirits which produce moral callousness in the soul. There is no passage in that sublime treatise on conscience which we call Macbeth, so sublime to me as this, on the law of judicial blindness:

"The raven himself is hoarse
That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
Under my battlements. Come, you spirits
"Unsex me here;
And fill me, from the crown to the toe, top-full
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood!
Stop up the access and passage to remorse!
"Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell!
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor Heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry 'Hold! 'Hold!'"

That invocation is likely to be uttered by every soul which has said "I will not" to the divine "I ought." It is as sure to be answered as natural law is to be irreversible. Macbeth himself, in a similar mood, says:

"Come, seeling night,
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day;
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
Which keeps me pale! Light thickens; and the crow
Makes wing to the rooky wood."

Have you ever offered in the rooky wood of sorcerous temptation a prayer for blindness? *In the nature of things every sin against light draws blood on the spiritual retina.*

You say that after death you are to have more illumination; and that, therefore, you will reform beyond the grave! How do you know that you will see greater illumination, even if you are in the presence of it? How do you know that you will love it, even if you do see it? There can be no blessedness without holiness; there can be no holiness without a free, affectionate acknowledgment of God as King, or a supreme love of what he loves, and hate of what he hates. Are you likely to obtain these soon under the law of judicial blindness? You will have what you like; but do you like the light? You have more and more illumination now, as the years pass. Do you see it? Do

you love it? There are two questions about this greater light beyond the grave. First—Will you see it? Second—Will you like it? Unless you have authority in the name of science for answering both these questions in the affirmative, you have no right in the name of science to rely on a mere possibility, on a guess, and take your leap into the Unseen, depending on a riddle. I, for one, will not do this for myself; and I will not teach others to do so.

Shakespeare has not left us in doubt at all on this theme; for in another place he says:

> "But when we in our viciousness
> Grow hard, the wise gods seal our eyes,
> In our own slime drop our clear judgments,
> Make us adore our errors, and thus
> We strut to our destruction."

Carlyle quotes out of the Koran a story of the dwellers by the Dead Sea, to whom Moses was sent. They sniffed and sneered at Moses; saw no comeliness in Moses; and so he withdrew. But Nature and her rigorous veracities did not withdraw. When next we find the dwellers by the Dead Sea, they, according to the Koran, are all changed into apes. "By not using their souls, they lost them." "And now," continues Carlyle, "their only employment is to sit there and look out into the smokiest, dreariest, most undecipherable sort of universe. Only once in seven days they do remember that they once had souls. Hast thou never, O traveller! fallen in with parties of this tribe? Methinks they have grown somewhat numerous in our day."

The old Greek proverb was that the avenging deities are shod with wool; but the wool grows on the eyelids that refuse the light. "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad;" but the insanity arises from judicial blindness.

Jeremy Taylor says that whoever sins against light kisses the lips of a blazing cannon.

I never saw a dare-devil face that had not in it something of both the sneak and the fool. The sorcery of sin is that it changes a man into a sneak and a fool; but the fool does not know that he is a sneak, and the sneak does not know that he is a fool. If I were a sculptor, I should represent sin with two faces, like those of Janus, looking in opposite directions. One should be idiotic, the other Machiavellian. But the one face could not see the other. The idiot would not know he was Machiavellian; the Machiavellian would not know that he is idiotic. The sneak would not know that he is a fool; nor the fool that he is a sneak.

2. Under irreversible natural law there is a self-propagating power in sin.

Of course, this self-propagating power depends upon the law of judicial blindness very largely; but by no means exclusively. So are we made that every effect in the growth of our characters becomes a cause—and every good effect no less than every bad one.

The laws of the self-propagating power of habit bless the righteous as much as they curse the wicked. The laws by which we attain supreme bliss are the laws by which we descend to supreme woe. In the ladder up and the ladder down in the universe the rungs are in the same side-pieces. The self-propagating power of sin and the self-propagating power of holiness are one law. The law of judicial blindness is one with that by which the pure in heart see God, and they who walk toward the east find the morning brighter and brighter to the perfect day.

Of course I shall offend many if I assert that there may be penalty that has no remedial tendency. But I ask you to be clear, and to remember that an unwelcome truth is really not destroyed by shutting the eyes to it. There are three kinds of natural laws: the physical, the organic, and the moral. *I affirm that "Never too late to mend" is not a doctrine of science in the domain of the physical laws, nor is it in that of the organic.*

Under the physical laws of gravitation a ship may careen to the right or left, and only a remedial effect be produced. The danger may teach the crew seamanship; it makes men bold and wise. Thus the penalty of violating up to a certain point the physical law is remedial in its tendency. But let the ship careen beyond a certain line, and it capsizes. If it be of iron, it remains at the bottom of the sea, and hundreds and hundreds of years of suffering of that penalty has no tendency to bring it back. Under the physical natural laws, plainly, there is such a thing as its being too late to mend. In their immeasurable domain there is a distinction between penalty that has a remedial tendency, and penalty that has no remedial tendency at all. So, under the organic law, your tropical tree, gashed at a certain point, may throw forth its gums, and even have greater strength than before; but gashed beyond the centre, cut through, the organic law is so far violated that the tree falls. And after a thousand years you do not expect to see the tree escape from the dominion of the law which is enforcing its penalty—do you? There is no tendency in that penalty toward remedial effect; none at all; and you know it. Therefore, under the organic laws, there is such a thing as its being too late to mend.

Now keep your eyes fastened upon the great principle of analogy, which Newton and Butler call the supreme rule in science, and ask yourselves whether, if you were to find some strange animal in a

geological stratum, and if you were to know, by having one of its hands free, that it had three fingers, and if you were to find two fingers on the other hand free from the rock, and both shutting toward the palm, would you not infer that the third finger, if you could loosen it from the rock, would also be found closing toward the palm? Just so I ask whether, if we find that under two sets of natural laws which are all included under three classes, there is incontrovertibly such a thing as penalty without remedial effect, may there not be the same under the third set? Two fingers shut toward the palm. I cannot quite trace the whole range of the moral law; but I know by analogy that, if two fingers shut toward the palm, the third probably does. *If there is such a thing as its being for ever too late to mend under the organic and the physical natural law, probably, and more than probably, there is such a thing under the moral natural law.*

Yes, but you say the will is free, and, therefore, that it cannot be supposed that a man will fall into final dissimilarity of feeling with God, or can so lose the desire to be holy, that he will not choose the right when greater light comes. You affirm that the self-propagating power of sin may place necessity upon the disordered nature. You say that the denial that all moral penalty is remedial requires us to deny that the will of lost souls continues free. I beg your pardon again, and that in the name of science. There may be certainty where there is no necessity.

Is John Milton putting together a self-contradiction when he pictures Satan as making evil his good, and as yet retaining a free will? Is he uttering self-contradiction when he shows us a fiendish character which retains yet some elements of its original brightness? Has Milton's Satan lost free will?

Origen used to teach that the prince of fiends might return to a glad allegiance to God; and so did Robert Burns, whom Emerson commends for using these words—originally written to attack the proposition I am now defending, but, after all, containing most subtle confirmation of it:

"Auld Nickie Ben,
O wad ye tak a thought and men',
Ye aiblins might—
I dinna ken—
Still hae a stake."

No; the self-propagating power of sin may produce a state of soul in which evil is chosen as good, and in which it is for ever too late to mend, and yet not destroy free will.

3. *Under irreversible natural law character tends to a final perma-*

nence, good or bad. In the nature of the case, a final permanence is attained but once.

If asked whether final permanence of character is a natural law, what should you say if we were to speak without reference to conclusions in religious science? How have men in all ages expressed themselves in literature and philosophy on this theme? Is it not perfectly certain that all the great writers of the world justify the proposition that character tends to a final permanence, good or bad?

This universe up to the edge of the tomb is not a joke. There are, in this life, serious differences between the right hand and the left. Nevertheless, in our present career a man has but one chance. Even if you come weighted into the world, as Sinbad was with the Old Man of the Mountain, you have but one chance. Time does not fly in a circle, but forth and right on. The wandering, squandering, desiccated moral leper is gifted with no second set of early years. There is no fountain in Florida that gives perpetual youth, and the universe might be searched, probably, in vain far such a spring. Waste your youth; you shall have but one chance. Waste your middle life; you shall have but one chance. Waste you old age; you shall have but one chance. It is an irreversible natural law that character attains final permanence, and in the nature of things final permanence can come but once. The world is fearfully and wonderfully made, and so are we; and we shall escape neither ourselves nor these stupendous laws. It is not to me a pleasant thing to exhibit these truths from the side of terror. But, on the other side, these are the truths of bliss; for by this very law, through which all character tends to become unchanging, a soul that attains a final permanence of good character runs but one risk, and is delivered once for all from its torture and unrest. It has passed the bourne from behind which no man is caught out of the fold. He who is the force behind all natural law is the keeper of his sheep, and no one is able to pluck them out of his hand. Himself without variableness or shadow of turning, he maintains the irreversibleness of all natural forces, one of which is the insufferably majestic law by which character tends to assume final permanence—good as well as bad.

4. Under irreversible natural law there may be in the soul a permanent loss of the predominant desire to be holy. Therefore,

5. Under irreversible natural law there may exist in the universe eternal sin.

It is not my duty here, as it is on the Sabbaths, to expound the Scriptures; but you will allow me to say that "eternal sin" is a scriptural phrase. As all scholars know, we must read in the twenty-ninth verse of the third chapter of Mark ἁμαρτήματος, and not

κρισέως. He who sinneth against the Holy Ghost is in danger of "*eternal sin.*"

Theodore Parker used to say that the profoundest expressions in the New Testament are those which are most likely to have been correctly reported. What phrase on this theme is profounder than "eternal sin"? Dean Alford well says that "it is to the critical treatment of the sacred text that we owe the restoration of such important and deep-reaching expressions as this." Lange calls it "a strong and pregnant expression."

It is not the best way in which to teach the truth of future punishment to say that a man is punished for ever and for ever for the sins of that hand's-breadth of duration we call time. If the soul does not repent of these with contrition, and not merely with attrition, the nature of things forbids its peace. But the biblical and the natural truth is that prolonged dissimilarity of feeling with God may end in eternal sin. If there is eternal sin, there will be eternal punishment. Final permanence of character under the laws of judicial blindness and the self-propagating power of sin, is the truth emphasized by both God's word and His works.

6. Under irreversible natural law there can be no blessedness without holiness.

Here I leave you, face to face with the nature of things, the authority which dazzled Socrates. God's omnipotence cannot force blessedness on a soul that has lost the predominate desire to be holy. Omniscience cannot make happy a man who loves what God hates, and hates what God loves. If you fall into predominant dissimilarity of feeling with God, it is out of his power to give you blessedness. Undoubtedly we are, of all men, most miserable unless with our deliverance from the guilt of sin there comes to us also deliverance from the love of it. Without holiness there can be no blessedness; but there can be no holiness without a predominant love of what God loves, and hate of what God hates. We grow wrong; we allow ourselves to crystallize in habits that imply a loss of a desire to be holy; and, at last, having made up our minds not to love predominantly what God loves, and hate what he hates, we are amazed that we have not blessedness. But the universe is not amazed. The nature of things is but another name for the Divine Nature. God would not be God if there could be blessedness without holiness.

THEODORE PARKER ON THE PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE HERALD.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

In the Singalese books of Gotama Buddha, written under the shadow of the Himalayas, we find the statement that "as surely as the pebble cast heavenward abides not there, but returns to the earth, so, proportionate to thy deed, good or ill, will the desire of thy heart be meted out to thee, in whatever form or world thou shalt enter." It was the opinion of Socrates, recorded with favour by Plato, that "the wicked would be too well off if their evil deeds came to an end.* All disloyalty to the still, small voice which declares what ought to be is followed by pain. *What if it were not?* Is God God, if, with unscientific liberalism, we in our philosophy put the throne of the universe upon rockers, and make of it an easy chair from which lullabys are sung, both to the evil and to the good?

"Whatever we do, God is on our side." So say many who would not dare to affirm that, whatever we do, the nature of things is on our side. But the nature of things is only the total outcome of the requirements, the perfections of the Divine Nature. God is behind the nature of things, and you and I cannot trifle with him any more than with it. He was; he is; he is to come. It was; it is; it is to come. It is he.

Great literature always recognises the law of moral gravitation. Seeking the deepest modern words, I open, for instance, Thomas Carlyle, and read:

"'Penalties:' Quarrel not with the old phraseology, good reader: attend rather to the thing it means. The word was heard of old, with a right solemn meaning attached to it, from theological pulpits and such places; and may still be heard there with a half-meaning, or with no meaning, though it has rather become obsolete to modern ears. But the *thing* should not have fallen obsolete. The thing is a grand and solemn truth, expressive of a silent law of Heaven which continues for ever valid. The most untheological of men may still assert the thing, and invite all men to notice it as a silent monition and prophecy in this universe; to take it, with more of awe than they are wont, as a correct reading of the will of the Eternal in respect of such matters, and in their modern sphere to bear the same well in mind.

"The want of loyalty to the Maker of this universe—he who wants that, what else has he or can he have? If you do not, you man or nation, love the Truth enough, but try to make a chapman-bargain with Truth, instead of giving yourself wholly, soul and body and life, to her, Truth will not live with you, Truth will

* Jowett's Plato, Introduction to Phædo.

depart from you, and only Logic, 'Wit'—for example, 'London Wit'—Sophistry, Virtue, the Æsthetic Arts, and perhaps (for a short while) Book-keeping by Double Entry, will abide with you. You will follow falsity and think it truth, you unfortunate man or nation! You will, right surely, you for one, stumble to the Devil; and are every day and hour, little as you imagine it, making progress thither."*

This majestic key-note of scientific, ethical truth is the deep tone that leads the anthem of all great thought since the world began. Open now Theodore Parker, and how harshly his words clash with Carlyle's!

"The infinite perfection of God is the corner-stone of all my theological and religious teaching—the foundation, perhaps, of all that is peculiar in my system. It is not known to the Old Testament or the New; it has never been accepted by any sect in the Christian world. The idea of God's imperfection has been carried out with dreadful logic in the Christian scheme. In the ecclesiastical conception of the Deity there is a fourth person in the Godhead—namely, the Devil: an outlying member, unacknowledged, indeed, the complex of all evil, but as much a part of Deity as either Son or Holy Ghost, and far more powerful than all the rest, who seem but jackals to provide for this roaring lion."†

What is in the lines here in Parker is not so painful as what is between the lines. "God is a perfect Creator," writes Parker, "making all from a perfect motive, for a perfect purpose. The motive must be love; the purpose welfare. The perfect Creator is a perfect providence; love becoming a universe of perfect welfare."‡

"Optimism is the religion of science." "*Every fall is a fall upward.*"

One feels, in reading Theodore Parker, that, whatever we do, God is on our side. Carlyle is of a very different opinion, and is moved by no faith deeper than that the distinction between duty and its opposite is "quite infinite." Place side by side this free-thinker, Carlyle, and that free-thinker, Parker, and ask which is the truer of the two to the deep intuitions of the soul? Contrast the seriousness of Buddha and the tone of this man of Massachusett's Bay. Compare Socrates and Plato, under the shade of the Acropolis, with this modern man, under the shade of what? Of a stunted mental philosophy; rooted well, indeed, in our soil at his time, but only a very imperfect growth as yet, and hardly risen above the ground when the attempt was made here to deny the existence of sin, and of its natural wages in the universe, in the name of an intuitive philosophy which asserts precisely the opposite in both cases.

---

* Carlyle, "Frederick the Great," vol. i. pp. 270, 271.

† Weiss, "Life of Parker," vol. ii. p. 470. ‡ *Ibid*, p. 471.

§ "Discourse on Religion."

Of course you expect me not to skip the topic of the origin of evil, for, after all, the question which touches that theme, quite as often as any other, drives men into intellectual unrest, throwing some into atheism, some into a denial of the authority of Scripture, some into various forms of a false, loose, unscholarly liberalism.

What are the more important points which the use of the scientific method can make clear on this multiplex, fathomless theme of the origin of evil?

1. There cannot be thought without a thinker.
2. There is thought in the universe.
3. Therefore there is a Thinker in the universe.
4. But a thinker is a person.
5. Therefore there is a Personal Thinker in the universe.

You will grant me, at least, what Descartes made the basis of his philospohy: "*Cogito; ergo sum*"—"I think; therefore I am." I know that I think; and, therefore, I know that I am, and that I am a person." Agassiz says, in his "Essay on Classification," that the universe "exhibits thought," and that is not a very heterodox opinion! You know with what magnificent logical, rhetorical, and moral power the massive Agassiz, in that best of his books, gathers up range after range of the operations of the natural laws, and closes every paragraph with this language: "These facts exhibit thought;" "these facts exhibit mind;" and so on and on through a mass of intellectual scenery gigantic as his own Alps, and as little likely to be pulverized! When that man, in presence of the scientific world, bowed his head in silent prayer in the face of the audience at Penikese, he did it before a Person! What cared he for the lonely few sciolists who assume that there is no reason for holding their heads otherwise than erect in this universe? As I contrast his mood and theirs, I think always of the old apologue of the heavy heads of wheat and light heads: the heavy heads always bend.

You say that you are sure you are a thinker, because you know there is thought in you. *I know there is a Thinker in the universe, because there is Thought in it, and there cannot be thought without a thinker.* There cannot be a here without a there. There cannot be a before without an after. Just so, in the nature of things, there cannot be a thought without a thinker. If we know there is thought in the universe, let us quit all doubt about a Divine Thinker.

What! falling into anthropomorphism, are you? That is a long word, but it means making God too much like man. Stern Ethan Allen, who made a speech once near Lake George, in a fort, the ruins of which were part of my playground in earliest years, said in a book

written to attack Christianity: "There must be some resemblance between the divine nature and the human nature. I do know some things, and God knows all things; and, therefore, in a few particulars there is resemblance between man and God."* Anthropomorphism, or the likening of God to man, is not quite as bad as likening God to mere blind physical force—is it? Most of those who are shyest of what is called anthropomorphism are advocates of a theory which likens God to what? To the highest we know? Not at all. To the next to the highest? No. They liken him to one of the lowest things we know—to mere physical force, which has in itself no thought or will. Force, the unknown God, forsooth? No doubt He whom we dare not name is behind all force. But to take one of the lower manifestations of his power as that according to which we will describe his whole nature is far more scandalous than to take the loftiest we know, and to say that God, at least, is equal to that; and how much better, neither man nor angel knows, or ever will. Descartes wrote, in a passage closely following his famous aphorism, and which ought to be as famous as that: "I must have been brought into existence by a Being at least as perfect as myself." The Maker must be better than his work. "He must transcend in excellence my highest imagination of perfection."

Is it anthropomorphism to say that there cannot be thought without a thinker, and that there is Thought, and that, therefore, there must be a Thinker in the universe? That is a necessary conclusion from self-evident, intuitive, axiomatic truth. It is an inference as tremorless as the necessary conclusion that if there is a *here* there is a *there*. So are we made that we cannot deny that if there is Thought in the universe there must be a Thinker. Let us rejoice with a gladness fathomless as this noon above our heads. Let us occupy our privileges. Let our souls go out to Him who holds the infinities and eternities in his palm as the small dust of the balance. Let our thoughts, if possible, not faint as they pass from the planet which He governs by his will, called gravitation, down to the winking of our eyelids, which the Asiatic proverb says are numbered, and who makes no mistake. This Thinker, with omnipotence and omniscience revealed by his works, ought to be holy. His unfathomable greatness raises the presumption of his holiness.

But we are not left in doubt upon this theme, for special light is given in the universe wherever doubt would be the most dangerous.

6. Every law is the method of action of some will.

Having presented to you the proof of that proposition which

---

* "Oracles of Reason."

ninety-five out of a hundred of the foremost names in physical science assert, I need do now no more than recite the names of Dana, Agassiz, Carpenter, Faraday, Helmholtz, Wunt, and Lotze, in support of a truth which transfigures the universe.*

7. There is in the universe an eternal law which makes for righteousness.

Matthew Arnold is authority for that, although his outlook on religious science and philosophy is much like a woman's outlook on politics.

8. The existence of that law is revealed in all outer experience or history.

Even Matthew Arnold says, that if you wish to know that fire will burn, you can put your hand in it and obtain proof; and that you can in the same experimental way convince yourself that there is in history a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.

9. This law is revealed with vividness in the inner experience in all the natural operations of conscience.

10. There is, therefore, in the universe a Holy Will.

11. But a Holy Will can belong only to a Holy Person.

12. But we know that the moral law is perfect, for it requires invariably and unconditionally *what ought to be.*

A fathomless deep that word *ought!* An intuition of rightness and fitness lies at the centre of it. In every individual moral good is simply *what ought to be,* and moral evil *what ought not to be,* in the choicest of the soul among motives.

13. The Maker must be more glorious than the thing made.

14. *The perfection of the moral law inhering in the nature of things proves the perfection of the Divine Nature.*

15. *The perfection of the moral law is a self-evident, axiomatic, intuitive truth.*

16. *All objections to the belief that God is perfect are, therefore, shattered upon the incontrovertible fact of the perfection of the moral law.*

17. The perfection of the Divine Nature having been proved on the basis of axiomatic truth, it follows that the present system of the universe is the best possible system, and that the present moral government of the world is the best possible moral government of the world.

18. *In all investigations concerning the origin of evil we must keep in the foreground the axiomatically demonstrated fact of the perfection of the Divine Nature.*

There is no one deeply impressed with the duty of using intuition, instinct, syllogism, and experiment as tests of truth

* See closing chapters of Carpenter's "Mental Physiology."

who will not grant me the proposition that there is a perfect moral law in the universe. There is no man who grants me that proposition who can analyze it in the light of self-evident truth, and not find himself obliged to admit that, as there is a perfect moral law, there must be a perfect moral lawgiver. You will allow me, in view of discussions which have preceded the present one in this lectureship, to use from this point onward the incontrovertible deliverance of the intuitional philosophy, *that the existence in the nature of things of a perfect moral law implies the existence in the universe of a Holy Will, which will can belong only to a Perfect Person.*

The perfection of the Divine Nature having been proved from the perfection of the moral law, what inferences follow as to the origin of evil?

1. It is a self-evident or intuitive truth that sin exists in this world.
2. God is perfect.
3. *Why did God permit sin to exist?*
4. *Of the many answers to this question all are, perhaps, conjectures.*

Take up Kant and read his discussion of "Religion Inside the Range of Mere Reason," and you will find him concluding that the moral law itself, which he regarded as the sublimest thing known to man, cannot be quite explained to the human understanding. We know that this law has unconditioned authority; and, yet, if we try to go behind its unconditional "categorical imperative" "Thou oughtest" and "Thou shalt," we find ourselves stopped by something beyond our comprehension, although not beyond our apprehension. Just so Julius Müller, discussing the topic of the origin of evil, quotes this language of Kant's, and says that the student of religious science need not be ashamed to say that the origin of evil is involved in much mystery.* Although we can know some things, we do not pretend to know all things concerning it. We may make many conjectures concerning it. We may say that it arises in the abuse of the free will. But what led to that abuse of free will? The very arbitrariness of will when it chooses evil—was that the cause of the abuse of free will by itself? Müller, you will remember, teaches explicitly, as Kant did implicitly, that the origin of evil is to be referred back to an extra-temporal existence, where conditions unknown to man brought about the first sin. He would account for the origin of evil not by what we see in this world, but by what may have occurred in some state of existence before this, and in which man was implicated as a personality. I am not adopting that portion of Julius Müller's scheme of thought.

---

* Muller, "Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p. 172.

Many of the deepest students of this theme affirm that we cannot explain the origin of evil without going back to a state of existence previous to this.

5. Even among conjectures there may be a great choice.

6. Is sin permitted as a dragooning process, to eventuate in good at last?

No; for then sin ought to be, and conscience affirms that it ought not to be.

Is sin the necessary means of the greatest good?

No; for the same reason.

Has all sin an ultimately beneficial effect, or is every fall a fall upward?

No; for, if this be the case, there is reason to doubt whether God is perfectly benevolent.

Let us suppose that there stands on the right here in the universe a marble staircase, and on the left a staircase of red hot iron. Let both ascend to the same height—namely, to a universe from which all sin shall be eliminated. You go up by the marble staircase; you reach that stage—a universe in which there is no sin. You go up by the red-hot iron staircase; you reach the same stage—a universe in which there is no sin. I beg you to be cautious now and here, lest you be misled. I warn you that just here is the place where you will think I was too rapid, and that you did not quite know what you admitted. You say that all penalty for sin has a remedial tendency, and that ultimately we shall reach a state in which there will be no evil in the universe. Men are going up the red-hot iron staircase. This represents the path of their suffering for sin. Ultimately, however, this staircase, you say, will bring all who go up it into freedom from all sin.

Be mercilessly clear. Could not God take men up the marble staircase to that same height? "Yes," you say. "He is omnipotent, omniscient." Do you admit that? Immense consequences turn on your being clear just here. God might take men up the marble staircase, which represents the path of holy free choice and freedom from the penalties of sin. A universe free from sin is what you wish to reach. Men may be taken up this marble staircase to that height; or they may be taken up the red-hot iron staircase of suffering to the same height.

I affirm that your theory of evil is dishonourable to God; for we do know that men are going up on the fiery staircase. They are suffering remorse; they are filled with anguish; and the outcome of all that suffering is to be only the attaining of a height to which God, according to your theory, might have raised them without any suffering at all. *Therefore, here are useless pains. He who inflicts*

them cannot be supremely benevolent. You might attain the platform which represents the absence of sin from the universe by that marble staircase. You are attaining it by the red-hot iron staircase. Why does he permit men to ascend to that height by pain, when they might ascend to the same height without pain? *If he has no motive in that red-hot iron staircase except to take men up, why does he not take men up by the cold marble?* He is not taking men up by the cold marble; he is taking them up the other way. But if, as you say, he has no motive but to take men up; if, as Theodore Parker said, every fall is a fall upward, how are you to prove the Divine benevolence face to face with his preference for that staircase when he might have chosen the other?

Assuredly the theory that all evil is a dragooning process, and that evil is the necessary means to the greatest good, not only is false to the intuitions which declare that evil ought not to be, but is in conflict with the truth that God is perfect. You cannot make it clear that God is perfect if every fall is a fall upward, for men might go up the marble staircase, whereas they do go up by the red-hot iron. *There is some other reason for the red-hot iron than to take men up.*

The theory that every fall is a fall upward dishonours God. I know not but that billions of times more spirits go up the marble staircase than up the red-hot staircase; but if billions and billions do go that way, why could not you or I go that way?

It is inadmissible to assert that a benevolent Being chooses to subject his creatures to extreme pain, and attains by that means nothing that he might not attain without pain.

What answer does religious science give to the question as to the origin of evil? On this theme there are two strategic questions:—

1. Can God prevent sin in a moral system?
2. Can God prevent sin in the best moral system?

Go to New Haven, and from the pupils of one of the profoundest and most original of New England theologians, Dr. N. W. Taylor, you will find authority for answering these questions in this way:

1. "Can God prevent sin in a moral system?" "We do not know that he can."

2. "Can God prevent sin in the best moral system?" "No." "How do you know?" "Because he has not prevented it."*

Go to Andover, and ask these questions, and you will find them answered in this way:

1. "Can God prevent sin in a moral system?" "Yes." How do you know?" "Because he that can create can do anything that is an

---

* Taylor's "Moral Government."

object of power. God can do anything that does not involve self-contradiction. He cannot deny himself; but we must suppose that a system of living beings, all with free wills, might be so influenced by motives as to retain their free will and yet not sin. God can prevent sin in *a* moral system."

"Can God prevent sin in the *best* moral system?" "Perhaps not." "How do you know?" "Because he has not prevented it."

The Divine Perfection is proved by the perfection of the moral law. Sin exists. There is no conclusion possible except that sin cannot be prevented wisely.

What are some of the reasons why, possibly, a perfect God cannot wisely prevent sin in the best moral system?

1. In the nature of things, there cannot be an upper without an under, a right without a left, a before without an after, a good without at least the possibility of evil.

2. *In the nature of things, the gift of free agency carries with it the possibility that the wrong, as well as the right, may be chosen.*

3. In the nature of things, a created being must be a finite being.

In the nature of things, a finite is an imperfect being. *In the nature of things, there will be the possibility of less than absolutely perfect action in every less than absolutely perfect agent. Man is such an agent.*

Julius Müller and Tholuck, in their earlier years, were wont to fall into long conversations upon the origin of evil; and they at last fastened upon Leibnitz's great thought—that the necessary limitations of power and wisdom in all finite beings leave open a possibility to evil. Do not think Leibnitz asserted that the limitation of the finite creature makes evil necessary. He asserts only that it makes evil possible. I know that I am here not following the authority of Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, who asserts that Leibnitz makes evil a necessity in the universe. He does not, if Julius Müller understands him; and if some readings of the "Theodicee" prove anything to me, Leibnitz means to assert only that the *possibility* of evil inheres in the very nature of things. If there is to be a created being brought into existence, that created being must be finite, and, as such, must be to a certain extent an imperfect being, and so *may*, not *must*, fall into sin. While the *possibility* of sin arises thus from the necessary limitation of the wisdom and power of created beings, the *fact* of sin, according to Leibnitz, comes from abuse of free will.*

4. It may be that God cannot prevent sin if he deals with finite creatures according to what is due to himself.

5. It may be better to allow free agents to struggle with sin, and

---

* Muller, "Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 276.

thus grow in the vigour of virtue, than to preserve them from such struggle, and thus allow them to remain weak.

But, my friends, let us rejoice that, after proving the divine perfection, we know enough for our peace as to the origin of evil. It is not at all necessary to establish the soundness of any of these conjectures, for none of them are needed to prove that God is perfect.

In the heavens of the soul there rise unquenchable constellations, which show that we alone are to blame if we do what conscience says we *ought* not to do. We are just as sure of the fact that we, and only we, are to blame when we do what conscience pronounces *wrong*, as we are of our own existence. Our demerit is a self-evident fact. All men take such guilt for granted. We know that we are responsible, as surely as we all know that we have the power of choice. We know both facts from intuition. Our existence we know only by intuition, and by that same axiomatic evidence we know our freedom. How does sin originate in us? By bad free choice. Just so it originated in the universe. But God brought us into existence. Yes, and he maintains us in existence. Very well; but the axioms of self-evident truth prove that he has given to us free will. The ocean floats the piratical vessels, the sea-breeze fills the sails of the pirate; but neither the ocean nor the sea-breeze is to blame for piracies.

THEODORE PARKER ON THE PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE NATURE.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

When Ulysses sailed past the isle of the Sirens, who had the power of charming by their songs all who listened to them, he heard the sorcerers' music on the shore, and, to prevent himself and crew from landing, he filled their ears with wax, and bound himself to the mast with knotted thongs. Thus, according to the subtile Grecian story, he passed safely the fatal strand. But when Orpheus, in search of the Golden Fleece, went by this island, he—being, as you remember, a great musician—set up better music than that of the Sirens, enchanted his crew with a melody superior to the alluring song of the sea-nymphs, and so, without needing to fill the Argonauts' ears with wax, or to bind himself to the mast with knotted thongs, he passed the sorcerous shore not only safely, but with disdain.

The ancients, it is clear from this legend, understood the distinction between morality and religion. He who, sailing past the island of temptation, has enlightened selfishness enough not to land, although he wants to; he who, therefore, binds himself to the mast with knotted thongs, and fills the ears of his crew with wax; he who does this without hearing a better music, is the man of mere morality. Heaven forbid that I should underrate the value of this form of cold prudence, for wax is not useless in giddy ears, and Aristotle says youth is a perpetual intoxication. Face to face with Sirens, thongs are good, though songs are better.

When a man of tempestuous, untrained spirit must swirl over amber and azure and purple seas, past the isle of the Sirens, and knots himself to the mast of outwardly-right conduct by the thongs of safe resolutions, although as yet duty is not his delight, he is near to virtue. He who spake as never mortal spoke saw such a young man once, and, looking on him, loved him; and yet said, as the nature of things says also, "One thing thou lackest." Evidently he to whom duty is not a delight does not possess the supreme pre-requisite of peace. In presence of the Siren shore we can never be at rest while we rather wish to land, although we resolve not to do so. Only he who has heard a better music than that of the Sirens, and who is affectionately glad to prefer the higher to the lower good, is, or in the nature of things *can* be, at peace. Morality is Ulysses bound to the mast. Religion is Orpheus listening to a better melody, and passing with disdain the sorcerous shore.

Aristotle was asked once what the decisive proof is that a man has acquired a good habit. His answer was, "The fact that the practice of the habit involves no self-denial of predominant force among the faculties." Assuredly that is keen, but Aristotle is rightly called the surgeon. Until we do love virtue so that the practice of it involves no self-denial of that sort, it is scientifically incontrovertible that we cannot at be peace. In the very nature of things, while Ulysses wants to land, wax and thongs cannot give him rest. In the very nature of things, only a better music, only a more ravishing melody, can preserve Orpheus in peace. This truth may be stern and unwelcome, but the Greek mythology and the Greek philosophy which thus unite to affirm it are as luminous as the noon. What is the distinction between morality and religion, and how can the latter be shown by the scientific method to be a necessity to the peace of the soul?

1. Conscience demands that what *ought to be* should be *chosen* by the will.

2. In relation to persons, what we *choose* we *love*.

3. Conscience reveals a Holy Person, the Author of the moral law.

4. Conscience, therefore, demands that rightness and oughtness in motives should not only be obeyed, but loved.

5. It demands that the Ineffable Holy Person revealed by the moral law should not only be obeyed, but loved.

6. This is an unalterable demand of an unalterable portion of our nature.

7. As personalities, therefore, we must keep company with this part of our nature and with its demand, while we exist in this world and the next.

8. The love of God by man is, therefore, inflexibly required by the nature of things. Of all the commandments of exact science this is the first,—Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy mind, and might, and heart, and strength.

9. Conscience draws an unalterable distinction between loyalty and disloyalty to the Ineffable Holy Person the moral law reveals, and between the obedience of slavishness and that of delight.

10. Only the latter is obedience to conscience.

11. But morality is the obedience of selfish slavishness.

That sounds harsh, but by it I mean only that a man of mere morality is Ulysses bound with thongs. He intelligently chooses not to land, but he wishes to do so. He loves what conscience declares ought not to be. His chief motive is selfishness acting under the spur of fear. In the nature of things, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, but the end of wisdom is the perfect *love* that casteth out fear. You say that I have been appealing to fear. Very well, that is

the beginning of wisdom, and I do not revere highly any love of God that has never known any fear of God. Show me that kind of love of God which has not felt what the fear of God is, and I will show you not principle, but sentiment; not religion, but religiosity. Of necessity, loyalty fears disloyalty. But loyalty is love for the Holy Person the moral law reveals, and such love conscience inexorably demands as what *ought* to be.

12. Religion, as contrasted with morality, is the obedience of affectionate gladness. It is the proud, rejoicing, unselfish, adoring love which conscience demands of man for the Ineffable Holy Person which conscience reveals.

13. As such, only religion, and not morality, can harmonize the soul with the nature of things. So much may be clearly demonstrated by exact research. Shakespeare says of two characters who conceived for each other a supreme affection as soon as they saw each other:—

"At the first glance they have changed eyes."

The Christian is a man who has changed eyes with God. In the unalterable nature of things, he who has not changed eyes with God cannot look into his face in peace. What is that love which conscience says ought to be given by the soul to the Ineffable Holy Person which the Moral Law reveals? Is it a love for a fragment of that Person's character, or for the whole? For a few, or for the whole list of his perfect attributes?

14. In the nature of things a delight in not only a part, but in all of God's attributes, is necessary to peace in his presence.

15. *A religion consisting in the obedience of affectionate gladness, or a delight in all God's attributes, is, therefore, scientifically known to be a demand of the nature of things.* It will not be to-morrow or the day after that these fifteen propositions will cease to be scientifically certain. Out of them multitudinous inferences flow as Niagaras from the eternal fountains. In a better age, Philosophy will often pause to listen to these deluging certainties poured from the Infinite Heights of the nature of things. The roar and spray of them almost deafen and blind whoever stands where we do now; but they are there, although we are deaf; they are there, although we are blind. Three inferences from these fifteen propositions are of supreme importance:—

1. It is a sufficient condemnation of any scheme of religious thought to show that it presents for worship not all, but only a fragment, of the list of the Divine attributes.

2. A religion that is true to the nature of things in theory will, of course, be found to work well in practice. The true in speculation

is that which is harmonious with the nature of things. The fortunate in experience is that which is in harmony with the nature of things. The true in speculation, therefore, will turn out to be the fortunate in experience when applied to practice. If a scheme of thought does not work well in the long ranges of experience, if it will not bear translation into life age after age, that scheme of thought is sufficiently shown to be in collision with the nature of things.

3. By all the tests of intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism, religious science must endeavour to obtain the fullest view possible to man of the whole list of the Divine attributes. What scheme of religious thought will bear these three tests best? All religious teaching that in a wide and multiplex trial does not bear good fruits, is presumably out of accord with the nature of things. Does the doctrine that every fall is a fall upward bear good fruits? Does the assertion that sin is a necessary, and, for the most part, an inculpable stage in human progress, improve society? Does the proposition that character does *not* tend to a final permanence, bad as well as good, and good as well as bad, work well when translated into life, age after age?

The supreme question, then, if you are convinced that man cannot have peace unless he has a delight in all attributes of the Holy Person revealed by the moral law, is to know what the full list is.

* * * * * * * * * * *

1. In the nature of things, to work for good is to work against evil. Does anybody doubt this? Is not that a proposition just as clearly true as that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that a thing cannot be, and not be at the same time and in the same sense or, as any other intuitive deliverance of our faculties?

2. In the nature of things God cannot work for good without working against evil. I am assuming only that God cannot deny himself. That *cannot* is to me at once the most terrible and the most alluring certainty in the universe. He cannot deny the demands of his own perfections. These are another name for the nature of things. We feel sure that in the nature of things there cannot be a here without a there, an upper without an under, or any working of God for good without working by him against evil. The nature of things is not fate, but the unchangeable free choice of infinite perfection in God.

Allow no one to mislead you by overlooking the distinctions between *certainty* and *necessity*, *will* and *shall*, *occasioning* and *necessitating*, *infallibly* certain and *inevitably* certain. Let no one assert that faithfulness to self-evident truths as to the nature of things leads to a system of thought consisting of adamantine fatalism. There can

be but one best way in which to conduct the universe. Omniscience will know that way. Omnipotence will choose and adhere to that way. There will be no deviation from that way in the course of the government of the universe. There will thus appear to be fate in the infinities and eternities; but there is there, in reality, only the infinitely wise and holy, and therefore unchanging, free choice of Almighty God. Even man's free-will may illustrate the law of *certainty* without falling at all under that *necessity*.

3. In the nature of things, God is not God unless he works for good.

4. Therefore, in the nature of things, he is not God unless he works against evil.

5. He is perfect, and therefore with all his attributes he works for good.

6. He is perfect, and therefore with all his attributes he works against evil.

7. Sin exists in the universe by the abuse of free will.

Of course I keep in mind the distinction between an error and sin, or between a mistake of the moral kind and a wrong of the moral kind. When I speak of sin, I mean a free choice of motives which conscience pronounces to be bad. In every bad free choice there comes upon the soul after the act a sense of personal demerit. If you deny the intuition which proves the will is free, you cannot prove your own existence; for you know your own existence only by intuition. How do I know there is an external world? By intuition. How do I know that I am in existence? By intuition. How do I know that I am personally to blame when I do what conscience pronounces wrong? By intuition. We are not to play fast and loose with this supreme test of truth. Intuition is the soul's direct vision of all truths which to men have these three characteristics—*self-evidence, necessity, universality. An intuition may mean a truth, self-evident, necessary, and universal; or it may mean the act of the mind in beholding such a truth.* We know we are to blame when we choose the wrong, and there is an end of that. What you take for granted in business, and in law, and in literature, you must allow me to take as proved in religious science. Does anybody doubt that he is free in business? Very well; will anybody doubt, then, that he is free in religion? Does anybody doubt that God gives the harvest, but that, nevertheless, man must sow and plant? Just so in the spiritual realm, a man must go forth and sow good seed, and God will give the increase. *Predestination* does not mean *destiny*. In religious science the predestination does not mean necessity, but only certainty.

8. *While sin continues God cannot forgive it without making the sinner worse.*

In this city six thousand people were told the other evening, with great depth of thought, that if a child deliberately lies, and you forgive the child before he has exhibited any sorrow for the act, you make the child worse. That is, indeed, a very simple instance of the moral law, but in scientific minds there is no doubt that the moral law is equally universal with the physical. If you will measure a little arc of the physical law, you can measure the whole circle.

9. The self-propagating power of habit acting in the sphere of holy affections places the nature of things on the side of righteousness.

10. The same self-propagating power of habit acting in the sphere of evil affections arranges the nature of things against evil.

11. Good has but one enemy, the evil; but the evil has two enemies, the good and itself.

12. Judicial blindness increases the self-propagating power of evil; remunerative vision increases the self-propagating power of holiness.

"Every man," says the Spanish proverb, "is the son of his own deeds." "Every action," says Richter, "becomes more certainly an eternal mother than it is an eternal daughter." These are the irreversible laws according to which all character tends to a final permanence, good or bad.

13. God cannot give the wicked two chances without subjecting the good to two risks.

14. Self-evident truth shows that man is free.

15. Self-evident truth proves that man may attain a final permanence of character, good or bad, and in that state not lose freedom of will.

16. *This may occur in the best possible universe, in which all things will of course work together for good to the good, and, therefore, of necessity, for evil to the evil.* Adhere to the proposition that there cannot be an upper without an under. *Can* God arrange the universe so that all things in it shall work together for the good of the good without arranging it so that all things shall work together for the evil of the evil? *Can* God be God, and not arrange the universe so that all things in it shall work together for the good of the good? *Can* God be God and not so arrange the universe that all things shall work together for the evil of the evil? Follow the deliverance of your intuitional philosophy, that the soul is free. I know how a man is tempted here, and how a silly sciolism will overturn the testimony of the intuitions themselves, rather than admit that man is responsible for all action that conscience pronounces wrong. But if you overturn the deliverance of the intuitions there, please overturn it elsewhere. You will not play fast and loose much longer; for our age is coming to be, thank God, unwilling to

take anything for granted, and more and more loyal to clear ideas. Our greatest philosophies, metaphysical and physical, all stand on the basis of self-evident truths, or intuition; and although your physicist, who never has studied metaphysics, does not know who sharpened his tools, or, sometimes, what his tools are; he every day is using self-evident truth, and stands on the intuitions at which he scoffs. On self-evidence you stand, and on self-evidence I stand, and if you and I can shake hands on this point we shall never part. If we are true to the deliverance of all the intuitions, and not merely to a portion of them, we shall see God in not merely a few of his attributes, but in that whole range of them which the nature of things exposes to human vision; and we shall find it a thing just as glorious to be reconciled with God as it is to be reconciled with the nature of things, and just as little likely to occur in a man asleep, or by accident and haphazard, and dreaming and poetizing.

We shall find it a thing at least as terrible to fall under the power of God as it is to fall under the power of the nature of things. Assuredly the nature of things will not break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax of loyalty to itself. The nature of things assuredly, too, may be a consuming fire to all disloyalty to itself. It may be an omnipresent kiss or an omnipresent flame. The savages in Peru used to kiss the air as their profoundest sign of adoration to the collective divinities. The nature of things is above and around and beneath us, and our sign of adoration to it must be not slavish self-surrender, but affectionate, glad preference of what this unbending perfection requires. You say the permanent existence of sin would be an impeachment of the Divine benevolence. Why is not the beginning of it an impeachment? The mystery is not that under the law of judicial blindness and the self-propagating power of habit sin may continue; the mystery is that sin ever was allowed to begin. *It has begun.* There is no doubt on that subject, and when you will explain to me the consistency of your philosophy with the beginning of sin, I will explain to you the consistency of a final permanence of free evil character with that same philosophy. What we do know is, that the more a man sins against light, the less sensitive he is to it. What we do know is, that over against judicial blindness stands remunerative vision, and we cannot change one law without changing the other. The nature of things is the flame; the nature of things is the kiss; God is God by being both. What God does is successfully done. What God does is well done.

THEODORE PARKER ON ADORATION.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

The Russian poet, Derzhavin, has the honour of having written an ode to the rhythm of which all cultivated circles have bowed down from the Yellow Sea westward to the Pacific. The stanzas of it you may see to-day embroidered on silk in the palaces of the emperors of Japan and China. You will find the poem translated into Persian, into Arabic, into Greek, into Italian, into German; and, when I open the most popular of our American anthologies, I find that the book closes with this Russian anthem:

"O Thou Eternal One, whose presence bright
All space doth occupy, all motion guide—
Unchanged through Time's all-devastating flight!
Thou only God—there is no God beside!
Being above all beings! Mighty one
Whom none can comprehend and none explore!
Who fill'st existence with Thyself alone—
Embracing all, supporting, ruling o'er—
Being whom we call God, and know no more!

* * * * * * * *

God! thus alone my lowly thoughts can soar,
'Midst Thy vast works admire, obey, adore:
And when the tongue is eloquent no more,
The soul shall speak in tears of gratitude."

When a poem has the majestic fortune to be adopted as the household word of culture in twenty nations, we are scientifically justified in the conclusion that the deep instincts of the human heart from the rising to the setting sun assert what the poem expresses. Thus we judge in the case of the songs of love; and so, I insist, we must judge in relation to the anthems of religion. Indeed, these latter sink more penetratingly into history than the former. Nothing is treasured by the best part of the world so painstakingly, from the epic we call the Book of Job, to Derzhavin's poem on the Divine Nature, as the literature that is struck worthily to the key-note of adoration of the Infinite Perfection of a Personal God. This is a literary fact which the Matthew Arnolds and Herbert Spencers would do well to fathom. The native human instincts are ascertainable by the reception all races and tribes and tongues give to the literature of communion with God as personal. *Such instincts are a scientific proof of the existence of their*

correlate. There can be no thought without a Thinker. There is Thought in the universe. Therefore, there is a Thinker in the universe. But a thinker is a person. Therefore, there is a Personal Thinker in the universe. There can be no such organic hungering as all nations have for communion with God as personal without the possibility of such communion. Men who revere the natural will not scorn theism, for it is as natural as anything else in nature. The veracity of our theistic instincts is proved by their naturalness. Julius Müller gives as one definition of religion the communion of the soul with God as personal.

1. Men as they are can be made holy only by loving a holy person.
2. Nothing so effectually purifies the heart as love, for nothing so effectually woos us from selfishness.
3. There can be no love without trust, and no trust without purity.
4. Love produces in the lover the mood of the object loved.
5. Souls grow more by contact with souls than by all other means.
6. Growth, strength, bliss, arise naturally from spiritual love.
7. All these laws of the higher affections apply to the communion of the human spirit with the Ineffable Holy Person whom the moral law reveals.
8. Under these irreversible natural laws religion is affectionate communion with God as personal.

In "Locksley Hall," Tennyson, speaking merely as an observer of human nature in its social zone, utters one of the profoundest of all the truths of its religious zone when he says:

> "Love took up the harp of life; smote on all the chords with might,
> Smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight."

Is there any hand but that of Love that can produce this effect? *Under natural law, can man be made unselfish or holy in any other way than by loving a holy person?* Tennyson knows of no other way; religious science knows of no other.

The truth is, my friends, we are acquainted with no furnace which will burn selfishness out of a man except this fiery bliss we call a supreme spiritual affection. There is admiration of men by each other; but there is no burning the selfishness out of men until they come to trust and to love, and to that intersphering of soul by soul which is always the result of trust of the transfigured sort, one of the rarest things on earth! Do not think that I am putting before you a low ideal of trust, for I speak of those forms of love—conjugal, filial, paternal—which the poets love to glorify.

I read, the other day, two Boston sonnets entitled "Trust," and

making of the crystalline window of one of the deepest human experiences an opening through which to look into the sky behind the sky :—

"I know that thou art true, and strong and pure;
My forehead on thy palm I fall asleep,
My sentinels with thee no vigils keep,
Though elsewhere never without watch secure.
How restful is thy palm! I life endure,
These stranger souls whose veils I shyly sweep,
These doubts what secrets hide within the deep
Because aglow within the vast obscure.
Thy hand is whitest light! My Peace art thou,
My firm green isle within a troubled sea;
And lying here and looking upward now
I ask, if thou art this, what God must be—
If thus I rest within thy goodness, how
In goodness of the Infinite degree?"

But there are lightnings wherever there is love, for character cannot have one side without having two sides—we cannot love good and not abhor evil; and so the second sonnet, equally true to trust, contrasts with the first :—

"This crystal soul of thine, were it outspread,
Until the drop should fill the universe,
How in it might the angels' wings immerse,
And wake and sleep the living and the dead;
Bereaved eyes bathe; rest Doubt its tossing head;
Swim the vast worlds; dissolve Guilt's icy curse;
And sightless, if but loyal, each disperse
Fear by full trust, and, by devotion, dread.
And yet these perfect eyes in which mine sleep
Would not be sweet were not their lightning deep;
In softest skies the swiftest firebolts dwell;
Thine eyes mix dew and flame, and both are well.
If thus I fear this soul, O God, how Thee,
Both Love's and Lightning's full Infinity?"

In the Portuguese Sonnets, the most subtle and tender and sublime expressions of affection ever written by woman, it is not so much Mrs. Browning who sings as Robert Browning, the future husband. When Tennyson, in the "In Memoriam," commemorates the young Hallam, it is not Tennyson who sings so much as Hallam. When Robert Hall and Canning form a friendship for each other at Eton, it is Canning who appears in Hall and Hall who appears in Canning. When Thomas Carlyle, John Sterling, and Edward Irving are friends, it is Irving that appears in Carlyle at times and Carlyle that appears in Irving; and when Sterling lies dying it is Carlyle that makes up more than half his soul. Always when two human personalities are

united by a supreme spiritual affection they intersphere each other, and produce the moods of one in the other; and when there is a transfiguration in personal affection, there is thus a smiting of the chord of self till it passes in music out of sight. Of course, therefore, there is no method to produce growth, strength, and bliss in the soul like the pure contact of spirit with spirit. Carlyle says we grow more by contact of soul with soul than by all other means united; and literature, if possessed of power, is the mirror of soul, and we grow by contact with the pulsating, reflected depths of genius.

But a Persian proverb says: "Look into the sky to find the moon, and not into the pool." Look into the faces of your elect living friends and into the souls of those whom you trust most. Make much of your giant friendships of all kinds, and be thankful if you have one genuine friendship of any kind, and let unforced trust enswathe you, if you would be transfigured. You grow more in these high moments of personal affection when you look at the moon in the sky than by much meditating on the moon in the pool. Friendships with authors and heroes in a far past are undoubtedly honourable to us and transfiguring, and in loneliness are, perhaps, the highest human solace. But they are not the highest possible to man. They are not the moon in the sky.

You foresee that I am to affirm that a human spirit may commune with the Infinite Spirit, and that all these laws of transfiguration are to be kept in view when we would explain the renovating power on man of the communion of the soul with God as personal. You anticipate that in a moment I shall be asking, in the name of the scientific method, that you, face to face with the holy Person the conscience reveals, should give free course to all those majestic natural laws by which soul transfigures soul through personal affection. I do ask this, and in the stern name of the scientific method. Is any one thinking that, as a benighted soul, brought up in the mossy mediævalism of our latest theology, I cannot worship one God, because I believe in three Gods? Do not pity mediævalism too much. It knows the difference between Trinity and Tritheism. I wish just now to thank God if you can worship one God as Derzhavin does. I rejoice with you if you can go as far as scientific theism does, and worship one God, who was, who is, who is to come. Let us to-day not go further than with Derzhavin, to admire, obey, adore one King eternal, immortal, invisible, and in conscience spiritually tangible.

Samuel Johnson, when he had finished his great dictionary, received a note from his publisher to this effect:—"Andrew Miller sends his compliments to Samuel Johnson, with the money in payment for the last sheet of his dictionary, and thanks God he has done

with him." To this rude note Johnson replied:—"Samuel Johnson sends his compliments to Andrew Miller, and is very glad to notice, as he does by his note, that Andrew Miller has the grace to thank God for anything." You call yourselves Deists, you call yourselves Theists, you hold that in the name of science we can worship one God, who must be behind all natural law. I thank God that you believe as much as that. Perhaps more lies wrapped up and capsulate in your belief than you think. Here are a few slight notes from a Boston marching song, on which my eyes fell the other day, when I was alone. They are sung in the name of exact science, and surely we can sing together anything attuned to that key-note:—

"Bounds of sun-groups none can see,
Worlds God droppeth on his knee:
Galaxies that loftiest swarm,
Float before a loftier Form.

"Mighty the speed of suns and worlds,
Mightier who these onward hurls;
Pure the Conscience's fiery bath,
Purer fire God's lightning hath.

"Brighter He who maketh bright
Jasper, beryl, chrysolite;
Lucent more than they whose hands
Girded up Orion's bands.

"Sweet the Spring, but sweeter still
He who doth its censers fill;
Good is love, but better who
Giveth love its power to woo.

"Lo! the Maker, greater he,
Better than his works must be;
Of the works the lowest stair
Thought can scale, but fainteth there.

"Thee, with all our strength and heart,
God, we love, for what thou art.
Ravished we, obedient now,
Only, only Perfect Thou!"

Will you sing that tremorless song of science, and keep entranced, stalwart step to your singing, and then turn to me, and say that these sublime natural principles by which human affection transfigures the soul do not apply in the sphere of man's relations to the Ineffable Holy Person the moral law reveals? There is such a law. There is such a Person. It follows that there are relations between that Holy Person and ourselves. Therefore, in the name of natural law, I affirm that men as they are can be made holy only by loving a Holy Person.

In the religious, as well as in the social zone of our faculties, only love can smite all the chords with might, or smite the chord of self into invisibility and music. *But the love which can do this is not admiration only—it is adoration.*

In addition to other errors already discussed, it must be noticed that—

11. *Theodore Parker's Absolute Religion fails to distinguish properly between the admiration and the adoration of the Ineffable Holy Person which Parker admits that the moral law reveals.*

1. Admiration does not always imply a full and vivid view of the Infinite Holiness, of the Infinite Oughtness revealed by the moral law. Adoration always does imply this.

2. Admiration does not always imply a glad self-commitment of the soul to the Infinite Holiness. Adoration always does.

3. Admiration usually has but a fragmentary view of the divine attributes as revealed in the nature of things. Adoration, has, or is willing to have, a full view.

4. Admiration may give pleasure for a time. Adoration gives bliss.

5. Admiration may have delight in only a few of God's attributes. Adoration is supreme delight in all God's attributes.

6. Admiration of God is often all that is found or all that it is thought necessary to require in the distinctively literary or poetic schemes of sceptical religious thought. Adoration, however, and not merely admiration, of an infinitely Holy Person revealed by the moral law, is scientifically known to be necessary to the peace of the soul with the nature of things.

What are the signs of this error in Parker's writings?

1. Theodore Parker made only a fragmentary use of the intuitions or self-evident truths of the soul.

2. Hence, his view of that portion of the divine nature which may be known to man was fragmentary.

3. The inadequate emphasis he laid on the fact of sin shows how fragmentary this view was.

4. Parker's fragmentary view of the Divine Nature is shown in his constant undervaluing of the nature of things as it is faithfully represented in the Old Testament.

The Old Testament is not sterner than the nature of things.

Goethe's literary insight, you will probably think, was quite as keen as Matthew Arnold's is, and he, long before Arnold, applied purely literary tests to the Hebrew Scriptures, as religious science herself has been doing for a hundred years. It is amazing that Matthew Arnold believes his famous literary test to be a new one. Goethe said, and Parker used, in his earlier career, to quote the words admiringly:

"The Hebrew Scriptures stand so happily combined together that, even out of the most diverse elements, the feeling of a whole still rises before us. They are complete enough to satisfy, fragmentary enough to excite, barbarous enough to arouse, tender enough to appease."*

The Old Testament Scriptures out of date? Not till the nature of things is. I rode once from a noon on the Dead Sea, through moonlight on the Mar Saba gorges, to Bethlehem in the morning light. I passed through the scenes in which many of David's psalms had their origin, so far as human causes brought them into existence. On horseback, I climbed slowly and painfully out of that scorched, ghastly hollow in which the salt lake lies. I found myself, as I ascended, passing through a gnarled, smitten, volcanic region, and often at the edge or in the depths of ravines deeper than that eloquent shaft yonder on Bunker's Hill is high. At a place where, no doubt, David had often searched for his flocks, I found the famous Convent of Mar Saba, clinging to the side of its stupendous ravine; and I lay down there and slept until the same sun rose which David saw. I looked northward from above Mar Saba, and saw Jerusalem above me yet to the north, for I had been ascending from a spot greatly below the level of the Mediterranean. As I drew near Bethlehem, through brown wheatfields, in which a woman called Ruth once gleaned, I opened and read the book which will bear her name yet to thousands of years to come. Johnson, you remember, once read that book in London, and moved a parlourful of people to tears by it, and to curiosity enough to ask who was the author of that beautiful pastoral. In my saddle, there, in Syria, I was moved as Johnson's hearers were in London; but when I opened the Psalms, one by one, and looked back over the ravines toward the Dead Sea, and northward toward Jerusalem and upon the hill of Bethlehem, to which all nations, after a gaze of nineteen hundred years in duration, were looking yet, and, at that season, sending pilgrims; when I remembered how that terraced hill of olive gardens had influenced human history as no other spot on the globe has done, and that in God's government of this planet there are no accidents; when I took up the astounding harp of Isaiah, and turned through the list of the prophets to find mysterious passage after passage predicting what would come, and what has come; and when I thought of those critics under the western sky who would saw asunder the Old Testament and the New, and put into the shade those Scriptures which Goethe calls a unit in themselves, and which are doubly a unit when united with the New Testament, I remembered Him who, on the way to Emmaus, opened the Old Testament Scriptures, and with them made men's hearts burn.

* See Frothingham's "Parker," p. 56.

God and the nature of things have no cross-purposes. Truth works well, and what works well is truth.

If we are out of harmony with the nature of things, we may be scientifically certain that we are out of harmony with God.

Only a religion consisting of delight in all God's attributes, or adoration of the whole nature of things as representative of the Divine Nature, can satisfy the demands of self-evident truth.

With multitudes of other careless students of the nature of things, Theodore Parker taught the admiration rather than the adoration of God.

I do not forget those prayers of this man, which seem to ascend always as into a dateless noon of mercy, and I do not deny the existence of that dateless noon. But, even if I were to forget, uncounted ages would yet remember that the prayers which caused great drops of blood to fall down to the ground were not quite in that mood, and that no doubt He who offered them knew the full reach of the Divine Mercy, and that it would go as far as the Divine Justice can, but that there are moral impossibilities to a holy being.

You may do as you please; but I, for one, will not take my leap into the unseen holy without looking for the truth around the whole horizon of inquiry. And I find that the most sceptical of you are agreed that there is a stern and an infinitely tender nature of things, and that, even if God exists not, you must be reconciled with the nature of things; and that if God exists, you must yet be reconciled with it, for God himself has no cross-purposes with it.

If a vivid view of the nature of things produced this bloody sweat, perhaps you and I ought not to dream through life, thinking that every fall is a fall upward, and that it is never too late to mend. *All history proves that that faith does not work well.* What does not work well is scientifically known to be out of harmony with natural law.

Go to India. Open the Bhagvat Gheta—a Hindu book your Emerson greatly reveres; look into the subtlest thought of the Hindu philosophy, and you will find these two searching sentences, which are all I need in reply to any criticisms I have heard:

1. "Repeated sin impairs the judgment."
2. "He whose judgment is impaired sins repeatedly."*

With equal scientific clearness Julius Müller says: "*Such is the constitution of things, that unwillingness to goodness may ripen into eternal voluntary opposition to it.*"† By irreversible natural law all character tends to a final permanence, good or bad. In the nature of things a final permanence can come but once.

---

* Professor Monier Williams, "Indian Wisdom," Cambridge, England, 1876.

† "Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii.

The inveteracy of sin! Have you ever heard of that? Out of its acknowledged inveteracy will *not* easily arise its evanescence. Out of its prolongation comes its inveteracy, and out of its inveteracy may come its permanence.

Here and now I do not touch the topic of the annihilation of those who fall into permanent dissimilarity of feeling with God, for I do not see that this cause produces any tendency to annihilation in this world when a man becomes incorrigibly bad. Villains do not commonly lack force. Your Nero, with his murders and leprosies has put his nature out of order; but look at his evil face in marble on the Capitoline Hill, and you start as if gazing into a demon's eyes. He is as little weak as a volcano. What do men mean when they talk of vice annihilating souls? It disarranges them; but disarrangement is not annihilation. Tacitus says that Nero heard the sound of a trumpet and the groans from the grave of his mother, Agrippina, whom he had murdered. His disarrangement was not derangement. Acting fitfully, all the wheels of the faculties continued to exist in Nero, and they are none of them without movement. They grind on each other, no doubt; but I do not find that spiritual wheels can be pulverized. Do you know how they can be? This idea that evil is to annihilate us ought to have some distinct scientific support in the experience of this life.

I affirm that you know that John Milton's Satan is not an impossible character. You say you do not care what Milton says; but I am not asking you to take his theology. Let me not be misunderstood in my citations of the poets as witnesses to what man is. "Paradise Lost" is a great classic, and no poem attains that rank if it is full of manifest absurdities. Now, Milton's Satan is a character in which the disarrangement of the soul is supposed to have become permanent—he has fallen into final permanence of evil character—and yet he is represented as absolutely free, and not very near annihilation! Burns says, if Satan had the predominant wish to do so, he might mend. I appeal to classical literature to show that a permanent evil character, with a free will, is not a psychological self-contradiction. You admit this readily, age after age, in your great classics; but the instant I, here, standing face to face with natural religion, assert that there may be a final permanence of free character, bad as well as good, and good as well as bad, you stand aghast at your own proceeding. You and I must have no cross-purposes with the nature of things. If Milton's description is not a psychological self-contradiction, there may be a person of permanently bad character, absolutely free, and therefore responsible.

What effect arises by natural law in the soul when a man is brought to

a vivid sense of the nearness of the Holy Person the moral law reveals? This question I, for one, am anxious should be investigated in the light of exact research, for the use of the scientific method in answering this enquiry opens the door to the proof that Christianity is the religion of science.

1. The more a man has of the religion demanded by the nature of things—that is, the more adoration he has of the Infinite Holiness, of the Infinite Oughtness revealed by the moral law—the more he is thrown into silence as to his own righteousness, into self-condemnation, and into unrest and fear as to the future effect of his past sins.

I affirm that this is a fair rendering of the history of the human heart age after age. When a man comes near to God, his mood is not that of self-justification. Wait till eternity breathes on your cheek, wait till you come face to face with somewhat in conscience that Shakespeare says makes cowards of us all, and then ask whether the Infinite Holiness of the moral law will be altogether satisfactory to you. Put the question here and now whether we, in our characters as they stand at this moment, should be happy if we were in Heaven with our characters unchanged? Whitfield asked that question on Boston Common in 1740. It has been asked in every century for eighteen hundred years, and now is asked by Science; and every man in his senses, when he has listened to the still, small voice, has said: "As for me, I am the son of a man of unclean lips, and I am of unclean lips, and in my own righteousness I cannot stand alone before God." What are we to make of this action of human nature? It is a fact, and it is an immeasurably significant fact. That is the way of history, and I defy any man to show that I am not true to the unforced outcome of human nature, outside of all the creeds, when I say that a view of all God's attributes humiliates man, puts him out of conceit with his own righteousness, and brings him more and more, even after he has reformed, into fear lest it may not be well with him, because there is a past behind him which ought to be covered. We are made so; and when a religion will not work well in those deep hours in which we see the structure of our own souls, I am afraid to take it in my lighter hours. Addison said that a religion should work well in three places, if it is good for anything: on death-beds, in our highest moments of emotional illumination, and when we are keenest rationally. A religion does not work well anywhere unless in all these three places. Take your scheme of thought that assumes that it is never too late to mend, or that every fall is a fall upward, and bring it face to face with these deepest expressions of human nature age after age. Does it work well there, in these deepest moments? If I find that, age after age,

a scheme of thought is not likely to make men better, is not improving society, is not taking hold of bad lives and making them good—that is for me a sufficient proof that it is out of harmony with natural law. If, in the long course of experience, a scheme of thought does not make me better, does not put a bridle upon passion, does not lift me into harmony with all the divine attributes, I know from that fact scientifically that it is out of harmony with the Infinite Oughtness which stands behind the moral law.

2. The only conception of God's character given under heaven or among men by which a man who worships all God's attributes can be at peace is Christ's conception.

3. The superiority of Christianity to all schemes of natural religion is that it presents the idea of God as an incarnate God and as an atoning God, and of personal love to that Person as the means of the purification of the world.

Christianity does not teach that personal demerit is taken off from us and put upon our Lord. Such transference is an impossibility in the nature of things. But I hold that Christianity, with the atonement as its central truth, matches the nature of things and turns exactly in the wards of the human soul. It has, as a theory of religious truth, a scientific beauty absolutely beyond all comment. The returned deserter, knowing his own permanent and unremovable personal demerit, may yet be allowed to escape the penalty of the law by the substitution of the King's chastisement for the deserter's punishment; and then that deserter, looking on his king as both his Saviour and Lord, needs no other motive to loyalty than the memory of his unspeakable condescension, justice, and love. That memory gives rise to adoration. Whether or not this scheme of thought be the correct one I am not asking you now to determine, but certainly it is the most moving, the most natural, and the most qualified to regenerate human nature of all the schemes the world has seen. I speak of it here and now only as an intellectual system, and affirm, in the name of the cool precision of the scientific method, that *Christianity, and it only, as a scheme of thought, shows how man may look on all God's attributes and be at peace. It, and it only, provides for our deliverance from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin.* Merely as a school of ideas adapted to the soul's inmost wants, Christianity is as much above all other philosophy in merit as the noon is more radiant than a rushlight. "The Cross," said a successor to Theodore Parker to me, the other day, "is full of the nature of things." God be praised that this incisively scientific sentence has come from the lips of a successor of Theodore Parker. "The Cross is not an after-thought." We are to love a God who, from eternity to eternity, is our Redeemer; and, looking on him as

such, we are to take him affectionately as both Saviour and Lord. Christianity includes all ethics; it teaches adoration before all the divine attributes; it is a philosophy; it is an art; it is a growth; and it is also a revelation of the nature of things which has no variableness nor shadow of turning. But its central thought is that of a holy person revealed by the moral law, and at once Redeemer and Lord, and of love for that person as the means, and the only possible effective means, for the purification of the world. God as an atoning God, God as revealed in history, the Cross full of the nature of things, the personal love of infinite perfection as a regenerating bath, this is the beautiful and awful which has triumphed, and will continue to triumph.

TRIUNITY AND TRITHEISM.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

There is a dim twilight of religious experience in which the soul easily mistakes Ossa and Parnassus for Sinai and Calvary. My feeling is that orthodoxy itself lives much of the time in this undispersed twilight; and that the unscientific and lawless liberalism of many half-educated people who have lost the Master's whip of small cords, believe in æsthetic but not in moral law, and proclaim that in the last analysis there is in this universe nothing to be feared—Dr. Bartol says so—and, therefore, we must add, nothing to be loved! is always in an earlier and deeper shadow of that misleading haze. The gray, brindled dawn is better than night; but the risen sun is better than the gray, brindled dawn. We must startle mere æsthetics and literary religiosity out of its dream that it is religion, by exhibiting before it the difference between the admiration and the adoration of the attributes of the Holy Person the moral law reveals. If any who are orthodox in their thoughts worship in their imagination three different beings, they, too, must be startled from this remnant of paganism by a stern use of the scientific method.

As Carlyle says of America, so I of this hushed, reverent discussion: Do not judge of the structure while the scaffolding is up. A glimpse only of the opening of the unfathomable theme which the distinction between the Triunity of the Divine Nature and Tritheism suggests can be given here and now; and more than this will be expected by no scholar. Reserving qualifications for later occasions, I purposely present only an outline, unobscured by detail. I know what I venture in definition and illustration; but I am asking no one to take my opinions. Nevertheless, in order yet further to save time, I am to cast myself abruptly into the heart of this topic, and to give you personal conviction. After all, that is what serious men want from each other, and the utterance of it is not egotism in you or in me. It is the shortest way of coming at men's hearts, and it is sometimes the shortest way in which to come at men's heads, to tell what you, personally, are willing to take the leap into the Unseen depending upon.

What is the definition of the Trinity?

1. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one God.
2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.
3. Neither is God without the others.
4. Each, with the others, is God.

That I suppose to be the standard definition: and if you will examine it you will find it describing neither three separate individualities nor yet three mere modes of manifestation; that is, neither tritheism nor modalism. In God are *not* three wills, three consciences, three intellects, three sets of affections. The first of all the religious truth of exact research is that the Lord our God is one God. It is the immemorial doctrine of the Christian ages that there are not three gods, but only one God.* He is one substance; and in that one substance are three subsistences. But the subsistences are not individualities. All the great symbols teach decisively that we must not unify the subsistences; but, with equal decisiveness, they affirm that we must not divide the substance. In our present low estate as human we find, by the experience of centuries that we do well to heed both these injunctions, and to look on the Divine Nature on all the sides on which it has revealed itself, if we would not fall into the narrowness of materialism on the one hand, or into the vague ways of tritheism or pantheism on the other.

How shall we make clear in our intellectual and emotional experiences the truth of the Trinity, and at the same time keep ourselves in the attitude of those who worship one God, and who, therefore, do not break or wish to break with science, and yet in the position of those who in the one substance worship three subsistences, and therefore do not break or wish to break with the very significant record of the most fruitful portion of the Church through eighteen hundred years? For one, accepting the definition of the Trinity which I have now given as neither tritheistic nor modalistic, I, personally, find no difficulty in this doctrine in the shape of self-contradiction in either thought or terms; and I find infinite advantages in it when I wish to conjoin biblical and scientific truth as a transfiguration for life.

It is sometimes despairingly said that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be illustrated. And this is true. It is the proverb of philosophy that no comparison walks on four feet; and what I am about to say you will take as intended by me to exhibit only the parallelisms which I point out. I am responsible for no unmentioned point in a comparison. No doubt you can find as many places where the illustration I am to use will not agree with the definition as I can places where it does agree. Nevertheless, after dwelling on perhaps a hundred other illustrations, my own thoughts oftenest and with most of reverence come back to this.

Take the mysterious, palpitating radiance which at this instant streams through the solar windows of this temple, and may we not

---

* Athanasian Creed.

say, for the sake of illustration, that it is one substance? Can you not affirm, however, that there are in it three subsistences? It would be possible for me by a prism to produce the colours seven on a screen. I should have colour there, and heat here, and there would be luminousness everywhere. But in colour is a property incommunicable to mere luminousness or to heat. In luminousness is a property incommunicable to mere heat or to colour. In heat is a property incommunicable to mere colour or to luminousness. These three—luminousness, colour, heat—are, however, one solar radiance. Heat subsists in the solar radiance; and colour subsists in the solar radiance; and light subsists in the solar radiance. The three are one; but they are not one in the same sense in which they are three.

It is one of the inexcusable mistakes of a silly kind of scepticism that there are in the Trinity three persons, in the literal or colloquial sense of that word. Sometimes with tears and sometimes with laughter, one pauses over this astounding passage, printed in his manhood by Thomas Paine, in his "Age of Reason"; and yet what he heard read was, I presume, an atrociously careless orthodox discussion.

"I well remember, when about seven or eight years ago, hearing a sermon read by a relation of mine, who was a great devotee of the Church, upon the subject of what is called *redemption by the death of the Son of God.* After the sermon was ended I went into the garden, and as I was going down the garden-steps (for I perfectly recollect the spot), I revolted at the recollection of what I had heard, and thought to myself that it was making God Almighty act like a passionate man that killed his son, when he could not revenge himself any other way; and, as I was sure a man would be hanged that did such a thing, I could not see for what purpose they preached such sermons. This was not one of those kind of thoughts that had anything in it of childish levity; it was to me a serious reflection, arising from the idea I had that God was too good to do such an action, and also too almighty to be under any necessity of doing it. I believe in the same manner at this moment. . . . The Christian mythology has five deities: there is God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, the God Providence, and the Goddess Nature. But the Christian story of God the Father putting his Son to death, or employing people to do it (for that is the plain language of the story), cannot be told by a parent to a child; and to tell him that it was done to make mankind happier and better is making the story still worse, as if mankind could be improved by the example of murder."*

There is nothing in Paine's "Age of Reason" worth glancing at now except this curious paragraph in which he details the circumstances of the life-long unconscious obtuseness and ignorance out of which arose his opposition to Christianity. Possibly, if he had understood the distinction between the Trinity in God's nature and tritheism,

* "Age of Reason," Part I.

this sharp and crackling pamphleteer for freedom, in spite of his narrow brow and coarse fibre, would not have fallen into this amazing error, which, according to his own account, underlay all his subsequent career as an infidel. Three separate beings, he thought, Christianity teaches us to believe exist in one God; and one enraged person of these three had murdered another person.

But scholars, as a mass, following St. Augustine centuries before poor Paine's day, copiously affirmed that the word "person" in the discussion of the Trinity does not mean what it does in colloquial speech. The word in its technical use is one thousand five hundred years old, and it means in that use now what it meant at first.

How commonplace is St. Augustine's remark, repeated by Calvin, that this term was adopted because of the poverty of the Latin tongue! Everybody of authority tells us, if you care for scholarly statement, that three *persons* never meant, in the standard discussions of this truth, three *personalities*, for these would be three gods. This Latin term *persons* is incalculably misleading in popular use on this theme. For one, I never employ it, although willing to use it if it is understood as it was by those who invented the term. Let us use Archbishop Whateley's word "subsistence," for that is the equivalent of the carefully-chosen, sharply-cut Greek term "hypostasis."* We had better say there are in one substance three subsistences, and not mislead our generation, with its heads in newspapers and ledgers, by using a phrase that was meant to be current only among scholars. All these scholars will tell you that it is no evasion of the difficulties of this theme for me to throw out of this discussion at once the word "persons," as misleading; for that word had originally no such meaning in the Latin tongue as the word *person* has in our own. Cicero says, "*Ego unus, sustineo tres personas:* I being one, sustain three characters—my own, that of my client, and that of the judge." Our English language at this point is, as the Latin was not, rich enough to match the old Greek. With Liddon's "Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of our Lord"—the best English book on this theme, though not exhaustive of it—let us say "One substance and three subsistences," and thus go back to the Greek phrase, and be clear.

Can the four propositions of the definition I have given be paralelled by an illustration?

1. Sunlight, the rainbow, and the heat of sunlight, are one solar radiance.

2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.

3. Neither is full solar radiance without the others.

---

* Note to Whateley's "Treatise on Logic."

4. Each with the others is such solar radiance.

Sunlight, rainbow, heat—one solar radiance. Father, Son, Holy Ghost—one God.

1. As the rainbow shows what light is when unfolded, so Christ reveals the nature of God.

2. As all of the rainbow is sunlight, so all of Christ's divine soul is God.

3. As the rainbow was when the light was, or from eternity, so Christ was when the Father was, or from eternity.

4. As the bow may be on the earth and the sun in the sky, and yet the solar radiance remain undivided, so God may remain in Heaven and appear on earth as Christ, and his oneness not be divided.

5. As the perishable raindrop is used in the revelation of the rainbow, so was Christ's body in the revelation to men of God in Christ.

6. As at the same instant the sunlight is itself and also the rainbow and heat, so at the same moment Christ is both himself and the Father, and both the Father and the Holy Ghost.

7. As solar heat has a property incommunicable to solar colour, and solar colour a property incommunicable to solar light, and solar light a property incommunicable to either solar colour or solar heat, so each of the three, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, has a property incommunicable to either of the others.

8. But as solar light, heat, and colour are one solar radiance, so the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God.

9. As neither solar heat, light, or colour is itself without the aid of the others, so neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost is God without the others.

10. As solar heat, light, and colour are each solar radiance, so Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each God.

11. As the solar rainbow fades from sight and its light continues to exist, so Christ ceases to be manifest and yet is present.

12. As the rainbow issues from sunlight and returns to the general bosom of the radiance of the sky, so Christ comes from the Father, appears for awhile, and returns, and yet is not absent from the earth.

13. As the influence of the heat is that of the light of the sun, so are the operations of the Holy Spirit Christ's continued life.

14. As is the relation of all vegetable growths to solar light and heat, so is the relation of all religious growths in general history, in the Church, and in the individual, to the Holy Spirit, a present Christ.

It was my fortune once, on an October Sabbath evening, to stand alone at the grave of Wordsworth, in green Grassmere, in the English

lake district, and read there the "Ode on Immortality," which your Emerson calls the highest water-mark of modern poetry and philosophy. While my eyes were fastened on the page the sun was setting behind the gnarled, inaccessible English cliffs, not far away to the west, and a colossal rainbow was spread over the azure of the sky and the glowing purple and brown of the heathered hills in the east. A light rain fell on me, and, with my own tears, wet the pages of the poet. What now, if some one, as I worshipped there, had come to me, in a holy of holies in my life, and had said, roughly, in Thomas Paine's way, "You believe in five Gods—you are not scientific"? Or what if some one had said, in Parker's way, "The perfection of God has never been accepted by any sect in the Christian world. In the ecclesiastic conception of Deity there is a fourth person, the Devil, as much a part of Deity as either Son or Holy Ghost"?* "Vicarious atonement teaches salvation without morality only by belief in absurd teaching."†

"According to the popular theology, there are three acknowledged persons in the Godhead. God the Father is made to appear remarkable for three things—great power, great selfishness, and great destructiveness. The Father is the grimmest object in the universe."‡ "He, the Draco of the universe—more cruel than Odin or Baal—the author of sin, but its unforgiving avenger. Men rush from the Father; they flee to the Son." "The popular theology makes Jesus a God, and does not tell us of God now near at hand. Science must lay his kingly head in the dust; Reason veil her majestic countenance; Conscience bow him to the earth; Affection keep silence, when the priest uplifts the Bible."§

How would all that speech of the Parkers and the Paines have jarred upon my soul if, standing there alone in a strange land and at the grave of Wordsworth, I had heard the profane collision of their accusations with the holy sentences of this seer, fed from the cradle to the tomb upon Christian truth! What—if at Wordsworth's grave, disturbed by such ghoulish attack, I had needed a spell to disperse the accusations—what better *Procul, procul, este profani*, could I have chosen than these words, once uttered in this city by a renowned teacher of this accused theology—a man of whom it might be said, as he once said of Jonathan Edwards, that he might have been the first poet of his nation if he had not chosen to be its first theologian? A majestic discourse delivered at the installation of the revered pastor of the Old South Church says: "Other men may be alone; but the Christian, wherever he moves, is near to his Master. Every effect is the result of some free will. But many effects within and without us are not produced by a created will. Therefore, they are produced by an uncreated. On the deep sea, under the venerable

* Weiss's "Life of Parker," vol. ii. p. 470.
† *Ibid*, p. 497.
‡ "Sermons on Theism," p. 101.
§ "Discourses on Religion," pp. 425-427.

oak, in the pure air of the mountain top, the Christian communes with the Father of Spirits, who is the Saviour of men. All ethical axioms are his revelation of himself to his children. Their innocent joys are his words of good cheer. Their deserved sorrows are his loud rebukes."

In these words of Professor Park, a benighted believer in three Gods, as you say, is God afar off? Are there three Gods here? Does science bow her head, affection grow dumb, reason muffle her face, as this priest lifts up the Bible?

As the rainbow shows the inner structure of the light, so the character of our Lord shows the inner moral nature of God, so far as that can be known to man. A rainbow is unravelled light—is it not? It was assuredly better for me at Wordsworth's grave to look on the bow I saw in the east than to gaze on the white radiance that fell on the poet's page, when I wished to behold the fullest glory of the light. So assuredly it is better for us to gaze on God's character as revealed in Christ, than on God's character as revealed in his works merely, if we would understand God's nature. As the rainbow is unravelled light, so Christ is unravelled God. At Wordsworth's grave I heard these hoarse voices from the Paines and the Parkers, and these softer, and, I think, more penetratingly human ones from the Wordsworths and the Parks, and, in the name of the scientific method, it was impossible not to assert in my soul that the God who was revealed in Christ was, and is, and is to come; for there is but one God, and he was and is and is to come. Therefore, when the bow faded from the east, I did not think that it had ceased to be. It had not been annihilated; it had been revealed for awhile, and, disappearing, it was received back into the bosom of the general radiance, and yet continued to fall upon the earth. In every beam of white light there is potentially all the colour which we find unravelled in the rainbow; and so in all the pulsations in the will of God the Father in his works exist the pulsations of the heart of him who wept over Jerusalem, and on whose bosom once the beloved disciple leaned; for there is but one God, who was, and is, and is to come; and on that same bosom we bow our heads whenever we bow our foreheads upon that Sinai within us which we call the moral law. The Holy Spirit to me is Christ's continued life.

But you say that this may be philosophical, but that it is not biblical truth. You affirm that I teach myself this by science, rather than by Scripture. I ask you to decide for yourselves what the Scriptures really teach as to the unity of the three subsistences in that Divine Nature which was, and is, and is to come. Assuredly, you will be ready in the name of literary science to cast at

least one searching glance upon this whole theme from the point of view of exclusively biblical statement.

"It is expedient for you that I go away. I have yet many things to say unto you. I will not leave you orphans. I am coming to you. A little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while and ye shall see me, because I go to the Father." They who heard these sentences said: "A little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while and ye shall see me, and because I go to the Father. What is this that he saith?" But there came a later day, when he who had made that promise breathed upon them and said: "Receive ye the gift of the Holy Ghost." We shall not be here—all of us will be mute and most of us forgotten—when, in a better age, the meaning of that symbolic act of the Author of Christianity is fathomed.

Next there came a day when there was a sound as of a rushing, mighty wind, and this filled all the house where they who had witnessed that act were sitting. This is but the experience of many nations since then—the rushing sound of a new influence in human history, quickening human consciences, transforming bad lives into good, but until that time never felt in the world in deluges, although it had appeared in streams. When that influence came, what was the interpretation put upon it by the scriptural writers? Peter, standing up, said: "We heard from him whom we know that God has raised from the dead the promise of the Holy Ghost. He hath shed forth this; therefore, let Jerusalem know assuredly that God hath made him Lord." I call that Peter's colossal "therefore." It is the strongest word in the first oration delivered in the defence of Christianity. The Holy Spirit was promised; it has been poured out; therefore, let those who receive it know that the power behind natural law—our Lord, who was and is and is to come—is now breathing upon the centuries as he breathed upon us symbolically. He hath shed forth this; therefore, let all men know assuredly that God hath made him Lord. When they who were assembled in Jerusalem at that time heard this "*therefore*" they were pricked in the heart.

I affirm that it is incontrovertible that the New Testament writers everywhere, with Stephen, gaze steadfastly into Heaven and behold our Lord—not in Galilee, not on the Mount of Olives, but at the right hand of the Father. Our imagination always looks eastward through space, as through the east window of a cathedral; and so we look out through vapour sometimes, through literalness, or through materialistic haze, thicker than vapor occasionally, and we have not strength of imagination or fervour of spirit enough to understand this literature of the east, on the face of which the world has gazed eighteen hundred

years, and seen its face to be like that of Stephen, as the face of an angel, and from the same cause. The whole New Testament, being full of the Holy Ghost, gazes, not as England and America do, into Gethsemane or upon any sacred mount; but into Heaven, and beholds our Lord at the right hand of the Father. I have bowed down upon the Mount of Olives; I have had unreportable experiences in the garden of Gethsemane, and on the banks of Jordan, and on the white, sounding shore of Galilee, and on Lebanon, and on Carmel, and on Tabor; and God forbid that I should underrate at all a religion that reverences sacred places; but of these sacred places the New Testament proclaims: "He is not here. He has arisen and is ascended." It nowhere exhibits our narrowness of outlook.

What if under the dome of St. Peter's there were but four windows? What if children were brought up to look out yonder upon the Appennines, and here upon the Mediterranean, and there upon the Coliseum, and here upon St. Onofrio's oak, under which Tasso sung? If children were brought up before these windows, and did not pass from one to the other, they might possibly think the outlook from each one was Italy. And so it is; but it is only a part of Italy. We are poor children brought up, some of us, before the window of science; some of us before the window of art; some of us before the window of politics; some of us before the window of biblical inculcation; and we say in petulant tones to each other, each at his accustomed outlook, "This is Italy." What is Italy? Sweep off the dome and answer, "There is but one sky." And that and all beneath it is Italy!

As a fact in literature, it must be affirmed that this is the central thought of the New Testament Scriptures.

We find that when one called Saul of Tarsus journeyed to Damascus (this is trite, because eighteen hundred years have heard it, and the trite is the important thing in history), he heard from a light, above the brightness of noon, the words, "I am Jesus!" And so, later on, Paul wrote that, "We, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from Glory to Glory, as by the Lord the Spirit." "The Spirit is the Lord," was St. Augustine's reading of Paul's words.

So, in the last pages of Revelation, I find that he who was the beloved disciple was in the Spirit on the Lord's-day, and that he beheld "One whose voice was like unto the sound of many waters, and whose countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength." "When I saw him," says this great poet, and prophet, and apostle, "I who have been called a Son of Thunder; I who, when Cerinthus was in the same bath with me, cried out, Away, thou heretic! I,

who have been ready at any time to suffer martyrdom—I fell at his feet as dead. He laid his right hand on me, saying unto me, Fear not; I am the first and the last: I am he that liveth, and was dead; and behold I am alive for evermore, and have the keys of hell and of death."

It is significant beyond comment that our Lord was often called "The Spirit," and "The Spirit of God," by the early Christian writers. "The Son is the Holy Spirit," is a common expression. Ignatius said: "Christ is the Immaculate Spirit."* Tertullian wrote: "The Spirit of God and the Reason of God—Word of Reason and Reason and Spirit of Word—Jesus Christ our Lord, who is both the one and the other."† Cyprian and Iræneus said: "He is the Holy Spirit."‡

Neander, in paraphrase of Peter's oration, says, in summarizing the New Testament literature: "From the extraordinary appearances which have filled you with astonishment you perceive that in his glorified state he is now operating with divine energy among those who believe in him. The Heavenly Father has promised that the Messiah shall fill all who believe on him with the power of the Divine Spirit, and this promise is now being fulfilled. Learn, then, from these events, in which you behold the prophecies of the Old Testament fulfilled, the nothingness of all that you have attempted against him; and know that God has exalted him whom you crucified to be Messiah, the ruler of God's kingdom, and that, through divine power, he will overawe all his enemies."§

So Alford writes: "Christ is the Spirit, is identical with the Holy Spirit; not personally nor essentially (but, as is shown by the Spirit of the Lord following) in this department of his divine working. Christ, here, is the Spirit of Christ."‖

Lange, writing on the same passage of this literature, adds: "We find here such an identification of Christ and the Holy Spirit that the Lord to whom the heart turns is in no practical respect different from the Holy Spirit received in conversion. Christ is virtually the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is his Spirit."¶

What if Peter, at Antioch, had beheld the earliest triumphs of Christianity under persecution, and had heard the story of the martyrdoms which became the seed of the Church and caused Christians to be called by that name, and that shot through with hope the unspeakable

---

* Ad. Smyrn. init. † De Orat. init.

‡ See Delitzsch's "System of Bib. Psychology."

§ Neander, "Planting of Christianity," Bohn's ed. i. 19. Summary of Peter's Speech in Acts ii.

‖ "Remarks on 2 Cor. iii. 17." ¶ Lange, 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.

despair of Roman paganism, as by the first rays of the dawn—could he not, looking on Lebanon and Tabor, on Jerusalem and Galilee, have said: "He hath shed forth this advance of Christianity in human affairs. God has a plan, and he thus reveals it. God is giving triumph to Christianity; therefore, let Lebanon and Tabor, let Jerusalem and Galilee, know assuredly that God hath made our Lord the Lord of the Roman earth, indeed, and that the influence of the Holy Ghost is Christ's continued life"?

What if, later, when Christianity had ascended the throne of the Cæsars, Peter had stood on the Tiber, and had beheld philosophy, little by little, permeated by Christianity? What if he had looked back on the persecutions and martyrdoms which gave purity and power to early Christianity, and which make her record, even to your infidel Gibbon, venerable beyond comment? Could not Peter, there on the Tiber, have said, looking on the Appennines, and Vesuvius, and the Mediterrannean, and on Egypt: "Let Rome and the Tiber, let Alexandria and the Nile, know assuredly, since our Lord who was, and is, and is to come hath shed forth this, that he is Lord"?

What if, later, Peter, standing on the Bosphorus, when Rome had lost her footing on the Tiber, had beheld the rushing in of the Turks to pulverize the sunrise foot of Old Rome; what if he had remembered the day when, standing on two feet, Rome, planting herself on both the Tiber and the Bosphorus, folded her arms and looked at the North Star, and proclaimed herself likely to be as eternal as that stellar light; what if, remembering all that had come and all that had gone, he had beheld that colossus topple toward the west, smite itself into pieces on the Alps, and fall in fragments on the Rhine, on the Elbe, on the Oder, some pieces scattered across the howling North Sea to the Thames, and to the sites of Oxford and Cambridge—these fragments of old Rome built up in these places into universities which caused at last the illumination which brought the Reformation; what if Peter, beholding thus the Greeks driven toward the sunset, and old Rome becoming seed for the Reformation, had stood on the Seine, on the Elbe, on the Oder, and had witnessed the varied progress of the ideas of Him who affirmed once that he had many things yet to say—might not Peter there, side by side by Luther, have said once more: "He hath shed forth this; therefore, let the Alps, and the Rhine, and the Seine, and the Elbe, the Thames, and the German Sea, know assuredly that this gulf-current in human history, now two thousand years old, is not an accident—that it means all it expresses, for what God does, he from the first intends to do. He who has thus watched over the cause of Christain truth, and has been breathing the Holy Ghost upon the nations, hath shed forth this; and therefore let Berlin, and Paris,

and London, and Oxford, and Cambridge, know assuredly that God hath made him Lord?

What if, later, when the tempest of persecution, rising out of the sunrise, smote upon those universities, and blew the "Mayflower" across the sea, Peter had taken position in that vessel, as its billowing, bellying, bellowing sails fled across the great deep in the icy breath of that time; and what if he had seen on the deck of that "Mayflower" a few rushlights taking their gleam from those universities, themselves illumined by the fire that fell at Pentecost? What if Peter, afterwards standing on Plymouth Rock, had seen these rushlights kindling others, and a line of rushlights, representing the same illumination of the Holy Spirit, go out into our wilderness until they glass themselves in the Connecticut, and in the Hudson, and in the eyes of the wild beasts, on the murmuring pines and hemlocks, and in the eternal roar of Niagara, and in the Great Lakes, and in the Mississippi, and in the springs of the Sierras, and at last in the soft, hissing foam of the Pacific seas? What if, beholding these rushlights, thus carried across a continent by Divine guidance, Peter had stood here, would not the force of his word "therefore" have had new emphasis, as he should have said: "He hath shed forth this; therefore, let Boston, let New York, let Chicago, let San Francisco, let the surf of the Bay of Fundy, let the waterfalls of the Yosemite know assuredly that God hath made him Lord"?

But what if, when a tempest sprung out of the south, and these rushlights were, I will not say extinguished, but all bent to the earth, and painfully tried, some of them blown out; he had beheld the lights, little by little, after the tempest had gone down, begin to be carried southward, and at last glass themselves in the steaming bayous and the Gulf; what if, although some had been extinguished for ever, he had seen others shining on the breaking of the fetters of three million slaves; what if the churches, when the tempest ceased, grew brighter in their assertion of the value of their light, and are filling the land with its influence, and, if God continues to illumine them, will make the rushlights glass themselves yet in all the streams, in all springs, and in all the sprays on all the shores of all the land—could not he, looking on such results, in a territory greater than Rome ever ruled over, have said: "He hath shed forth this; therefore, let America know assuredly that God hath made him Lord"?

But what if, lastly, Peter had beheld a rushlight taken across the Pacific to the Sandwich Islands, and one to Japan, and one to China, and one to India, and had seen the soft-rolling globe enswathed in all its zones by rushlights, bearing the very flames which fell at Pentecost,

and beaten on, indeed, by persecution here and there, but not likely to be beaten on ever again as fiercely as they have been already; not likely to be blown out everywhere, even if they are in some places; and thus ensphering the globe, so that it is not probable at all, under the law of the survival of the fittest, that they will be put out; could not Peter, then, looking on what God has done, and what he therefore intended to do, looking on the incontrovertible fact that the islands of the sea and the continents have been coming to prefer Christian thought, and seem likely to remain under its influence; could not he, while standing on scientific and biblical ground, at once have affirmed, in the name both of science and of Scripture, the transfiguring truth: "He hath shed forth this; therefore, let Asia on the Himalaya tops, let Europe in the Parthenon and Coliseum, let London's millions, let the New World in her youthful vigour, let all the islands of the sea, know assuredly that the fittest has survived, and that the fittest will survive, and that God hath made him Lord who is fittest to be so"? All the seas, in all their waves on all their shores, would answer to such an assertion: Hallelujah! So be it! The influences of the Holy Spirit are Christ's continued life.

POPULAR AND SCHOLARLY THEOLOGY.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

God punishes sin no longer than it endures. Many of the evils of disloyalty to the nature of things may continue even after the soul becomes loyal, as many of the evils of secession persist even after a state has returned to allegiance. But, so far as is possible, the forces which were punitive to the disloyal commonwealth become healing to the loyal; and those that are healing to the loyal become punitive to the disloyal. A personal will has proclaimed an unbending enactment, which we call the law of causation; and out of that free, holy law arise all the blessings and all the pains of the universe. Sin's punishment is sin's effect. It is far more wise, therefore, to ask how long sin may endure, than to inquire how long its punishment may last. Of the two methods, the scientific and the biblical, by which an answer to this momentous question may be sought, I am here shut up to neither the one nor the other; but I prefer always to put the scientific method in the foreground. Let me say, once for all, that I do so not because I undervalue the biblical, but because in our time the wants of many minds are best met by combining scientific and biblical evidence, and by making now the scientific the edge, and the biblical the weight of the weapon behind the edge; and now the biblical the edge, and the scientific the weight of the weapon behind the edge.

According to my view of the Unity of the Divine Nature, God is one, as we meet him in the Old Testament and the Oldest, in the New and the Newest. There are four Testaments—an Oldest and an Old, a New and a Newest. The Oldest Testament is the Nature of Things; the Newest is Christ's continued life in the present influences of the Holy Spirit. The Oldest and Newest are unwritten; the Old and the New are written. But the voices of the four are one. Singularly enough, too, the scenery of the four Testaments is one and the same Holy Land, and he who does not feel at home in them all may well suspect the thoroughness of his knowledge of either. Carlyle calls Luther what the future will call Carlyle: "Great, not as a hewn obelisk, but as an Alpine mountain; unsubduable granite, piercing far and wide into the heavens, yet in the clefts of it fountains, green, beautiful valleys, with flowers." This is a good map of the human conscience as we know it scientifically. This, too, fairly understood, is a good map of the Old Testament, and of the New and

of the Newest. If the Old Testament Scripture is at once severe and tender; if in all its gnarled, unsubduable heights there burst out springs of crystalline water; if in the dreadful ruggedness of its peaks we find green places, soft with celestial visitation of showers and of dew; if there is in the Written Word a combination of the Alpine and of the Paradisaical, unfathomable justice, matched by unfathomable tenderness; so in the Newest Testament and in the Oldest—that is to say, in History and in the Nature of Things—*we find in the deepest clefts the springs that do most to quench our thirst!* I, therefore, shall dare to ask you to hang over the great chasms in the nature of things, because at the bottom of these spring up the waters which are the healing of the nations.

Agassiz, wishing to study the glittering interior of an Alpine chasm, allowed himself on one occasion to be lowered into a crevice in a glacier, and remained for some hours at midday at a point hundreds of feet below the surface of the ice. After gratifying his enthusiastic curiosity, he gave the signal to be drawn up. I heard him tell this himself, and he said: "In our haste, we had forgotten the weight of the rope. We had calculated the weight of my person, of the basket in which I rode, and of the tackling that was around the basket; but we had forgotten the weight of the rope that sank with me into the chasm. The three men at the summit were not strong enough to draw me back. I had to remain there until one of the party went five miles—two and a half out, and two and a half back—to the nearest tree to get wood enough to make a lever, and draw me up." When habit lowers a man into the jaws of the nature of things, it is common, but it is not scientific, to forget the weight of the rope. That weight is a *fact* in the universe, and the importance of not forgetting it is one of the most haughty and unanswerable teachings of science.

Character does not tend to final permanence! You have a large task on your hands, if you are going to prove that. You have all the great literatures of the globe against you, to commence with. All the deep proverbs of all nations, and kindreds, and tribes, and tongues are against you. All the established truths relating to habit are against you. All the instincts in man, which forebode terrible things when we let ourselves sink far down in the practice of sin, are against you. All subtlest sorcery, by which we forget the weight of the rope, is against you. The Oldest Scripture and the Old, the Newest and the New, are against you. The law of judicial blindness, not one proposition or illustration about which do I take back, the world will understand by-and-bye as well as Shakespeare understood it. In that day your proposition that character does not tend to a final permanence will

find no scientific believers. The results of evil choice in character are effects; but they become causes, and so every act in itself is an eternal mother, more surely than it is an eternal daughter. The weight of the rope! It is as unscientific to forget that in religious science as it was for Agassiz to forget it among the glaciers of the Alps—and not a little more dangerous!

You wish me to look fairly at all the facts of the case. That, and only that, is what I am trying to do. The question is, whether, while I am doing this, or while I am true to the scientific method, I can agree with Theodore Parker in these propositions:

1. "There is nothing in God to fear."*

Really this language is here.

2. "If God does not care as much for Iscariot as for Christ, as much desiring and insuring the ultimate triumph of the one as the other, then he is not the Infinite Father, whose ways are equal to all his children, but partial, unjust, cruel, wicked, and oppressive."†

3. "Every fall is a fall upward."‡

Turn over to the last and most emphatic passage in this best book Parker ever wrote—except, always, his attacks on slavery—and we find this for the concluding sentence:

"Suppose I am the blackest of sinners—that, as Cain, I slew my brother, as Iscariot, I betrayed him (and such a brother), or, as a New England kidnapper, I sold him to be a slave—and, blackened with such a sin, I come to die. Still I am a child of God, of the Infinite God. He foresaw the consequences of my faculties, of the freedom he gave me, of the circumstances which girt me round; and do you think he knows not how to bring me back—that he has not other circumstances in store to waken other faculties and lead me home, compensating my variable hate with his own constant love?"§

"Come, then, expressive silence, muse his praise."

Theodore Parker's practice throttled kidnappers. Theodore Parker's theory nursed kidnappers.

1. The theory that a man may die a kidnapper or murderer of the blackest criminality, and yet be sure to come out right in the end, and that God as much desires and insures the ultimate triumph of Iscariot as of Christ, does not work well in this world.

You say that one fact does not mean much; and I am not asking anybody to put the emphasis on it which it seems to me to deserve. But I have four tests of truth: intuition, instinct, experiment in the large range, and syllogism. Now, to test Parker's explicit teaching that a man may die a kidnapper, or a Cain, or an Iscariot, and yet be sure of coming out safe in the end, take the test of plain common sense, and suppose society saturated with that belief for thousands of

---

*Parker, "Sermons on Theism," p. 210. †P. 299. ‡P. 408. §P. 417.

years. Ask how it operates in this life, in long, and wide, and multiplex trial, to make that the ruling opinion behind law and literature, politics and commerce, peace and war. Does not every man know that the theory that "it is never too late to mend" relaxes the moral fibres, loosens the strenuous curb which mere prudence puts upon greed and fraud, and, even with the most thoughtful and conscientious, inevitably diminishes the imperativeness of the reasons in favour of good morals? Theodore Parker's preciously loved Iscariot theory hampers—to be perfectly frank I must say I think it hamstrings—society! If a theory does not work well, I hold that it is scientifically proved to be out of harmony with the nature of things. Any proposition which, in a long course of absorption into the veins of the world, produces pimples, and dizziness, and ugly ulcers, is not good food. It is not made for us. The theory that a man may die a Cain, an Iscariot, or a kidnapper, and yet come out right, is one which I will never take the responsibility of proclaiming, for I know it will do harm; and because I know it will not work well, I, for one, am convinced that it is out of accord with the nature of things, and so is wholly unscientific.

2. *A style of teaching that does not work well in this world is adequately discredited as a guide to practical truth as to the next world.*

Law is a unit throughout the universe; and, therefore, a vivid sight of an arc of experience in the seen and temporal exposes, by more than a glimpse, the course of the whole circle in the unseen and eternal. Even in this life we are not outside of the range of the irreversibly just and the irreversibly tender laws of the nature of things; and, therefore, when age after age puts its seal of condemnation on any proposition because it does not work well in this world, I have the right, in the name of the unity and universality of law, and of the principles that truth works well, and that what works well is truth, to brand that proposition as unscientific, and as, therefore, not to be trusted in its relations to the next world.

3. From our present point of view look fairly and with your own eyes at the central objection to the theory that there may be punishment in the universe for ever.

Do you admit that the past is irreversible? I hope you do. Certainly I do. Very well; if the past is irreversible, there are some six thousand years at least during which not a few men have done what conscience proclaims ought not to have been done. That record is to last—is it not? "Oh, no! Oh, no! It would be against the deepest of the liberal instincts to suppose that anything that can cause regret and pain will be in existence when the great plan of the universe has at last been executed." What! a record having in it all

the Neros and Caligulas, all the perjuries and villainies and butcheries of all time, and existing there as a thing that ought not to have been—a record irreversible and inerasible—and yet this give no regret to consciences looking back upon it, even if they are purified ones? There will be for ever in the universe a regret on the part of all consciences in the universe, including God's, that that sin was committed. If regret is pain, there will be pain in the universe for ever! What are we to do with these provincial, unscientific, lawless whippers of syllabub in thought, who will not look north, south, east, and west, and who proclaim constantly that there is nothing in God to fear? There is much in the nature of things to fear! "In the last analysis there will be a painless universe! It cannot but be that all things will come out as they ought to come out!" Indeed, I think they will, and that is why, for one, I am afraid. I am not quite a full-grown man; but I am afraid of the tendency of sin to benumb the moral sense, and of the tendency of human nature to sin repeatedly when the moral sense is once benumbed.

I am afraid of the weight of the rope when I lower myself into the jaws of Gehenna; and I believe solemnly that I never shall cease to regret any sin which I outgrow. It always will be to me a thing that ought not to have been; and my future will have rays of bliss taken off it by every sin I have committed. And that will be true, no matter what God does for me. He is not likely to change to-morrow, or the day after, the natural laws according to which I and all consciences in the universe must for ever and for ever condemn whatever ought not to have been.

Look at the fact, the mathematical certainty, that if you deduct from the experience of a man's holiness for a while you have deducted something of absolutely measureless value. You have poisoned him for once. Now this positive evil of diminishing the possible bliss of that man is to last some time! It never will stop its course—will it? "There will be no final pain or permanent loss in the universe? Oh, no!" I affirm that you cannot take out of human history six thousand years, and give them over to your blackest sins, or to your least black, without subtracting from the bliss of the universe; and that this gap is a part of the record of the past, and that you never can fill it up. That gap will exist

> "Till the sun is old,
> And the stars are cold,
> And the leaves of the judgment-book unfold.*

If you please, my friends, this universe is more serious than poet

* Bayard Taylor's Translation of a Persian Hymn.

has ever dreamed or prophet proclaimed. Any love of ours for what the nature of things condemns is dissonance with Almighty God. If we are not glad to have the nature of things take its course, we are not glad to have God do his will. Whoever reveres the scientific method will never for an instant forget the stern facts that all the past is irreversible; that a record of sin, once written, will endure for ever; that a deduction from the bliss of the universe, if made at all, is of necessity made for eternity. So has God arranged all things that no tears, no infinities of the Divine tenderness, will ever cause that which once has been, but which ought not to have been, to cease to be a part of the record of the past, on which you and I and he must gaze for ever and for ever.

Carlyle is as free from partisanship as the north wind is from a yoke, and Boston ought to hear him when he speaks of Cromwell's inner sky. Hampden and Cromwell, Macaulay says, were once on shipboard in England, with the intention of coming to America for life. Milton, Cromwell, and Hampden, were the first Americans. "It is very interesting, very natural, this conversion, as they well name it," says Carlyle of Cromwell; "this awakening of a great, true soul from the worldly slough, to see into the awful truth of things; to see that Time and its shows all rested on Eternity, and this poor earth of ours was the threshold either of Heaven or Hell."* "The world is alive, instinct with Godhead, beautiful and awful, even as in the beginning of days; one life, a little gleam of time between two eternities; no second chance to us for evermore."†

The force that moves men to deny that character tends to a final permanence, bad as well as good, is sentiment, and not science. It is a form of sentiment peculiar to luxurious ages, and not to the great and strenuous ones. Let the tone of an age change, and this sentiment changes. It is what the Germans call a *Zeit-geist*, and by no means an *Ewigkeit-geist*—a spirit of the day, and not a spirit of eternity. Even self-evident truth has sometimes very little power to exorcise what reasoning did not inculcate. But it is the business of Science to make all ages great and strenuous. When Science has done her perfect work in the world, the lawless liberalism, characteristic of luxurious and relaxed ages, will have no authority.

It is scientifically incontrovertible that the past cannot be changed; and, therefore, it is sure that, if regret for what ought not to have been is pain, there will be pain in the universe for ever; and part of it will be God's own.

This planet moves through space, enswathed with light. The

---

* On Heroes, Lect. vi. † Lect. v.

radiance of the sun billows away to all quarters of infinity. Behind the globe a shadow is projecting, diminishing—indeed, lost at last in the immeasurable vastness of the illuminations of the scene. The stars sing there. The suns are all glad. No doubt, if Richter was right in saying that the interstellar spaces are the homes of souls, there is unfathomable bliss in all these pulsating, unfathomable spaces, so far as they are regions of loyalty to God. There can be no blessedness without holiness; and so there cannot be bliss where loyalty does not exist. Behind every planet there will be that shadow. And as surely as there cannot be illumination on one side without shadow on the other, so surely a record of sin will cast a shadow for ever, and some part of that shadow will sweep over the sea of glass, and not be invisible from the Great White Throne.

You would be true to self-evident propositions. Be true to the certainty that the past is irreversible, and you will break the spell of the unscientific sentiment that there cannot be pain or loss in the universe for ever. So many worlds are around us, so many better ages are ahead of us, that there will be, for aught I know, as much more light than shadow in the moral as there is in the physical universe. Let no man proclaim that the human race thus far has been a failure. Let no man exhibit as Christianity the pandemonium caricature which regards the white lives that come into the world and go out of it before they are stained with responsible evil, as lost ones! A majority of the human beings who have appeared in the world have gone hence before they were responsible for their actions. I believe the majority of all who have been born into the world thus far are in Heaven. But you and I are forced by the precision of the scientific method to admit that the majority of those who live now have not learned similarity of feeling with God. And you and I know incontrovertibly that without similarity of feeling with God salvation is a natural impossibility.

Why, Universalism itself teaches glad allegiance to God as the natural and inexorable condition of the peace of the soul. Go to your Dr. Ryder (who misunderstands so thoroughly an American evangelist whom Gladstone understood), and that serious teacher will tell you that he everywhere proclaims the necessity of the new birth. Where is there, among the more sober—that is, the later Universalists—a man who really possesses scholarship who does not teach the necessity of similarity of feeling with God? Dr. Ryder, however, at a late national convention at Lynn, said that the Universalist churches have not, on the whole, a good name for spiritual efficiency, and that the Universalist ministry does not seem to feel itself charged with the duty of bringing society into this mood, which science pronounces to

be a necessity to the welfare of the soul.* He criticised that ministry for lack of earnestness in the work of leading men into similarity of feeling with God. That convention, although it came near censuring this formidable frankness by a formal vote, did not cut its own throat by doing so. Even Universalism, if scholarly at all, will admit that without similarity of feeling with God salvation is a natural impossibility. It knows that it cannot deny that the majority of those now in the world are not living in the love of what God loves, and the hate of what God hates.

We are agreed, therefore, up to this point; and the question is, whether, as Parker affirms, a man who passes out of life as incorrigibly bad as the blackest crimes can make him, can be assured in the name of natural law that he will attain bliss at last, and that character does not tend to a final permanence.

Your chief objection to the idea that evil may last for ever is drawn not from Science, nor from Scripture, but from this characteristic of luxurious ages—an unscientific sentiment. You affirm that there cannot be pain in a perfect universe—that is, in a moral system where all are free, and where what ought to be done is done by the Ruler. I wish to fracture this boulder which lies upon the necks of many. This vague, easy sentiment has behind it nothing strenuous or clear in thought. I have done enough to throw logical discredit upon that sentiment by simply pointing to the irreversibleness of the past, and the certainty that conscience, as transfigured by the salvation which you say all men will attain, must regret for ever and for ever a record of sin. I have shown that there will be loss for ever and for ever on account of all the sin that has occurred or that is yet to occur.

Having thus, in the name of the scientific method, thrown across this misty chasm of sentimentality a single thread, will you allow me to carry over on that one strand a cable? When the bridge at Niagara was built, a single wire was carried over by a kite, and on that wire was taken over a cable, and finally a bridge. I wish to span this chasm; and beyond all controversy, we see that a single wire is carried across it. Sin having once entered the world, there is a form of loss or evil; and there is one form of pain which we assuredly know will exist for ever. *If, then, some pain and some evil may exist for ever, and God yet be good, do you know enough to say how much evil may exist for ever, and God yet be good?*

Who is there here who dares say that he is wise enough to authorize Theodore Parker to hiss at the Scripture upon this theme?

When you know scientifically that one thread is carried over, how

---

* See *The Universalist*, of date of the Convention, 1875.

do you know but that the cable which the Scriptures carry across may absolutely be the scientific bridge?

We are all agreed that some evil may last for ever; we are all agreed that God is good; and now, in the name of the fact that God is good, you want me to say, with Theodore Parker, that a man may die a kidnapper and yet be saved. You have no reason at the bottom for your demand on that point except this sentiment or the feeling of the luxurious hours, and not of the most illumined days of the world, that it cannot be that any pain can last for ever. I say some pain will, and you know it will; some loss and evil will, and you know it will. Is it not high time, therefore, for us to consult some other authority than that of this scientifically discredited sentiment? The question is whether you are wise enough to estimate the amount of pain or loss or evil which may last for ever?

Apply to this misleading sentiment another and yet sterner test. Suppose that the world were not yet created, and that you were asked: "What will there be in this moral system which God is about to call into existence? Will there be evil in it?" "I do not think there will be, because God is good." "Will there be any one in it allowed to lose peace of soul by falling into love of what God hates, and the hate of what God loves?" "My sentiments assure me that there will not be. God is good and perfect. There will be no imperfection in his work." "Will there be in this universe which is about to come into existence any free and responsible agent, weighted from birth to death with inherited bad tendencies, which, although not sin, are the copious fountain of evil choices?" "Will there be a law of hereditary descent by which beings innocent, so far as their own acts are concerned, will be brought into the world to suffer to the third and fourth generation, as a consequence of the evil choices of their ancestors?" "No; that cannot be. A Perfect Being, with a perfect motive, creating with a perfect purpose, never will call such a law into existence." "How do you know he will not?" "My cultured sentiment is all against it. It is almost a violation of taste to suppose that God will do anything of that sort. Advanced thought cannot admit that any such imperfection will exist in a universe created by a perfect being. God is good. Evil will not be allowed to begin. I am sure nothing of the kind will be found in the world. It is not to be supposed for a moment that an Infinite Being will permit sin to exist in a moral system. I am willing to stake my eternity on the veracity of this sentiment."

Turn now to the actual facts of life, and what is here? What Infinite Wisdom and Power and Goodness have permitted, and nothing else. What God does not do cannot be done wisely. He has not pre-

vented sin; he has given to evil, as well as to good, a power of self-propagation; he has made it a rule that children shall suffer, as well as be blessed, for the evils of their ancestors, and this to the third and the fourth generation. It is a fact beyond all comment amazing that sin has such self-propagating power as to spread itself from birth beyond what we should say is the range of responsibility for it, and that men should come burdened into the world with the offences of those who went before them. But virtue has equally great and even greater power of self-diffusion. Why could not there have been an upper without an actual under in this free world? Perfectly innocent is many a maniac; perfectly innocent is many a cripple. But not innocent some ancestor whose mischiefs spread by hereditary descent! God allows such things to be, and yet we believe God is perfect.

Archbishop Whately has shown elaborately that all the reasoning which proclaims that sin cannot endure for ever proceeds on principles which prove that sin would never be allowed to begin.

Will your unreasoning sentiment stand in this light of science? Or is the universe, perhaps, more complex and serious than you dreamed? I affirm, that all this unscientific sentimentality is best tested by taking it over to a point previous to the commencement of our present moral system, and applying the reasoning there fully and fairly. If a sentiment indicates the truth, it will work well there. Well, I go enswathed in this sentiment into the councils which preceded the formation of this world, and I really find myself a minority there. *Incontrovertibly, there is in the universe a different plan than I should think there would be, if I were to follow the lead of this sentiment, which is the secret source of the denial that all character tends to a final permanence.*

Therefore, my friends, as this sentiment fails us when we apply it to this course of facts which we can test, I affirm that it is not safe to take it and apply it to this course of facts which lie beyond the touch of the human spiritual finger tips. We can reduce this sentiment to absurdity by applying it to the time before the world was; and, therefore, I fear it will turn out an absurdity if we apply it to the time after the world shall cease to exist.

Yes; but ultimately more good will come if evil is permitted. What! I thought you did not believe that evil is a necessary means of the greatest good! I assumed that you adhered to Theodore Parker's position that conscience pronounces that evil ought not to be. If evil is the necessary means of the greatest good, then it ought to be.

In any case you will obtain only a painless universe; so we come back precisely to the point where we stood before public criticism was cast on our lines of thought—and that was that your marble

staircase takes men up no higher than your red-hot iron; and your red-hot iron no higher than they can ascend on your marble. And so, if the only object of evil in the universe is to take men up, God is not benevolent, for he could take men up painlessly to the same height, and he does not do so. There is where you come out at last. It is the stern scientific truth on this theme that you have no ground in this sentiment for denying that character tends to a final permanence.

4. Fill the ages with the certainty that all character tends to a free final permanence, which can come but once, and you encourage all virtue and repress all vice—as the nature of things does. That belief works well, and so deserves coronation. It puts beneath every man who is loyal to duty the Everlasting Arms. It makes him glad, with the unbounded confidence that all things work together for good to those who love God; and serious in an equally measureless confidence that all things do not work together for good to those who do not.

Theodore Parker once proclaimed, in a stray passage, that violation of moral law may be so bold and persistent as to bring with it penalties that have no remedy. He wrote explicitly: "From my own experience I know the remorse which comes from conscious violation of my own integrity, from treason to myself and my God. It transcends all bodily pain, all grief at disappointed schemes, all anguish which comes from sickness, age, from the death of dear ones prematurely taken away. To these afflictions I can bow with a 'Thy will, not mine, be done.' But remorse, the pain of sin—that is my work. This comes, obviously, to warn us of the ruin which lies before us; for, as the violation of the natural material conditions of bodily life leads to dissolution of the body, so the wilful, constant violation of the natural conditions of spiritual well-being leads to the destruction thereof."*

This is clear and straightforward; but it is immediately explained away and repudiated by its own author.

If lost souls repent, they in that act cease to be lost. Will Iago repent? Will Mephistopheles repent? Will Milton's Satan repent? What is the definition of perdition? Permanent dissimilarity of feeling with God. That definition does not imply that a man has lost all tendency to respect what is reasonable; but that he never attains predominant love of what God loves. The failure to attain predominant love of what God loves, and hate of what God hates, is perdition. In the name of the law by which all character tends to final permanence, all science proclaims that Iago and Mephistopheles may fall into permanence of dissimilarity of feeling with God. Salvation in that con-

* "Sermons on Theism," p. 404.

dition is a natural impossibility, for salvation includes similarity of feeling with God.

We want truth winnowed by being held up in the breezes that blow out of all quarters of the sky. I take this proposition that it is safe to die as an Iscariot, and I hold it up in the winds that blow out of the centuries of Roman degradation. It suffers a winnowing even then, for the winds whisper to me: "This teaching would not have cleansed Rome." I hold up the proposition in the winds that blow out of American greed and fraud. The answer is yet more decisive. Safe to die an Iscariot? Safe to die a kidnapper? Safe to die a Cain, with the blood of your brother on your forehead? The scheme does not work well, and it is to be known scientifically and finally by its inevitable fruits.

Thread and cable across the chasm—what is the bridge? And this in one word? It is written in Scripture that there will come a time when, in the name of the nature of things, it will be proclaimed: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still." There is to be a day, of which no man or angel knoweth the time, after which the unholy will continue to be unholy, and the holy will continue to be holy. On the last page of the New, as in many another page of the New and Old, and of the Newest and Oldest Testament, the law is proclaimed that all character tends to a final permanence, good as well as bad, and bad as well as good. The written Scriptures end with this explicit declaration, and in it reach their most awful and their most alluring height. In the great words "Let him that is unjust be unjust still," the Greek verb implies that the agent in this eternal sin is wholly free, and can blame only himself.*

The last verity proclaimed in Scripture is thus the natural permanence of moral character, and the certainty that all crystallization of the soul into final permanence will bring with it its natural wages. The truth that I am afraid of is what all science, what all Scripture, what all human experience affirm—that he who is unholy long enough will be unholy longer; he who is filthy long enough will be filthy longer; and that inveteracy will lead to permanence of voluntary moral remoteness from God; and that this will be its own punishment, in the nature of things.

You are at war with the nature of things. Which shall change, you or it? God cannot be an enswathing kiss without being also a consuming fire.

---

* Alford, Rev. xxii. 11.

COMMUNION WITH GOD AS PERSONAL.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

The river Rhine is a majestic stream until in the Netherlands of the North Sea shore it divides into shallows, and swamps, and steaming oozes. Man's adoration of God is a majestic stream until in the Netherlands of religious experience it divides among three gods or among many gods, and so becomes a collection of shallows, and swamps, and steaming oozes. Out of these North Sea hollow lands, wherever they have existed in any age of the moral experience of the race, there has invariably arisen a vapour obscuring the wide, undivided azure, and even the near landscapes, of natural truth. Give me the Christian and the scientific surety of the Unity of the Divine Nature, and let my whole soul flow toward one God; let me not worship three separate wills, three separate consciences, three separate sets of affections; but one Will, one Conscience, one Heart, which was, and is, and is to come; and so long as the Alps of thought feed me with their cool, impetuous, crystalline streams, I shall be like the Rhine, deep enough in the current of my adoring affections to drive out the driftwood and boulders in the stream, and not permit them to accumulate and form islands, to divide the river into shallows and oozes. Let me move toward God, one in nature outside of the soul, one in Christ revealed in history, one as tangible to the conscience in the intuitions; let me feel that all these subsistences are one substance; and it may be that the Rhine of the human affections, turned thus toward God as one will, one heart, and one conscience, will be majestic enough to float fleets, both for peace and for war, and will go out into the ocean at last not as a set of befogged shallows and oozes, but as the Amazon goes out—an undivided river into an undivided ocean, a thousand flashing leagues caught up into infinite times ten thousand flashing leagues, the intersphering of wave with wave, in every case the interspersing of a portion of the finite personality with the Infinite Personality, one, invisible, omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal; the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; hly holy, holy; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

For one, I had rather go back to the Bosphorus, where I stood a few months ago, and worship with that Sultan who lately slit his veins and went hence by suicide, than to be in name only an orthodox believer, or in theory to hold that there is but one God, but

in imagination to worship three gods. I am orthodox, I hope, but my first concern is to be straightforward. I purpose to be straightforward, even if I must be orthodox. Revere the orthodoxy of straightforwardness; and when that justifies you in doing so, but only then, revere the straightforwardness of orthodoxy. Mohammedan paganism contains one great truth—the divine unity. And I never touch this majestic theme of the divine triunity without remembering what that single truth, as I heard it uttered on the Bosphorus, did for me when I knelt there once in a mosque with the Sultan and with the peasants, with the highest officers of state and with the artisans, and saw them all bow down and bring their foreheads to the mats of the temple, and heard them call out, from the highest to the lowest, as they prostrated themselves: "*Allah el akbar!*" —"God is one, and God is great." So prostrating themselves, they three times called out, "*Allah el akbar!*" and then remained silent, until I felt that this one truth had in it a transfiguration. I affirm that I had rather go back to that shore of the azure water which connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and, omitting the leprosy of Mohammedanism, take for my religion pure theism, than to hold that there are three gods, with three wills, three sets of affections, three intellects, three consciences, and thus to deny the assurances of both scriptural and scientific truth, and make of myself the beginning of a polytheist, although calling myself orthodox.

At what should we arrive, however, if we should adopt the bare idea of the divine unity without taking also that of the triunity? Should we thus be faithful to the scientific method? Should we thus be looking at all the facts? Should we obtain by this method the richest conception of God, or should we see from such a point of view only a fragment of that portion of his nature which man may apprehend?

Theodore Parker taught God's immanence in mind and matter, and it is amazing that he thought this truth a new one. If you are of my opinion, you will reverence that one portion of his far from original teaching; for it is at once a scientific and a Christian certainty that wherever God acts, there he is. The Bridgewater treatises affirm this truth with more emphasis than Parker ever laid upon it. The one chord which he struck in theology to which all hearts vibrate was the certainty of the Divine Immanence in matter and mind. And this one certainty was the secret of any power he had in distinctively religious endeavour. Men, he said, have a conscience; and in that conscience the moral law is revealed; and that moral law reveals a Holy Person.

Your Helmholtz, and Wundt, and Beale, and Carpenter, and Herschel, and Faraday, and Darwin, and Agassiz, as well as your Lotze, and Kant, and Leibnitz, and your St. Chrysostom, and Jeremy Taylor, and Bishop Butler, all unite with Plato, and Aristotle, and David, and Isaiah in asserting the Divine Personal Immanence in matter and mind. There is no cloud at this moment, shot through by the sun, so completely saturated by light, as all mind and matter are by the Divine Immanence—that is to say, by this invisible, incomprehensible Personality which the moral law reveals.

But, granting the fact of the Divine Personal Immanence in matter and mind, to what results must a rigid use of the scientific method bring us on the theme of the Triunity of the Divine Nature? I know of no question on this topic fairer or more fruitful than this.

1. Since a personal God is immanent in all matter and mind, it follows that in all Nature outside the soul we look into God's face.

2. For the same reason it is incontrovertible that in the Soul we call Christ, and in his influence in history, we look into God's face.

3. For the same reason, it is certain that in the intuitions of conscience we look into God's face.

4. *These three spheres of his self-manifestation embrace all of God that can be known to man.*

5. *In each of these spheres of the self-manifestation of the Divine Nature something is shown which is not shown with equal clearness in either of the other spheres. In each of them the Ineffable Immanent Person says something new.*

6. In external Nature he appears chiefly as Creator; in Christ chiefly as Redeemer; in conscience chiefly as Sanctifier.

7. These are all facts scientifically known.

8. *A scientific scheme of religious thought must look at all the facts.*

9. *When all the facts known to man are taken into view, a Trinity of Divine Manifestations is, therefore, scientifically demonstrable.*

10. *But, according to the admitted proposition that a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind, he reveals himself in each of these manifestations as a Person and yet as one.*

11. *A Personal Triunity, of which Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier are but the other names, is, therefore, scientifically known to exist.*

12. This is the Trinity which Christianity calls Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and of all parts of whose undivided glory it inculcates adoration in the name of what God is, and of what he has done, and of what man needs.

All these propositions you will grant me except the second; but you

cannot deny that without throwing away your own admission that a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind.

Even Rousseau could say that Socrates died like a man, but the Founder of Christianity like a God. Carlyle affirms that Voltaire's attacks on Christianity are as battering-rams driving in the wrong direction. Who doubts that at the head of the effect we call Christianity there was an adequate cause, or a Person? and who can deny that in the soul of that Person God spake to man as never before or since? Scholarship has outgrown the old forms of historical doubt; and historical science now admits that, whether we say Christ possessed proper Deity or not, he assuredly has been the chief religious teacher of the race. But that fact means more than much, if looked at on all sides.

Napoleon, at St. Helena, said that something mysterious exists in universal history in its relation to Christianity. "Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was?" said this Italian, greater than Cæsar, and as free from partisan religious prejudices. The question was declined by Bertrand, and Napoleon proceeded: "Well, then, I will tell you." I am reading now from a passage authorized by three of Napoleon's biographers, and freely accepted by European scholars as an authoritative statement of his conversation in exile.* "Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and I myself have founded great empires; but upon what did these creations of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone founded his empire upon love, and to this very day millions would die for him. . . I think I understand something of human nature; and I tell you all these were men, and I am a man. No other is like him. Jesus Christ was more than a man. I have inspired multitudes with such an enthusiastic devotion that they would have died for me; but to do this it was necessary that I should be *visibly* present, with the electric influence of my looks, of my words, of my voice. When I saw men and spoke with them I lighted up the flame of self-devotion in their hearts. . . . Christ alone has succeeded in so raising the mind of man toward the Unseen that it becomes insensible to the barriers of time and space. Across a chasm of eighteen hundred years Jesus Christ makes a demand which is beyond all others difficult to satisfy. He asks for that which a philosopher may often seek in vain at the hands of his friends, or a father of his children, or a bride of her spouse, or a man of his brother. He asks for the human heart; he will have it entirely to himself; he demands it

* See Liddon's "Bampton Lectures," Eng. ed., p. 148, for a full list of authorities for this xtract.

unconditionally, and forthwith his demand is granted. Wonderful! In defiance of time and space, the soul of man, with all its powers and faculties, becomes an annexation to the empire of Christ. All who sincerely believe in him experience that remarkable supernatural love toward him. This phenomenon is unaccountable; it is altogether beyond the scope of man's creative powers. Time, the great destroyer, is powerless to extinguish the sacred flame; Time can neither exhaust its strength nor put a limit to its range. This is that which strikes me most. I have often thought of it. This it is which proves to me quite convincingly the divinity of Jesus Christ."

It is beyond all controversy that precisely this central thought of Christianity which convinced Napoleon was what most struck the ancient Roman philosophers. Christ's continued life in the Holy Spirit—was that heard of in the first centuries? Why, I open an ancient book, written in opposition to Christianity, by Arnobius, and I read: "Our Gods are not displeased with you Christians for worshipping the Almighty God; but you maintain the deity of one who was put to death on the cross. You believe him to be yet alive (*et superesse adhuc creditis*) and you adore him with daily supplications."* Pliny's letter to Trajan implies all this, but is so celebrated that I need not recite its majestic facts here.

Men showed me at Rome, in the Kircherian Museum, a square foot of the plaster of a wall of a palace not many years ago uncovered on the Palatine Hill. On the poor clay was traced a cross bearing a human figure with a brute's head. The figure was nailed to the cross, and before it a soldier was represented kneeling and extending his hands in the Greek posture of devotion. Underneath all was scratched in rude lettering in Greek: "*Alexamenos adores his God.*" That representation of the central thought of Christianity was made in a jeering moment by some rude soldier in the days of Caracalla; but it blazes there now in Rome, the most majestic monument of its age in the world.

You believe *your* Lord is yet alive? You adore him? Listen to the last words of the martyrs through all the first five centuries of Christianity. They are these and such as these: "O Lord God, who didst make heaven and earth; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one God, be near us! Save the Church!"

Poor Blandina, there at Lyons, in the year 177—you remember how they roasted her, frail girl, on the red-hot iron chair; put her in a net and exposed her to the horns of the wildest oxen; whirled

* Arnobius, "Adv. Gentes," i. 36.

her in instruments of torture till her senses were lost, and then plunged her into flames; and day after day did that, while she apparently experienced little pain, calling out at every interval when her strength came back: "I am a believer in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, one God, who is with me. There is no evil done among us. I am a Christian." And so she passed hence, but speaks to us as one yet living!* Multitudes and multitudes, a great army of martyrs, passed out of the world believing that the influence of the Holy Spirit was Christ's continued life; and if there is anything mysterious in history, Napoleon had his eye upon it when he asked what it is that makes the martyrs in every age painless when on the bosom of their Spouse.

There was a God in Christ, whether you regard him as divine or not; and that was one revelation of God which was made and is now making, in this incontrovertible fact of his earthly influence, which Napoleon thought utterly inexplicable on merely human lines of cause and effect. But in conscience there is a God. In the moral intuitions of the soul we look into God's face. Assuredly, even if you and I were not to have, a better age will have, a religious science that will take into view all these facts. There is a God in external nature; there is a God in Christ; there is a God in the intuitions of the human spirit; and, if I could not have any other Trinity than that, although I do not believe that to be the best, I would have that, for I want all the truth I can reach. I, therefore, will look on God as manifesting himself in external nature and in our intuitions, and in history as influenced by his Spirit; and my God will be thus revealed to me with more fulness than he could be if I had only one of these three personal revelations of himself. In each of them he says what he does not say elsewhere. Science must be hungry to hear all that all facts say.

God is a person in each one of these revelations. He is a person in the strict sense, as seen in external nature. As seen in our Lord he is a person in the strict sense. As revealed in the moral law he is a person in the strict sense. *But there are not three persons. He is one Person in the strict sense, for natural law is a unit in the universe, and reveals but one will.* Three revelations of God are all one Person, although in each revelation he is a person. Now, is that mystical? or does that straightforward use of the scientific method give a richer view of human history, a richer view of the human soul, a richer

* See Eusebius, v. 1—3, for a contemporary account of Blandina, in a letter written from the churches of Lyons and Vienne to those of Asia Minor.

view of external nature than mere deism, or theism, or materialism, or pantheism, however fortified by modern science, can present to you?

Thus far I have asked you to notice only what is involved in Theodore Parker's admission that a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind. On this point, as on so many others, Theodore Parker failed to carry out consistently his own principles, and fell into error not so much through a wrong direction as through haste and incompleteness of research. If I must at this point drop analytical discussion and give personal conviction, let me say that Theodore Parker's scheme of thought, melodious as that one feebly-struck note of the Divine Immanence in mind and matter is, compares to me with Christianity as water compares with wine. Tennyson makes one of his characters say to another:

> "All my passions, matched with thine,
> Are as moonlight unto sunlight,
> Or as water unto wine."

So I aver, in the name of the precision of the scientific method, that any scheme of thought not Christian, as matched with Christianity and tested fairly by intuition, instinct, syllogism, and ages of experiment, is as moonlight matched with sunlight, or as water matched with wine.

I want supremely such a view of religious truth as shall set me at rest about my irreversible record of sin. I want such a view of God as shall present him as an atoning God, on whom I cannot look without the regeneration of my own nature through gratitude, and on whom I can look, and yet for his sake be at peace.

Why do the ages cling to the doctrine of the Trinity? Perhaps their wants have been much like yours and mine! Is the truth of the Divine Trinity dear to us because it is a fine piece of philosophical speculation? Ah! you know life too well to think that eighteen centuries have offered up their martyrdoms, and the personal careers which, not ending at the stake, have been bound to the stake perhaps through the better part of the time from birth to death, and that these ages have had nothing more than philosophy behind them! *Great human organic wants are revealed by the reception the world has given to the deepest religious truths. We know we are going hence. We wish to go hence in peace. We want a religion that can wash Lady Macbeth's red right hand.* We want to know that an atonement has been provided such that we may look on all God's attributes, and then in His merit, not in

our own, be at peace here and in that Unseen Holy into which it is scientifically sure that all men haste.

Religious science never teaches that personal demerit is or can be transferred from an individual, finite personality to God. That is a ghastly error, which has been charged to Christianity in every age. It is one of the most monstrous of misconceptions, one of the most unphilosophical of all the hideous caricatures set up by Theodore Parker before the public gaze, that Christianity teaches that personal demerit or blame-worthiness may be taken off one soul and put upon another, and that one an innocent being. We hold nothing of the sort; but we have been taught that there is revealed in Christianity a view of God which represents him as substituting chastisement for punishment, and as thus making possible the peace of all who are loyal to him. And this has been the regenerating influence which has brought the human spirit to the highest summits it has ever attained; so that, both by ages of experience and by philosophy, we know that this central portion of the Christian scheme of thought is adapted to man's deepest wants.

If you deny the doctrine of the Trinity, you must deny the whole central portion of this crowned system of truth, in all its philosophical glory and in all its prolonged and multiplex breadth of power in human experience. There was nothing so touching when Professor Huntington, of Harvard University, turned toward the doctrine of the Trinity as his proclamation of the "life comfort and salvation" which burst upon his vastly-enlarged horizon as he attained at once the scientific, the biblical, and the only historically radiant point of view.*

Only an undiluted Christianity gives such a view of God that we can be true to the scientific method, and yet at peace with all his attributes.

You will not soon drive out of human nature the desire to go hence in peace. You will not soon remove from human nature the feeling it has exhibited in every age that peace does not come even when we reform. You will not soon change the natural operations of conscience. You will not soon cause the past to be reversible. You, therefore, will not soon make the atonement anything other than a desire of all nations. But until you have done all these things there will be life, there will be a wholly natural and abounding vitality in that exhibition of God's nature to man which represents him as an atoning God, and as a Person who was and is and is to be with us,

---

* See Huntington, Bishop, "Christian Believing and Living."

because one with him who made Heaven and earth, and with him who speaks in conscience at this hour, and who, from eternity to eternity, is our Saviour and our Lord.

But next I want in my view of religion something that will bring me into harmony with all exact research. I want no mysticism; no mediævalism; no doctrine supported simply by the schools, or of doubtful worth under the microscope and the scalpel. I find it beyond controversy, as Theodore Parker held, that a Personal God is immanent in matter and mind. It is beyond all debate that there is a Holy Person revealed by the moral law. I want a God who shall be one in history, in external nature, and in my intuitions; and I turn to Christianity, and I find a breadth of outlook more than equal to the loftiest philosophical demand. I read that he who is the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world—that is, the Personal God who is revealed in conscience—is also he whose light shone in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not; and who was in the world which was made by him, and the world knew him not. He who speaketh in the still small voice is he who spoke, and who yet speaks, as never man spoke. If we do not force upon the Scriptures our own narrowness of thought, we find that Science and Scripture are agreed, for both make God perfect and one; and, according to the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit is Christ's continued life.

What are the great proofs in Scripture that God is presented to us as Trinity in Unity? What are the great biblical proofs that God is triune? What are a few of the tremorless bases of conviction that the Trinity is taught in the New Testament? I hold that it is a cheap reply to the assertion that the Trinity is taught in the New Testament to say that the word is not there. The word "Christianity" is not there; the word "Deity" is not there; the word "humanity" is not there. The question is, whether it is not taught in the New Testament that God is one. You say yes. If it be taught in the New Testament that God is one, and that each of the three subsistences is God, the Trinity is taught there as implicitly, though not explicitly. After ages of debate, you know what nine out of ten of the devoutest and acutest think the New Testament teaches in the baptismal formula and the apostolical benediction—two incisive biblical summaries of Christian truth. The direction to the apostles as to baptism was: "Baptise all nations in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost"—a triune name, no distinction being made between these three. So, too, the benediction was pronounced in the triune name: "May the love of God, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you." You have been told that Neander says that there is not a passage in the New Testament which asserts the doctrine of the Trinity explicitly; and Neander does say so. But he says a great deal more—namely, that the whole New Testament contains the doctrine implicitly!

"In the doctrine of the Trinity," he writes, "God becomes known as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, in which threefold relation the

whole Christian knowledge of God is completely announced. Accordingly, all is herein embraced by the Apostle Paul when, in pronouncing the benediction, he sums up all in the formula: The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit. God, as the living God, the God of mankind, and the God of the Church, can be truly known in this way only. This shape of theism presents the perfect mean between the wholly extra-mundane God of deism and the God brought down into and confounded with the world of pantheism. This mode of the knowledge of God belongs to the peculiar science of theism and the theocracy."*

As many windows as there are facts let us use when we gaze on religious truths. Your mere theism shuts me up to one window. You will not let me look on all quarters of the sky. You shut your eyes to the light when you will not recognize what Napoleon saw in history. *I want no pulpit that is not built on rendered reasons; but I must be allowed to find reasons wherever they exist, whether the heavens stand or fall.*

Let research, with the four tests of intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism, have free course, and I am content. For fear that your conclusions may be a little broader than you like, you will not fail to gaze on the evidence which convinces Neander that the outcome of all looking into the Scriptures and into mere reason must be a belief in a Creator, in a Redeemer, and in a Sanctifier, the three one God, personal, omnipresent, and in conscience tangible.

When I thus use all my light, I am delivered from materialism; when I thus look on God, I am delivered from pantheism.

Whoever searches the Bible as a Christian believer will be delivered from some narrowness that belongs to half-educated Christian circles. We are not abreast of our privileges when we live always in Judea. The Scriptures are a map of the universe, and not of Palestine merely. If we are full of their spirit, the wings of philosophy will tire us only by their tardiness and narrow range of flight.

There are in all ages, and particularly in this age of special studies, the most terrific dangers in a fragmentary view of God. I want this doctrine of the Trinity to save me from fragmentariness of outlook upon the Divine Nature. I will not allow myself to see God merely in my intuitions, and shut up the windows of external nature and of history; for thus I may easily drop down into pantheistic individualism, which, with supreme felicity of speech, your brave, broad, and massive Thomas Hill calls egotheism.†

Neander says that the doctrine of the Trinity implies that of the theocracy, or of a government of God in the universe and in national history. Remember that our fathers came here avowedly to found a theocracy. What did that mean? A state of which natural law and revelation together, shining under, in, and about legislation, should be the masters; a state where what can be known

---

* Neander, "Hist. of the Chr. Rel. and Ch.," Torrey's trans., i. 572.

† See Hill, ex-president of Harvard University, "The Theology of the Sciences," 1877.

of God by reason, on the one side, and revelation, on the other, should lock its two hands around the neck of all vice, and throttle whatever would throttle the Christian well-being of the poorest or the highest; and should thus build up in history a state fit to be called at once natural and God's own! When the Jesuits came to the mouth of the St. Lawrence, they intended to found a theocracy. The great dream that lay behind Milton's, and Cromwell's, and Hampden's thoughts and deeds, was that human legislation should be a close copy of the Divine and natural law. At the point of view to which exact research has now brought us we must assert that the fact of the Divine Immanence in matter and mind makes the world and nations a theocracy, and that politics and social life, no less than philosophy, must beware of fragmentary outlooks on the Divine Nature. Richter said: "He who was the Holiest among the Mighty, and the Mightiest among the Holy, has, with his pierced hand, lifted heathenism off its hinges, and turned the dolorous and accursed centuries into new channels, and now governs the ages." History, the illuminated garment of God! The church, Christ's temple! Did you ever hear of the former in the name of science, or of the latter in the name of Christianity? But to your Titanic Richter the two are one. De Tocqueville affirms anxiously that men never so much need to be theocratic as when they are the most democratic. Democracy will save itself by turning into a theocracy, or ruin itself by not doing so.

Transfigure society with Richter's thought. Saturate the centuries with the certainty of the Divine Personal Immanence in matter and mind. Do this, and in the name of Science itself the labouring ages will slowly learn not merely admiration, but adoration, of one God incontrovertibly known in external nature, history, and conscience as Creator, as Redeemer, as Sanctifier. When they touch the hem of the garment of a Personal God thus apprehended, and never till then, will they be healed of the measureless evils arising from fragmentariness of outlook upon the Divine Nature. Let the forehead of Science, in the name of Christianity, bow down upon the moral law, as the beloved disciple did upon our Lord's bosom. Let Richter lead, and a time will come when all clear thought, all political action, all individual growth will call out: "Glory be to God revealed in external nature; Glory be to God revealed in Christ and the Church; Glory be to God revealed in conscience." To this secular voice the Church will answer, in words which have already led eighteen centuries, and Science will add at last her momentous acclaim: "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end."

THE TRINITY A PRACTICAL TRUTH.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

Charles Kingsley, poet and philanthropist, friend of the workingman, and chaplain to the Queen of the British Empire, a stalwart and intense soul, not easily cheated, wrote from St. Leonard's, in 1857:—

"My heart demands the Trinity as much as my reason. I want to be sure that God cares for us, that God is our Father, that God has interfered, stooped, sacrificed himself for us. I do not merely want to love Christ—*a* Christ, some creation or emanation of God's, whose will and character, for aught I know, may be different from God's. I want to love and honour the abysmal God himself, and none other will satisfy me. No puzzling texts shall rob me of this rest for my heart, that Christ is the exact counterpart of him in whom we live and move and have our being. I say, boldly, if the doctrine of the Trinity be not in the Bible, it ought to be, for *the whole spiritual nature of man cries out for it.* Have you read Maurice's essay on the Trinity, in his theological essays addressed to Unitarians?* If not, you must read it."†

In 1865 Kingsley wrote to Maurice:—

"As to the Trinity, I do understand you. You first taught me that the doctrine was a live thing, and not a mere formula to be swallowed by the undigesting reason; and from the time that I learnt from you that a Father meant a real Father, a Son a real Son, a Holy Spirit a real Spirit, who was really good and holy, *I have been able to draw all sorts of practical lessons from it in the pulpit, and ground all my morality and a great deal of my natural philosophy upon it, and shall do so more.*"‡

In 1875 Charles Kingsley, having bidden adieu to Westminster Abbey and Windsor Castle, lay dying; and, with the breath of eternity on his cheeks, the central thought of this modern man was that "only in faith and love to the Incarnate God our Saviour can the cleverest, as well as the simplest, find the peace of God which passes understanding." "In this faith," says his wife, "he had lived; and as he had lived, so he died—humble, confident, unbewildered." In the night he was heard murmuring: "No more fighting; no more fighting." Then followed intense, earnest prayers, which were his habit when alone. His warfare was accomplished; he had fought the good fight; and on one of his last nights on earth his daughter heard him exclaim: "How beautiful God is!" The last morning, at five o'clock, just after his eldest daughter and his physician, who had sat up all night, had left him, and he thought himself alone, he was heard, in a clear voice, repeating the words of the Burial Service: "Thou knowest, O Lord,

---

* "Theological Essays," pp. 410—441."

† Charles Kingsley, "Letters and Memories of his Life," 1877. ‡ *Ibid*, p. 357.

the secrets of our hearts; shut not thy merciful ears to our prayer; but spare us, O Lord most holy, O God most mighty, O holy, merciful Saviour, thou most worthy Judge Eternal, suffer us not, at our last hour, for any pains of death, to fall from thee." He turned on his side after this, and never spoke again.*

This modern martyr, who passed hence at the age of fifty-five, died as martyrs have died ever since the apostolic age; and I ask you to gaze with proper awe upon this recently unveiled holy of holies of a brave, late, and adequately cultured life, as a vivid type of what has been happening in the world for eighteen centuries. If you have historic sense, or any other kind of sense, you will not be easily persuaded that teaching which has survived the buffetings of eighteen hundred years, and has been to such crowned multitudes of the acutest and saintliest of the race a source of strength in life and of peace in death, has behind it only philosophical speculation, metaphysical nicety, cold analysis, scholarly precision, without practical application. I affirm in the name of all accredited history:

1. That the doctrine of the Trinity has always been held by Orthodoxy for its practical value.

2. That it was the doctrine of the Trinity which excluded from power in human cultured beliefs the thought of God as fate, and brought in the organizing and redemptive idea of God's fatherhood, and especially of the possibility of the communion of men with God as personal.

The scholarship of the Roman Empire shook off its belief in the fatalism of Paganism by learning the doctrine of the Trinity. Incontrovertibly, the divine aroma of communion with God as personal was breathed into history from the lips of that philosophy which speaks of God under a Triune name. Historically, this teaching has borne these fruits; and the law of the survival of the fittest makes me, for one, reverent toward a proposition which, in so many ages, in so many moods of the world's culture, in such different circumstances of individual growth, has exhibited a power ever fresh, and has yet been the same, from the time when the apostolic benediction was pronounced in that Triune Name, to the last anthem that rolled around the world in that same Name.† With the goodly company of the prophets and the apostles; with the martyrs of the earliest Christian ages; with the earlier and the later Fathers; with the strong scholars who, differing on much else, are on this truth essentially and persistently at one; with the Continental and English reformers, and the Anglican and Puritan and American divines; with

---

* Charles Kingsley, "Letters and Memories of his Life," 1877, pp. 481, 482.

† See Huntington, Archbishop, "Christian Believing and Living," pp. 359—361.

Athanasius and Tholuck; with Fénélon and Knox; with Augustine and Anselm; with Calvin and Wesley; with Luther and Bossuet; with Bull and Baxter, Horsley and Howe, Pearson, Newman, Pascal, Cudworth, Wolf, Butler, Tauler, and Hopkins, Waterland, Edwards, Sherlock, and Dwight, Park and Neander; with Nice, Trent, Augsburg, Westminster, Edinburg, Leipzig, Berlin, Princeton, New Haven, and Andover, shall not Boston say, "Let the anthem roll on"?

It is amazing to me that any one can have considered my definition of the Trinity as Unitarian. A man whom I honour, and whose candour every one honours, is reported to have said publicly that the view presented here two weeks ago is "almost identical" with his own, and is such a view as "any Unitarian may readily receive."* I am very glad if it is; but, as I understand Mr. Clarke's view, the one presented here and his differ by celestial diameters. What is the definition which this lectureship has presented?

1. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God.
2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.
3. Neither is God without the others.
4. Each with the others is God.

On the street I met, a few days ago, a man whom I suppose to be the best scholar in America in early ecclesiastical history. It is not permitted to me to mention his name; but he has a public position that commands respect from all scholars. Before I had introduced the topic at all, he said to me, with much emphasis: "I have documentary evidence in my possession to prove that your doctrine of the Trinity is the view held in the first four centuries." I also met a theologian whose knowledge of the relations of Christian truth to philosophy seems to me to be unequalled in this country; and he said to me, without any introduction of the topic on my part: "That definition of the Trinity which you have given will stand." He said this twice or thrice over; and, in order to be sure that he had really paid attention enough to this poor lectureship to know what the definition was, I recited the four propositions. And again he said, in effect: "The storm in the past has been borne by that definition, or its equivalent; and you will find that the storm of the future will be."

It is not by authority that I desire to buttress up any definition. *It is not a definition that I wish to give, but a life.* In the midst of a hushed atmosphere, where an Unseen Power is revealing itself in the conversion of men, this very Temple, filled not long ago with the commercial business soul of Boston, and Massachusetts likely to be

---

* *Daily Advertiser*, March 26th, "Outline of the Rev. James Freeman Clarke's Discourse, March 25th.

reverent if she sees that the executive talent of this city is on its knees before Almighty God, we want not merely analysis and discussion. We want no breath of the unsanctified north wind which has too often blighted Eastern Massachusetts on holy themes. Let a fascinating devoutness lock hands with a fascinating clearness, or no discussion can transmute truth into life. Let luminousness of thought and the whole clustered growth of the divine emotions twine around our lives, as the vines wreathed themselves around the thyrsis of Mercury of old; and even then we shall not be ready to study religious science unless we have, as Mercury had, on feet and shoulders, the wings of the Spirit, to enable us to fly whithersoever the Spirit calls.

There are seven tests which any definition of the Trinity must meet. It must not be modalistic or unintelligible; it must not be tri-theistic or Unitarian; it must not be a contradiction in terms or unhistorical; and, above all, it must not be unscriptural.

The definition given here is not *modalistic*—that is, it does not represent God as simply three manifestations, nor yet as three modes of being, considered merely as modes. How can it be proved that the definition is not modalistic?

1. It teaches that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.

2. It asserts that each subsistence, with the others, is God, and that neither, without the others, is God.

3. Therefore, it asserts in strict terms the Deity of our Lord.

4. What is said of Christ in this definition can be said of no human being. If Socrates had never existed, God would yet be God.

But if the Holy Spirit had never existed, God would not be God.

If Christ had never existed, God would not be God.

If the Father had never existed, God would not be God.

So, too, Socrates, with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God.

But Christ, with the other two subsistences, is God.

Is it thought that, according to this definition, God was in Socrates, and in Moses, and in Plato, and in every great, devout soul; and that, therefore, there is a sense in which divinity or deity may be attributed to these loftiest of the human sort? I do not see that; for, according to this definition, Socrates, with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God. Let us perfectly understand ourselves here, once for all. Is Socrates, with any two subsistences which we suppose exist in the Trinity, God? If so, you may say that, according to this definition, as God was in Christ, so he was in Socrates. But in the name of clear thought you

will never say that; for Christ with the other two subsistences is here affirmed to be God; and each of the subsistences with the others is God; but no human spirit has such qualities that you may make assertion of it parallel to these.

5. What is affirmed of Christ in the definition can be said of no created being, however high in rank.

If the highest of the archangels had never existed, God would yet be God.

But if either of the three subsistences in the Trinity had never existed, God would not be God; for, according to this definition, neither subsistence is God without the others.

So, too, the highest of the archangels, with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God.

But Christ, with the other two subsistences, is God.

It is, therefore, futile to charge this definition with being modalistic. There is no clearness of thought on any theme if it be not clear that our Lord, according to this definition, displayed a degree of being that was deific. How can a man who holds that definition be charged with holding that Socrates, and Isaiah, and Plato are to be named in the same list with our Lord? Is it not unspeakably shocking merely to the historic, to say nothing of the religious, sense of man? Is it not a silly disloyalty to all the incontrovertible facts which reveal Christ's present influence in the world to run up, in the light style of literary æsthetics, a list from Socrates to Christ, and so on, until when the vexed catalogue of merely human beings becomes confessedly ather unimportant, you read in the discussions of some that the future is to be drawn on? "We have not yet quite equalled Him who spake as never man spoke. But we shall. Better things are coming!" How shocking that is to sobriety of all kinds, intellectual and emotional! Historic, to say nothing of religious, devoutness stands aghast at any such contravention of the straightforward reasoning of Napoleon at St. Helena. *Admit, however, as the scientific method requires you to do, that Christ was so exceptional a soul that God was in him in a thoroughly exceptional manner; admit, with Rousseau, that he lived a sinless life; admit, with the most scholarly of modern infidels, that God was in him in such a sense as he never was in any other created being; admit this, and you have conceded enough to prove that you logically ought to regard this exceptionally holy and wise Being as veracious; and, therefore, that you, in consistency with your own admissions, ought to accept Christ's testimony concerning himself. Take that, as re-enforced by the testimony of the ages to his work in the world, and perhaps you will not be at a loss for reasons for changing your word "divinity" into "deity,"*

if you are logical. Liebnitz said that those who deny the deity of our Lord and yet pray to him may be good men, but that surely they are not good logicians.

The definition is not *unintelligible*, for the incommunicable peculiarity is defined by several very distinct traits.

Ages of close discussion lie behind the assertions I am making, and you will not think it the temerity of extemporaneous speech for me to recite these propositions rapidly. The ages of discussion make it necessary that I should be cautious; they make it unnecessary that I should be prolix.

1. The peculiarity of each subsistence is incommunicable.

2. It is such that neither subsistence, taken alone, wholly without the other subsistence, is God.

3. It is such that each subsistence is of the same dignity as the others.

4. It is such that each subsistence is of the same substance with the others.

5. It is such that the chief office of one subsistence is best expressed by the words Creator and Father; of a second subsistence, by the words Redeemer and Son; and of a third, by the words Sanctifier and Comforter.

6. It is such that each subsistence, with the others, is God.

Beyond these six traits it is neither necessary nor possible to define the subsistences.

Will you explain to me everything in connection of mind and matter? Will you so illustrate the structure of the human spirit that there shall be no mystery hanging over the border-land between the immaterial and the material? Can you in philosophy obviate all the difficulties arising from the limitations of the human faculties? Read your Mansel, your Hamilton, your Kant, and your Lotze on the relations of attribute to substance. Would substance exist aside from attribute? Has any one a perfectly distinct idea of what substance is wholly apart from its attributes? Until you get rid of all mystery in the fields of thought purely philosophical, do not say, when we come to realms of existence immeasurably higher above our own than the noon is above the brightness of the transient gleam of the firefly in the summer's meadow, that we shall not find some things inexplicable to our present capacities. If God were perfectly explicable to a finite being, he would not be God.

Merely on account of any mystery left in this portion of the doctrine of the Trinity after these six specifications have been made, you cannot reject a truth which stands here to-day guaranteed by eighteen centuries of good fruits. We know some things, although we do

not know all things, about the character of the subsistences. Nobody ever pretended to know all the facts about either of them. Moses Stewart used to refuse with emphasis all appeals to him to define the words "person," "distinction," "subsistence." He held the doctrine of the Trinity most emphatically; but beyond the truth now enumerated, it is un-scriptural, it is clearly unphilosophical, for a man to pretend to be wise above the range of the human faculties.

What is the difference between a mystery and a contradiction? A mystery is something of which we know *that* it is, although we do not know *how* it is. A self-contradiction is the inconsistency of a proposition with itself or with its own implications. Now, if there is in the Trinity a self-contradiction, we must throw its propositions overboard, in the name of learning and of clear thought. But if there be in it only a mystery, that may be no objection, for a mystery is merely something of which we know *that* it is, although we do not know *how* it is. I know *that* the grass grows, I do not know *how* it grows. I I know *that* my will lifts my arm, I do not know *how* it does this. There is mystery in each of these cases, but the mystery does not hinder my believing the facts, although I do not know how they are to be explained. Mystery belongs to physical almost more than to religious truth. We should expect it to appear oftener in religious science than in physical, as the topics of the former are incalculably vaster and more complex than those of the latter; and yet it is a question whether your Tyndalls and your Huxleys do not call on you to believe more mysteries than your Butlers, your Edwardses, and your Channings.

The definition is not *tri-theistic*, for

1. It asserts that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one, and only one, God.

2. It denies that either, taken wholly without the others, is God.

Therefore, according to this definition, there are not three Gods. This definition does not in terms assert, but it does imply, that there are not in God three wills, three sets of affections, three consciences, three intellects. According to the Scriptures, are there not in God such subsistences that when it is said that the Father sends the Son, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, *some portion of the action involved in these events may not be common to all the three subsistences?* I think so. If you will be careful in your phraseology, and not say that there are literally three wills, three sets of affections, three intellects—if you will simply say some portion of the action involved in the sending of the Son, or in the shedding forth of the Holy Spirit, may not be common to all the three subsistences, you will be asserting only what is affirmed in the second

proposition of this definition—namely, that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.

But I will resist, in the name of the mass of scholarship for the last one thousand five hundred years, the proposition that there are in God three persons, in a strict, colloquial, literal, modern, English, American, Boston sense. Why do I resist that? Because the word person, in our colloquial speech, implies a species. What is a species? When you say a man is a person, you imply that he belongs to a class of beings called men. If you say there are three *persons* in God, and mean by that word just what you mean by it on the street and in the parlour, you assume that these persons are individuals in a species; and my reply is that there is no species of gods outside of pantheism or polytheism. There is nothing of the sort known to either Scriptural or scientific truth. No doubt Orthodoxy has often been careless in her phrases. Under the rubric of *idle words* many a stupid and many an incautious expression used in religious and philosophical discussion will, no doubt, be judged at the last day. But it is not stupidity, it is not incautiousness, which causes Orthodoxy to use the word "person" sometimes. She is always speaking in Latin when she uses that word intelligently. She employs it as a technical term, because it has been in the creeds of the church one thousand five hundred years. Adopted in the days of the poverty of the Latin language, it has come down to the days of the richness of the English tongue. Calvin himself said he would be willing that the word person should be dropped for ever out of the discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity, if only the truth could be retained that there are in God three distinctions, each with a peculiarity of a property incommunicable to the others, and each, with the others, God. For three hundred years the definition I have been putting before you, or its equivalent, has been generally regarded as the standard. But if by persons you understand individuals, you must admit that you cannot make three persons—John, William, and James—one. There is a sense in which each individual which we describe by the word person, in its ordinary sense, is incommunicable, as a whole, to any other individual. This idea of personality, as the word is understood on the street and in the parlour, does not belong to the idea of the Trinity. Scholarship has always taught that God is one, and has never taught that William, and John, and James are one. God is one essence or substance. Three persons, in the usual sense of the word, are not of one substance. It is the immemorial teaching of religious science that we must not divide the substance of God; and we do this whenever we say that there are in God three persons in the literal, modern, colloquial sense of that word. When the popular is substituted for the

technical meaning of this term, and men who have little time for thought on the subject are confused and led to suppose that you are teaching self-contradictions, or that God is three and that he is only one; and that he is one in the same sense in which he is three; why, here in Eastern Massachusetts, on the battle-fields of Unitarianism and Trinitarianism, it is high time that this misapprehension should cease to have any excuse for itself in the carelessness of the phrases used in Orthodox quarters. Say three subsistences; three distinctions, each with a peculiarity incommunicable to the others; but not three wills, three sets of affections, three intellects. Such, however, is the force of the proposition that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others, that I am not unwilling to say that in the whole range of activities involved in God's connection with men there are influences which are not common to all the subsistences. This is biblical truth; and this truth is in this definition, which, therefore, as scholars will allow me to say, avoids patripassianism, as well as modalism.

There are four expressions that can be used: "all the attributes"; "some of the attributes"; "property"; "peculiarity." Some men say: "All the attributes of one subsistence may be, for aught we know, different from those belonging to either of the other subsistences." Others say: "Some attributes differ." Yet others affirm: "Properties differ." But the word which has been used here is "peculiarity." Why do I adopt that word? Because, if I use "property," instantly arise all the celebrated forms of speculation about the connection of "substance" and "property," and you may find yourselves befogged by merely philosophical difficulties. "All attributes," "some attributes," "property," "peculiarity"—that last is the word employed in the definition used here, and the word which I believe will bear not only the microscope and the scalpel of philosophy, but the blaze of the infinity of biblical truth.

You ask whether there have not been teachers who have held that there are three wills in God? Yes. Have there not been in New England intelligent Christians who have worshipped three beings in imagination, although in their thoughts they have asserted that God is one? I fear there have been, and that there are yet. Is this, however, the standard doctrine of Christianity, or the more general teaching of the Church? By no means. Is that divided mood which you find among some of looking into Judea for our Lord, and into Heaven for the Father, and into the space between the earth and Heaven for the vague somewhat which we call the Holy Spirit, biblical? Not as I read the Scriptures. Are we to regard those as well-educated Christians who, in thoughts of God, are constantly

thinking of our Lord as if he were now in Gethsemane, or on the Mount of Olives, or walking on the shore of Galilee; and of the Father as among the constellations; and of the Holy Spirit as shed down on us from the infinite spaces—three wills, three intellects, three sets of affections? You may regard such Christians tenderly; but, for one, I regard them tenderly enough to wish they might be both more biblical and more scientific. It is not pleasant to me to dwell on topics that require us to walk over embers hardly cold; but I belong to a generation that had nothing to do with the discussions that divided God's house in Eastern Massachusetts. Has not the time come for us to attend to each other's definitions, and not to each other's defamations? Seriousness in speech or print usually spends its time more profitably than in gymnastic boxing. Shall we not, in the transfigured mood of Boston at this hour, call ourselves into Christ's presence, as he was visible to Stephen, and to Paul, and to John, not on the Mount of Olives, not on the shore of Galilee, but at the right hand of the Father? Let us grasp the transfiguring biblical certainty that the influences of the Holy Spirit are Christ's continued life. You will not understand me to deny for an instant that our Lord's earthly life and sufferings are a better revelation to us of God's moral attributes than external nature is or can be. Christ is the rainbow, or unravelled light, and the Father is the white light; and *we must look on the seven colours, if we would know what is always in the white beam.* Thus our Lord's life and sufferings on earth are to be constantly before us as a picture of the Divine Nature. But the influences of the Holy Spirit are a present Christ; and God is not three, but one. Our Lord himself is now in Heaven and here; and, though we look to Judea for one part of his life, we must beware how we look there, as Stephen and Paul did not, for him. Though the rainbow has ceased to appear, it has not ceased to exist. It has been taken back into the bosom of the general radiance, and yet falls on the earth. *Wherever white light falls, the rainbow falls potentially;* and the luminousness, the colour, and the heat—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three subsistences in one substance—all enswathe us here and now, and make the present hour sacred as the beginning of days, for there is but one God, who was, and is, and is to come.

Mr. Clarke is reported as saying that "If God is seen and shown in Christ as he is seen and shown in Nature, there is no reason for considering one as more divine than the other. God is *in* Christ, and we may worship God as shown to us in Christ. But so is God also *in* Nature, and we may worship God as shown to us in Nature. God is in Christ and God is in Natnre; but that does not make Nature or Christ God, but only manifestations of him."

Here are two meanings in the one word Nature, a term that has behind it the most mischievous ambiguity, and is the greatest fog in the whole range of philosophical discussion. By Nature what do you mean? The sun and the moon? Of course we do not worship these. We are not Persians. But if by Nature you mean that Power of Intelligence and Choice which is behind all natural law, we do worship the God revealed by the Oldest Testament, or the nature of things. But this we understand to be the very God revealed by the New Testament and the Newest. "All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made that is made." "He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." These are words written rather earlier than the year 325, and you say* that there was no doctrine of the Trinity till after this date.

Is it affirmed that we must worship God in conscience? What do you mean by conscience? The human part of the intuitive moral sense, or that divine Somewhat or Someone who is revealed by the moral law, and is in us, but not of us? If you mean the latter, we do, in the name of every text in the Oldest and the Old, the Newest and the New Testament, worship it as "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." But of that light we read that in the beginning it was with God and was God.

It is reported that I am called a Buddhist, because I set natural law above God. What is natural law? The method of action of God's will. Can God's will be above God's will? Even your Maurice says that the Greek from the Thessalian Hill heard the voice of God, but mistook it for that of Fate.

The old polytheists made necessity the highest God. If you please, fixed law is, from one point of view, the highest force in the universe; and it becomes us, as stern cultivators of science, to reverence this quite measurelessly-important Fact. But what the old Greek at Delphi regarded as fate we have come to regard as the unchanging, because perfectly holy and wise choice of Almighty God. It must be that an Infinite Being knows what the one best way is in which to manage the universe, and that he will choose and adhere to that way. There can be but one best way to manage the universe—can there? If that self-evident truth is not a part of the nature of things, what is? This Oldest Testament is fearfully orthodox. We know that there can be but one best way, for best is a superlative word, and admits no comparison; and that one best way Omnipotence and Omniscience will choose and adhere to. Therefore, as I said before, and repeat now because I was misunderstood, in the eternities and infinities governep by a Perfect Will there will appear to be fate; but there will be there

* See Clarke, "Orthodoxy," p. 503.

in reality only the completely wise and holy and, therefore, unchanging choice of Almighty God. Your Oldest Testament says the nature of things is without variableness or shadow of turning. But when your New and your Newest Testament speak of the Father of Lights, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift, they affirm also that although he is Father, he is without variableness or shadow of turning. We worship one God; but a God free and above all things—except what? The requirements of his own perfections. Theodore Parker used to stand on a platform not five hundred feet from this and say, God cannot make two and two one thousand. Such is God that he cannot choose to do what ought not to be done. He cannot deny himself. A moral impossibility inheres in the nature of a perfect being. The cans and cannots of all science spring out of the impossibilities existing in a perfect nature.

Mr. Clarke says that "Christianity teaches not the sovereignty of the nature of things, but the sovereignty of divine love." And another liberal critic has said that "If God be such a Being as the New Testament represents him to be, he will make short work of the nature of things." What astounding confusion of thought is this, and what misunderstanding of the Oldest Testament and the Old, the Newest and the New! God make short work of the nature of things! What is the nature of things? By definition it is the total outcome of the divine perfections. God make short work of his own infinite justice and holiness; his own intellectual excellence; and of all that is implied in the infinitude of the Divine Nature! What we call the nature of things is but another name for all the requirements of the Divine free choice. And is an infinitely perfect being to make short work of that? God himself making short work with the nature of things! God a suicide! These phrases mean the same thing. It will be of importance for you and for me to have no war with the nature of things until the day when God ceases to be God.

The definition is in no sense *Unitarian*, for

1. It asserts the Deity of our Lord. There is no form of Unitarianism that asserts this.

2. We have seen that what is said of Christ in the definition can be said of no created being.

It is not a *contradiction in terms*, for it does not assert that God is one in the same sense in which he is three, or three in the same sense in which he is one.

It is not *unhistorical*, for it presents a view of the Trinity consistent with all the greatest symbols in use in the Church for fifteen hundred years.

It is not *unscriptural*.

In the celebrated discussions between Unitarianism and Trinitarianism in Eastern Massachusetts the proof-texts of the Deity of our Lord adduced by Moses Stuart in his letters to Channing have never been answered. Andrews Norton made many philosophical objections to the Trinity, which do not apply at all to the best definition of it. No one has ever shown that the scriptural passages Moses Stuart adduced do not have the meaning he attributed to them.*

We are assured by the scientific method that in no page of that portion of the volume of the universe which is open to us is there any light we can spare. Science and practical life alike require that we should be loyal to all the facts within our view. It is incontrovertible that, when we look into all our light, a Trinity is within view. External Nature, History, and Conscience reveal God as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and yet as one. But Science and Scripture affirm that there is but one God; and, contemplated more closely, as we have seen, *a* Trinity is found to be *the* Trinity. Therefore, we open all the windows of the outer and inner azure by the truth of the Trinity of the Divine Nature. This is the historic force which changed the sky of brass and iron which bent above the Thessalian Hill into soft azure, all soul, and not sky. The inaccessible Heaven which stood above Olympus comes near now and enswathes all the round world in its bosom. But some would build negations of fact above our heads as an obstructing dome, and confine us to a fragmentary view of the Divine Nature. There are two kinds of Unitarianism. One looks through but a single window vividly, and sees from it well only God the Father. In this view there is a simplicity which is pleasing to many. For a time it may be a devout view, especially in modern days, with full Christianity behind them and pouring through them, and in these yet early New England years, with Plymouth Rock and all the generations since our fathers landed, to give moods of devoutness to the generation now passing off the stage. There are wants of life, however, which no one quarter of the sky, taken alone, can meet. History teaches that in the growth of the flowers which blossom against that one window there is apt to be, in the third or fourth generation, a want of vigour, and a subtle loss of plainly celestial aromas. But there is another and wider belief in the Divine Unity, a window that has the sun all the day. Sweep off the whole dome, and you open God's window—behold Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as one undivided Heaven, of equal height at every point of its pulsating, fathomless azure, whose light, and colour, and heat, although three subsistences, are one substance, and you have God's Unitarianism.

---

* See Stuart, Professor, "Letters to Channing."

THE TRINITY THE MARTYR'S FAITH.

By the Rev. JOSEPH COOK.

Preliminary Address.

In the city of Edinburgh the American evangelists who are now in Boston never had a hall that would seat over one thousand five hundred. They reached the Scottish metropolis November 22nd, 1873, and left it January 21st, 1874. They have now been here as long as they were in Edinburgh. It will always be incontrovertible that a structure which holds from six thousand to seven thousand people has been opened in Boston for religious audiences, and that week after week, for two months, on every fair day and often twice or thrice a day, when an undiluted Christianity has been proclaimed there, this Boston building has been filled to copious overflowing. *What other cause would have filled it as often and as long?* This is the large question which Edinburgh, and London, Chicago, and San Francisco will ask. As a help to an interior view of Massachusetts and its capital, it is not improper for me to state, what the evangelists themselves could not, perhaps, with propriety say publicly, that their opinion is that in Boston the average result of their work has been better than it was in Edinburgh. Both the evangelists have expressed, with detailed reasons and emphasis, that opinion to me, and neither of them has asked me to state the opinion publicly.

Harvard and Yale both strenuously opposed George Whitefield, and now both regret their opposition. Did you notice that the revered president of Boston University was reported as having silenced a group of critics at the obsolescent Chestnut Street Club, the other day, by an invulnerable endorsement of the general character of the religious work now being performed in this city? This endorsement came from a scholar of whom it can be said, as I think it cannot be of any other New England president of a college, that before he finished his yet recent German studies he had written in German an elaborate work on religious science, abreast of the latest thought. Boston University, led by this incomparable scholar of the freshest and severest German training, is as cordial toward the American evangelists as the great University of Edinburgh was. When Phillips Brooks appears in the Tabernacle, the culture of Boston and the students of Harvard are there. Of course, Harvard University differs from Edinburgh University in its religious attitude; and for that fact there are reasons, prolonged, historic, adequate, but, thank God! of waning force. When James VI. was sixteen years of age, in 1582, Edinburgh University was founded; and it was fed from the Scottish Universities of St. Andrews and Glasgow, which began their stalwart career before America was discovered. University life in Scotland had venerableness when Harvard was yet in the gristle. It has had a longer time than Harvard in which to judge creeds by the law of the survival of the fittest. It is wiser, therefore; but Harvard one day will be wiser under the law.

Are there any points of superiority in this religious awakening to

that which occurred in Boston in the days of Whitefield? It must be admitted that there are some points of inferiority; but are there any of superiority? We are a larger and more heterogeneous community now than we were then. We are fuller of commercial activity; our heads are in newspapers and ledgers, and not, as the heads and hearts of the early New England fathers were, in the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it was a temporarily demoralized community which Whitefield and Edwards addressed. A practical union of Church and State had so secularized religious society that it had sunk further away from scriptural and scientific ideals than the present religious society of New England has done. We all hold now that the ministry ought to be made up of converted men, and that no one should become a member of the Church unless he can give credible evidence of having entered upon a religious life. But in Whitefield's day it was necessary for him to insist upon what is now a commonplace truth—that conversion should precede entrance upon the ministry and church-membership. In Edwards' day many circles of the New England population had forgotten the necessity of the new birth, or did not believe that it is an ascertainable change; and so there was a hush in the revival when Whitefield was here—a sense of sin, which ought to exist now, but which probably does not for a great variety of reasons, not all of them to be classed as proofs of the shallowness of the present effort. Would that we had such loyalty to the scientific method as to have an adequate sense of our dissonance with the nature of things! It were good for us and for America if we had in Boston to-day just that far-penetrating gaze which filled the eyes of New England one hundred years ago, as Whitefield and Edwards turned our fathers' countenances toward the Unseen Holy.

In one particular, however, this revival certainly surpasses that under Whitefield in this city in 1740—namely, in the extent to which types have been consecrated to the work of sending religious truths abroad through the newspaper press. All the leading and all the respectable newspapers of Boston have favoured the revival. . . . . It is easier for the platform than for the press to speak for to-morrow against the dissent of to-day. But the best part of our press not only mirrors, but leads public sentiment. and speaks for to-morrow against the rivalry of the poorer part of both platform and press, which speak only for to-day. *Encourage all speakers for to-morrow.*

In the next place, it deserves to be mentioned that religious visitation from house to house, and especially among the perishing and degraded, is now going forward in a hopefully thorough manner in Boston. I am able to assure you that two thousand persons are now devoting a large part of their time in this city to religious visitation among the poor. In no other population has there been a more effective arrangement for visitation than here. God be thanked that every lane is to be seen, and that superfluity and squalor are to look into each other's eyes! Of one hundred and ten evangelical churches in this city, ninety have already signified their intention to co-operate in this work. Each pastor of these ninety has appointed gentlemen to oversee the work undertaken by his particular church. Is there any

one shallow enough to sneer at such proceedings? You will sneer, then, at the best executive talent of Boston. There are seventy thousand families within the limits of Boston, and there have been workers appointed to cover sixty-five thousand of these families. In Boston I include Charlestown, East Boston, South Boston, Dorchester, Roxbury, and Brighton. We are to look on this work as performed by picked men and women. There is no quarter of this city so degraded by unreportable vice that it is not being visited by women, lineal descendants, no doubt, of those whom Tacitus says our German forefathers honoured as recipients of special illumination from Heaven. The saloons are being visited, and the report now coming in is that the visitors are kindly received, and you will find every now and then a visitor saying: "There are in my district fifteen cases of interest, or persons seriously inquiring how they can get rid of vice and enter upon a manly or womanly life; and I am to follow these cases up." Remember that this work of visitation is intended not merely for those who are outside of the circle of glad loyalty to religious truth, but for those who are nominally inside of that circle and are yet inefficient. Nothing quickens a man like trying to quicken another. If there is one measure in which our American evangelist has shown his generalship more effectively than anywhere else, it is in setting men to work, and in so setting them to work as to set them on fire.

But what are we to say of the prayer-meetings among business men, which have not yet attained their height, and yet are already visible at a distance? It is my privilege and joy to be a flying scout in New England. One morning, I woke up to the sound of the swollen and impetuous Androscoggin, and in the course of the day passed through Portland, and Portsmouth, and Newburyport, and Salem, and Boston, and Worcester, and Springfield, to Hartford; and all along I had evidence, by conversation, and by looking at the local papers, that these business men's meetings are visible on the Androscoggin and on the Connecticut. You have in this Temple a very interesting meeting, which was never matched for weight in Edinburgh. There are crowded prayer-meetings at high noon for men engaged in the dry goods business, for men in the furniture trade, for men in the market, for men in the fish trade, for newspaper men, for all classes, indeed, of our throbbing, tumultuous, breathless, business community. This, if you will notice the fact, is Boston. When I stated a few weeks ago that you would see Boston visited as you had seen other cities visited, you did not receive the affirmation with a smile of incredulity, but the public did. That poor prophecy has been fulfilled, and *we have a month more for work.*

If you please, the times are serious, and light sneers will do no good now, and ought not to be noticed by me except in pity. It was my fortune professionally to walk down to a church near the Tabernacle to give an Easter discourse. As I passed up the street, I met a crowd of people emerging from, I did not at first think where, until I remembered that the Tabernacle service had just closed. They covered acres, and came on in thousands, like the crowds of a gala day. I noticed their faces; for the best test of what has been done in a reli-

gious address, in any assembly, is to study the countenances of the audience as it disperses. If you see a softened, an ennobled, a "solar look," to use one of the phrases of Bronson Alcott, one may be sure that religious truth has done good. I saw the solar look yesterday on the street in hundreds and thousands of faces. I saw it sometimes in the gaze of shop-girls, perhaps.

Yes; but high culture in Boston does not care much for shop-girls. Well, it is time it should. There is a low-bred, loaferish liberalism uttering itself occasionally in sneers because the poor have the Gospel preached to them. That sneer has been heard ever since the days of Celsus and the games in the old Coliseum, and it has a peculiarly reptilian ring. There are many kinds of liberalism. Christian liberalism I honour; literary and æsthetic liberalism is to be spoken of with respect in most cases; but below what I have called a limp and lavender and unscientific liberalism there is a low-bred and loaferish liberalism. This, in Boston, has impudence, but no scholarship; rattles, but no fangs. In the great multitude the solar look is the best prophecy that can be had for the American future. It is a radiance that is like the rising of the sun to any man who is anxious about what is to come in America.

After noticing that look, and thanking God for it, I walked on, and happened to pass a lonely Boston corner, where the Paine Hall and the Parker Memorial Hall stand near each other—"*par nobile fratrum.*" On a bulletin on the Paine Hall, the street in front of which looked deserted, I read: "Children's Progressive Lyceum Entertainment this evening." "The Origin and Amusements of the Orthodox Hell." "Twenty-ninth Anniversary of Modern Spiritualism, April 1st." Passing by the Parker Memorial Hall, where, no doubt, words of good sense have been uttered occasionally, I found in the window this statement: "To-night, a Lecture on the Arctic Regions, with a Stereopticon and Seventy Views."

All over the world, the equivalent of the scene I saw on that Easter morn may be looked upon almost everywhere within the whole domain of Christendom. Infidelity in Germany is no stronger than it is in Boston. Out of the thirty universities of that most learned land of the globe, only one is called rationalistic to-day.

When the sun stands above Bunker Hill at noon it has just set on the Parthenon, and is rising on the volcanoes of the Sandwich Isles. As Easter day passed about the globe, the contrasted scenes which the sun saw here—a multitude fed with God's Word, and a few erratics striving to solace themselves without God—were not unlike the scenes which the resplendent orb looked down upon in the whole range of civilization. In two hundred languages of the world the Scriptures were read yesterday; in two hundred languages of the world hymns were lifted to the Triune Name yesterday; in two hundred languages of the world the Gospel was preached to the poor yesterday.

What is our impecunious scepticism doing here? Has it ever printed a book that has gone into a second edition? Theodore Parker's works never went into many editions. I do not know of a single infidel book over a hundred years old that has not been put on the upper neglected

shelf by scholars. Boston must compare her achievements with those of cities outside of America, and take her chances under the buffetings of time. Where is there in Boston anything in the shape of scepticism that will bear the microscope? For one, I solemnly aver that I do not know where, and I have nothing else to do but search. Theodore Parker is the best sceptic you ever had; but to me he is honey-combed through and through with disloyalty to the very nature of things—his supreme authority. It was asserted not long ago, in an obscure sceptical newspaper here, that Parker's works ought to be forced into notoriety by his friends; it was admitted that there was not much demand for the books; but it was thought that if now there was an effort made strategically, one might be put upon the market. You have no better books than these, and there has been no marked demand in Boston for these, and the attentive portion of the world knows the facts. Why am I proclaiming this? Because outside of Boston it is often carelessly supposed that the facts are the reverse, and that this city is represented only by a few people who, deficient in religious activity, and forgetting the law of the survival of the fittest, are distinguished far more by audacity than by scholarship, and are members of a long line in history, of which Gallio stood at the head.

Let me mention, as a fourth prominent trait in this revival, the great effort made for temperance. We have done more in that particular than was done in Boston in Whitefield's day; for in his time men were not awake on that theme. It is a good sign to see the Church and secular effort join hands. It is a good sign when our American evangelist himself can say, "I have been a professing Christian twenty-two years, and I have been in Boston and other cities for most of that time, and I never saw such a day as this is. I stand in wonder and amazement at what is being done. It seems as if God were taking this work out of our hands. Prayer-meetings are springing up in all parts of the city. If you were asked two months ago if these things were possible, you would have said: 'Yes, if God will open the windows of Heaven and do them.'"

Let us admit that we could all wish for greater blessings. Macaulay said concerning literary excellence that we were to measure success not by absolute, but by relative standards. Matching his own history against the seventh book of Thucydides, he was always humble; but matching his history against current productions, Macaulay felt encouraged. Matching this day in Boston against some things in Whitefield's day; matching it against the dateless noon of Pentecost; matching it against our opportunities, we are humble; we have no reason for elation; ours is a day of small things. But compare what has been done here by God's Word and religious effort with all that has been done since Boston was founded by the opponents of God's Word, and we are encouraged.

Our opportunity in the second New England is greater than that of our fathers was in the first New England. Let us act as the memory of our fathers dictates. New England, the Mississippi Valley, the Pacific coast, Scotland, England, always knows whether or not Boston does her duty. A power not of man is in this hushed air. Who will

lock hands with him whom we dare not name, and go forward to triumph in the cause that cares equally for the rich and the poor, and for to-day and to-morrow?

The Lecture.

When the Christian martyr Pionius was asked by his judges, "What God dost thou worship?" he replied: "I worship him who made the heavens and who beautified them with stars, and who has enriched the earth with flowers and trees." "Dost thou mean," asked the magistrates, "Him who was crucified (*illum dicis qui crucifixus est*)?" "Certainly," replied Pionius, "Him whom the Father sent for the salvation of the world." *

As Pionius died, so died Blandina and the whole host of those who, in the first three centuries, without knowing anything of the Nicene Creed, held it implicitly, if not explicitly, and proclaimed it in flames and in dungeons, in famine and in nakedness, under the rack and under the sword.

On the Ægean Sea, under the shadow of the Acropolis, there were undoubtedly sung yesterday, in the Greek cathedrals, words which were written in the second century:

"Hail! gladdening Light, of his pure glory poured,
Who is the Immortal Father, heavenly, blest,
Holiest of Holies, Jesus Christ our Lord!
Now we are come to the sun's hour of rest,
The lights of evening around us shine,
We hymn the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit divine!
Worthiest art Thou at all times to be sung
With undefiled tongue,
Son of our God, Giver of life alone,
Therefore, in all the world, Thy glories, Lord, they own."†

This poem is yet a vesper hymn in the Greek Church, and St. Basil quotes it in the third century. It, and the "*Gloria in Excelsis*," and the "*Ter Sanctus*," which yesterday rolled around the world, were written in the second century, to pay absolutely divine honours to our Lord.

When I open the best book which unevangelical Christianity ever printed in Boston—James Freeman Clarke's "Truths and Errors about Orthodoxy"? No! "Truths and Errors *of* Orthodoxy"—but the first would have been a better title—I read: "Down to the time of the Synod of Nice, Anno Domini 325, no doctrine of Trinity existed in the Church."‡ Will that statement bear the microscope of historical science? If it will, I wish to believe it and to reject everything inconsistent with it.

But I hold in my hands this Greek vesper hymn, and this "*Ter Sanctus*," and this "*Gloria in Excelsis*," written in the second century. What do they mean? Here, too, are the dying words of martyrs for three centuries, and all in harmony with the present faith of the Christian world.

---

* Ruinart, "*Acta*," p. 125. See Liddon's "Bampton Lectures," p. 409.
† See original in Routh's "*Reliquæ Sacræ*," iii. p. 515. ‡ P. 508.

Here is this statement of the Emperor Adrian, who, when writing to Servian, described the population of Alexandria as divided between the worship of Christ and the worship of Serapis.*

About A.D. 165 Lucian says:—"The Christians are still worshipping that great man who was crucificed in Palestine."†

Remember Pliny's explicit official letter to Trajan, affirming that cross-examination and torture had elicited from the martyrs only the statement that "they were accustomed to meet on a stated day and sing a hymn to Christ as God," and to pledge themselves by a sacrament to crush out evil of every kind.‡

Calyisianus said to the martyr Euplius: "Pay worship to Mars, Apollo, and Esculapius." Euplius replied: "I worship the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I adore the Holy Trinity, besides whom there is no God. Perish the gods who did not make Heaven and earth and all that is in them. I am a Christian."§

The followers of Artemon maintained that the doctrine of the Trinity was brought into the Church at a late day. A writer quoted by Eusebius observed, in reply, that the psalms and hymns of the brethren, which from the earliest days of Christianity had been written by the faithful, all celebrate Christ, the Word of God, proclaiming his Divinity.‖

Is it true that there was no doctrine of the Triune Name before the year 325? Or, if you admit there was a Triune Name before that date, do you deny that these martyrs, who died with prayers to Christ as God, knew what they were about?

Follow up the unimpeached record, and you will find it beyond controversy that the first three centuries taught explicitly the doctrine of the Triune Name. Was that a practical truth?

To be analytical—in order that, if possible, I may be clear—let me say that I wish to show by detailed documentary evidence that the Ante-Nicene Christian literature proves that in the first three centuries the church held the doctrine of the Trinity.

1. This literature copiously asserts that Christ possessed proper Deity.

2. It teaches copiously that believers are saved by the atonement made by our Lord.

3. It affirms abundantly that the Holy Spirit is a present Christ.

4. It everywhere proclaims that God, as three and one, is omnipresent in natural law.

5. These must be regarded as the most practical of all religious truths, if judged by the work they have done. They were the inspiration of martyrs' lives and the solace of martyrs' deaths.

6. These truths contain the doctrine of the Trinity implicitly, and the doctrine of the Trinity contains them implicitly and explicitly.

7. That doctrine, therefore, is the teaching of the first three Christian centuries.

We are to-day to breathe the spring-time of Christianity. The sights and the sounds of that period may well move us, for they have conquered the world. We are to gaze upon an age which is renowned

---

* Ab aliis Serapidem, ab aliis adorari Christum. Apud Lamprid., in Vita Alex. Severi.
† De Morte Peregrini, c. 11.
‡ Pliny, Ep., Lib. x. Ep. 97.
§ Ruinart, "*Acta*," p. 362.
‖ Eusebius, "Hist. Eccl.," v. 28.

now, and is to be more and more renowned as the centuries roll on, as that of the Apostolic Fathers. I hold in my hand the first volume of a celebrated series of books (published by T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh) called the "Ante-Nicene Library"—that is, Christian documents existing before the Nicene Council was called together in 325. I am to read you nothing upon which I have not put elaborate study; but that fact is not assurance that I am right. The world has boxed about these documents in close controversy for one thousand five hundred years; and if anything is known about history, it is known that the select passages I am to present to you are genuine records of the first three centuries. Do not think that I forget, although I cannot mention here in detail, how much is interpolated here and spurious. But scholarship has been walking over this record till it has found every boggy spot in it; and I am to have you put your feet now only on a few stepping-stones which infidelity itself considers firm as adamant, so far as their historical genuineness is concerned.

There is a marvellous Church of St. Clement, near the Coliseum, in Rome. You remember the words "Rejoice always; and again I say, rejoice."* In the verse preceding that St. Paul mentions a certain Clement of Rome, and that Clement is supposed to be the author of this letter, which now, in the year 1877, in Boston, you may hold in your hands, and which was sent from Rome to Corinth by one church to admonish another, in a majestic age of the world. Clement, the author of this epistle, is known to have written it about the year 97. By common consent he is regarded as one of the pupils of St. Paul. This epistle Eusebius calls "great and admirable," and says that it was very often read in the churches before and during his day.†

Purposely I avoid following analytically the order of the propositions I am defending; but at hap-hazard almost I take passages out of this unspeakably electric record, and you shall judge whether or not all that my propositions assert is here implied:

> "Content with the provision which God had made for you, and carefully attending to his words, ye were inwardly filled with his doctrine, and his sufferings [whose sufferings? God's sufferings] were before your eyes. Thus a profound and abundant peace was given to you all; and ye had an insatiable desire for doing good, while a full outpouring of the Holy Spirit was upon you all. Full of holy designs ye did, with true earnestness of mind and a godly confidence, stretch forth your hands to God Almighty, beseeching him to be merciful unto you, if ye had been guilty of any involuntary transgression. Day and night ye were anxious for the whole brotherhood, that the number of the elect might be saved with mercy and good conscience."—P. 8.

How fresh is this breeze, as from spring hill sides—the bursting April of Christianity! It is written in the record of a day which dawned on the world eighteen hundred and forty-eight years ago yesterday,‡ that while it was yet dark Mary Magdalen came to the sepulchre, and the beloved disciple and Peter also; and that, although the beloved disciple outran his companion, Peter went first into the sepulchre. It was yet dark then; but is it not getting to be, in the history of the world, when this letter was written, gray-brindled

---

* Phil. iv. 4. † Eusebius, iii. 16. ‡ Lewes, "*Fausti Sacri.*"

dawn? Remember what persecution surged around the Church out of which came these words, with a tone that belongs only to spiritua greatness of the first rank:—

"Let us set before our eyes the illustrious apostles. Peter, through unrighteous envy, endured not one or two, but numerous labours; and when he had at length suffered marytrdom, departed to the place of glory due to him. Paul also obtained the reward of patient endurance, after being seven times thrown into captivity, compelled to flee, and stoned. After preaching both in the east and west, he gained the illustrious reputation due to his faith, having taught righteousness to the whole world; and, come to the extreme limit of the west, he suffered martyrdom under the prefects."—P. 11.

"We are struggling in the same arena, and the same conflict is assigned to us."—P. 12.

What historic majesty there is in this language!

"Wherefore [what? Here is revealed the martyr's inner sky] let us give up vain and fruitless cares, and approach to the glorious and venerable rule of our holy calling. Let us attend to what is good, pleasing, and acceptable in the sight of Him who formed us. *Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious that blood is to God, which, having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world.*"—P. 12.

Will Boston in this far day listen to Clement of Rome, speaking in the year 97?

When I turn to that really sublime document, the epistle of Diognetus, which scholars here will thank me for citing, I come upon this passage, written in the second century:—

"Truly, God himself, who is almighty, the Creator of all things and invisible has sent from Heaven and placed among men [him who is] the truth, and the holy and incomprehensible Word, and has firmly established him in their hearts. He did not, as one might have imagined, send to men any servant or angel; but the very Creator and Fashioner of all things, by whom he made the heavens, by whom he enclosed the sea within its proper bounds, whose ordinances all the stars faithfully observe, from whom the sun has received the measure of his daily course to be observed, whom the moon obeys, being commanded to shine in the night, and whom the stars also obey, following the moon in her course; by whom all things have been arranged and placed within their proper limits, and to whom all are subject—the heavens and the things that are therein, the earth and the things that are therein, the sea and the things that are therein—fire, air, and the abyss—the things that are in the heights, the things which are in the depths, and the things which lie between. This [messenger] he sent to them. As a king sends his son, who is also a king, so sent he him; as God, he sent him; as to men, he sent him; as a Saviour, he sent him."—Pp. 309, 310.

If this amazing passage asserts the Deity of our Lord, does not the next copiously teach the atonement?

"He himself took on him the burden of our iniquities. He gave his own Son as a ransom for us—the Holy One for transgressors, the Blameless One for the wicked, the Righteous One for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible One for the corruptible, the Immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than his righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation! That the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One; and that the righteousness of one should justify many transgressors! Having, therefore, convinced us in the former time that our nature was unable to attain to life, and having now revealed the Saviour who is able to save even those things which it was, formerly, impossible to save, by both these facts he desired to lead us to trust

in his kindness, to esteem him our Nourisher, Father, Teacher, Counsellor, Healer, our Wisdom, Light, Honour, Glory, Power, and Life."—Pp. 312, 313.

"This is He who was from the beginning, who appeared as if new, and was found old, and yet who is ever born afresh in the hearts of the Saints. This is He who, being from everlasting, is to-day called the Son; through whom the Church is enriched, and grace, widely spread, increases in the saints, furnishing understanding, revealing mysteries, announcing times, rejoicing over the faithful, giving to those that seek, by whom the limits of faith are not broken through, nor the boundaries set by the fathers passed over. Then the fear of the law is chanted, and the grace of the prophets is known, and the faith of the Gospels is established, and the tradition of the apostles is preserved, and the grace of the Church exults."—P. 315.

But now I open another document of equal interest, and read in the epistle of Polycarp, written about the middle of the second century:

"Our Lord Jesus Christ, to him all things in heaven and on earth are subject. Him every spirit serves. He comes as the judge of the living and the dead. But he who raised him up from the dead will raise up us also, if we do his will, and walk in his commandments, and love what he loved."—P. 70.

I turn on, my friends, and find in the shorter recension of the epistles of Ignatius—notice, I say the shorter—this statement:

"He who possesses the word of Jesus is truly able to hear even his very silence, that he may be perfect, and may both act as he speaks, and be recognized by his silence. There is nothing which is hid from God; but our very secrets are near to him. Let us, therefore, do all things as those who have him dwelling in us, that we may be his temples, and he may be in us as our God, which indeed he is."—P. 163.

Is there nothing in this early religion at which modern culture may sneer? In all my readings of antiquity outside the Scriptures, I never met a chapter in prose equal for poetic power to the one I am about to pronounce before you, nor one that is half as worthy as this to be held up in the light of modern science:

"The heavens, revolving under his government, are subject to Him in peace. Day and night run the course appointed by him, in no wise hindering each other. The sun and moon, with the companies of the stars, roll on in harmony according to his command, within their prescribed limits, and without any deviation. The fruitful earth, according to his will, brings forth food in abundance at the proper seasons, for man and beast, and all the living beings upon it, never hesitating, nor changing any of the ordinances which he has fixed. The unsearchable places of the abysses and the indescribable arrangements of the lower world are restrained by the same laws. The vast immeasurable sea, gathered together by his working into various basins, never passes beyond the bounds placed around it, but does as He has commanded. The ocean, impassable to man, and the worlds beyond it, are regulated by the same enactments of the Lord. The seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter peacefully give place to one another. The winds, in their several quarters, fulfil, at the proper time, their service without hindrance. The ever-flowing fountains, formed both for enjoyment and health, furnish without fail their breasts for the life of men. Take heed, beloved, lest his many kindnesses lead to the condemnation of us all."—Pp. 21, 22.

"The Creator and Lord of all himself rejoices in his works. For by his infinitely great power he established the heavens, and by his incomprehensible wisdom he adorned them. He also divided the earth from the water which surrounds it, and fixed it upon the immovable foundation of his own will. The animals, also which are upon it, he commanded by his own word into existence. So, likewise, when he had formed the sea, and the living creatures which are in it, he enclosed them within their proper bounds by his own power. Above all, with his holy and undefiled hands he formed man."—P. 30.

"How blessed and wonderful, beloved, are the gifts of God! Life in immortality, splendour in righteousness, truth in perfect confidence, faith in assurance, self-control

in holiness! And all these fall under the cognizance of understanding [now]. What then shall those things be which are prepared for such as wait for Him? The Creator and Father of all worlds, the Most Holy, alone knows their amount and their beauty."—Pp. 31, 32.

Does Concord furnish anything better than that? It is Pantheism, you say. It is Christian theism in the first century, uttering itself in majestic tones fit to be matched with the anthems of the last investigation.

So spoke Clement, and he is a pupil of Paul, and is to be interpreted in part by his master; and, if you put Paul and Clement together, the meaning of one and of the other is doubly clear, as is the light in two mirrors when they face each other.

Old Rome is alive. When I entered for the first time the Eternal City, I purposely came in by the last light of day and under the earliest stars. I took pains not to meet at first with anything inartistic or trivial. I put myself in a carriage, and kept my eyes inside of it until I reached my rooms, and next morning kept my eyes inside a carriage until I was in presence of the Coliseum. That was the first object I saw in Rome. Mrs. Browning's words were constantly in my thoughts:

> "And the mountains in disdain
> Gather back their lights of opal,
> From the dumb despondent plain,
> Heaped with jaw-bones of a people."

Cæsar and Antony were near, and Cicero, and Sallust, and Horace, and Virgil, and Cato, and Seneca, and Nero, and the rest. After days and weeks of trance, I obtained a better historic sense. Suddenly, among the marbles in St. Clement's Church, I remembered Mrs. Browning's other words:

> "Cæsar's work is all undone."

But Clement's is not; Peter's not; Paul's not. The feet of these men, too, fell on the seven hills, and their work endures. In the Catacombs the gray crypts of volcanic stone seemed to be the nursery of America, because the cradle of Christianity when it was preparing to ascend that throne of the Cæsars from which it has not yet come down. When in the Coliseum at midnight and in the Forum at noon, the tallest of the historic forms that filled the living air seemed to be those of the Christian martyrs, for they have ruled the world as Cæsar has not. In the Coliseum I came at last to understand Richter's words: "Here coiled the giant snake five times about Christianity. But the Serpent and the bear crouch. Broken asunder are the gigantic spokes of the wheel which once the stream of the ages drove."* In the azure lights of the outer and inner sky the wheel of the universe moves on without variableness in its motion or shadow of change.

Was the Holy Spirit to the Early Christians present Christ?

To them was God as three and one, omnipresent in natural law?

All history since the Ascension proclaims that the Holy Spirit breathed out to-day is one with that which eighteen hundred and a few years ago was breathed upon the disciples with the words "Receive ye the Holy Ghost."

THE LIBRARY OF THE

* Titan.

MAR 4 1932

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA
3 0112 064597369